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It is difficult today to imagine that scarcely thirteen years ago
the subject of search and seizure by state police had received scant
judicial attention. When these police practices were scrutinized at
all it was generally in civil actions instituted by the aggrieved, not
in criminal justice administration.' There is, in fact, nothing inher-
ent in the fourth amendment2 which would forecast that its growth
and application should occur peculiarly within the sphere of the
criminal process. It could have, perhaps with less agonizing, contin-
ued to unfold as a tort doctrine. It may turn back in that direction
yet.'
The advent of the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States4
as the enforcement technique of the fourth amendment drew federal
police conduct under judicial scrutiny and commenced the experi-
ment which the Warren Court ultimately imposed on the states in
Mapp v. Ohio.' It signalled that search and seizure would hence-
forth evolve as a "criminal law" concept. Although Mapp indicated
* The author expresses grateful acknowledgement to Phillip B. Harrison for his invalua-
ble research assistance and to Wayne R. LaFave whose excellent article, Search and Seizure:
The Course of True Law. .. Has Not. . . Run Smooth, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255 (1966), formed
the conscious, and, I am sure, subconscious foundation for this piece.
1. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961).
2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched,and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1970) (Burger, J., dissent-
ing).
4. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
5. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Berner: Search and Seizure: Status and Methodology
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1974
472 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the Court was not reluctant to assume a more active role in state
criminal justice matters, the decisions in Ker v. California6 and
Aguilar v. Texas,7 holding that the standards of "probable cause"
and "reasonableness" developed by federal courts were constitu-
tionally mandated and thus applicable to the states, augured a swift
and total federalization of this major aspect of state police practice.
The development of a set of legal principles through the vehicle
of criminal cases is usually rapid and tortured-rapid due to the
sheer number of such cases and the minimal marginal cost and
effort of interposing additional theories of prosecution or defenise,
and tortured because the freedom of a man and the potential free-
dom and safety of others is almost always at stake. In the adminis-
tration of the exclusionary rule, another element adds to the judicial
agony-when the rule is successfully invoked it results, of course, in
the exclusion of relevant, often crucial, evidence. The theory,
clearly, is that the value of the general deterrence exceeds the value
of admitting unlawfully seized evidence in any given case. Those
who administer the rule, however, do not uniformly assess the wis-
dom of this trade-off, which is understandable: one result is visible,
the other speculative.'
Regardless of one's political opinion as to the direction the War-
ren Court traveled, one must marvel at the distance. And almost
before the contours of that development could be assessed, the
Burger Court has begun the process of retrenchment. Whether this
ultimately remains an encirclement of Warren Court decisions or
becomes a disassembling process is speculative, but it seems rela-
tively certain that this Court, no less than the last, will be active in
this sphere.
PURPOSE
The thrust of all this is not to trigger an evaluation of past
decisions or predictions of the future. but to illustrate why a working
knowledge of search and seizure law today is so elusive. The explo-
sive development and uncertain future in the area often intimidates
those who seek to learn, to practice or, if confessions are in order,
6. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
7. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
8. See generally La Fave, Search and Seizure: The Course of True Law . . . Has Not
Run Smooth, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255 (1966) [hereinafter cited as LaFave].
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to teach in this area. Not only is the case material voluminous, but
search and seizure cases have a marked tendency to collide with no
apparent injuries. The concepts of "probable cause," "reasonable-
ness," "warrant" or "warrantless" searches seem to present endless
permutations. Research in a search and seizure problem too often
assumes characteristics of crime investigation in which many auspi-
cious leads untimately prove fruitless.
This piece is intended to serve three limited ends: (1) to sum-
marize the current status of the law of arrest, search and seizure,
and to identify potential trends; (2) to offer some of the leading
rationales often urged for either side in the continuing tension be-
tween the needs for law enforcement and for individual privacy;9
and (3) to place the law and its rationale within a methodology
calculated to render solution of fourth amendment cases more or-
derly. It is hoped such methodology will enable the reader quickly
to isolate the cases and theories apposite to a given fact situation.
Since the main intent is not to argue for any particular position,
an attempt has been made to remain objective in reporting the
various theories involved. In many cases, however, the attempt has
been largely unsuccessful due to hopeless addiction to certain essen-
tially political beliefs.
METHODOLOGY
The method of attack, stated briefly, is a series of questions to
be answered or avoided depending on the answers to prior questions.
Outlined, the process is as follows:
I. Does the subject police conduct constitute a search? If
not, there is no fourth amendment violation. If so, proceed
to II.
II. Did "probable cause" for such search exist? If so, pro-
ceed to III. If not, proceed to V.
III. Was the search conducted pursuant to a valid
warrant? If so, valid search. If not, proceed to IV.
IV. Does the case fit an exception to the warrant
requirement? If so, valid search. If not, proceed to V.
9. The word "reasonable" in the fourth amendment is crucial as it permits the courts
to conduct a balancing process. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 378 U.S. 523, 536-37
(1967).
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V. Does the case fit an exception to the probable cause
requirement?'0 If so, valid search. If not, invalid search.
When following this process, two crucial major premises must
be kept in mind. First, when any police conduct is based in whole
or part on past police conduct, the earlier conduct itself must be
valid. For example, assume a police officer views contraband mate-
rial within a house, incorporates such information into a warrant
and pursuant thereto searches the house and seizes the evidence.
The search pursuant to the warrant appears to be valid under III.
However, since the "probable cause" which underlies the warrAnt
is based on prior police conduct, that conduct itself must first be
examined through the same process. If the initial observation con-
stituted an invalid search, its fruits may not form any necessary
component of a subsequent search."
Second, although the state must show a lawful basis for the
search free from prior unlawful conduct, it need show only one such
lawful basis. For instance, assume an officer with probable cause to
search an automobile obtains a formally defective warrant. The
failure of the warrant requires a negative answer to III, and yet the
search may be valid under IV pursuant to a well-recognized warrant
exception relating to automobiles. 2 This would result even had the
officer subjectively relied on the warrant as indispensable to a valid
search. A search, therefore, cannot be dismissed as invalid until
every possible basis is excluded.
Certain threshold problems are outside the scope of this article.
The presence of the requisite state action and the defendant's stand-
ing to challenge the subject police action are presumed. 3
10. Since the fourth amendment in part provides ". . . no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause .... " it would seem initially that only warrantless searches could
qualify under Section V. This is true when "probable cause" is given its traditional meaning
as described infra in Section II. Recentlv. however, the Conrt hqq fn~ind, in tflip Pdm inra te
search area, that "probable cause" in a different sense may exist for a search. Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967). The term "probable cause" in the headings for
Sections II and V is employed in its traditional sense. The administrative search cases are
an exception to "probable cause" in that sense.
11. See United States v. Soviero, 357 F. Supp. 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
12. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). The Court, after striking down
search warrants, considered whether the searches could be upheld under a warrant exception.
13. On the standing issue, see Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Alderman
v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); and Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
[Vol. 8
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I. DOES THE SUBJECT POLICE CONDUCT CONSTITUTE A
SEARCH?
Anterior to inquiries about the "reasonableness" of, or "proba-
ble cause" for, a search is the question of whether the conduct in
issue can be characterized as a search at all. Clearly not all police
observation or surveillance need be tested against the fourth amend-
ment.
A. THE BASIC TEST-Katz v. United States
The fourth amendment guarantees the people's right to be se-
cure in their "persons, houses, papers and effects." This language
may be viewed either as establishing a certain broad sense of pri-
vacy illustrated by example or as setting forth a finite set of catego-
ries within which police cannot intrude. Until 1967, the Court acted
primarily on the latter assumption and, since the constitutional
words revolved around property concepts, the decisions did like-
wise. 4
14. There were, to be sure, cases earlier than Katz which dealt in broader terms with
the concept of "search," e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962); yet in Katz, for the
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While the residence structure itself is clearly covered by the
fourth amendment,' 5 the Court held that "open fields" were not
included in "house" even though such fields formed a portion of the
homestead tract owned by defendant. 6 Later decisions held open
land to be protected if within the "curtilage" of the dwelling house."
Similarly, the nature of police intrusion was governed by prop-
erty principles. Placing a listening device in one's home was consid-
ered a "search," but if the device were placed outside the subject
area to monitor conversations within, there was no "trespass" and
hence no "search."' 8
Against this backdrop came Katz v. United States.'" FBI
agents, with probable cause to suspect Katz of gambling violations,
but without a warrant, placed a "bug" on the top of a public tele-
phone booth from which Katz was placing a call. So completely
intertwined with property concepts had search law become, that
petitioner formulated the issues to the Supreme Court as follows:
A. Whether a public telephone booth is a constitutionally
protected area so that evidence obtained by attaching an
electronic listening recording device to the top of such a
booth is obtained in violation of the right to privacy of the
user of the booth.
B. Whether physical penetration of a constitutionally
protected area is necessary before a search and seizure can
be said to be violative of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution."°
The Court expressed surprise at "the misleading way the issues have
been formulated" indicating that "the correct solution to Fourth
first time, the Court espoused a definitive test for searches not based on traditional property
concepts.
eek -;.± Unte SlfI ta tusL , 2.2. U.S. 3.35 ('19114).
16. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
17. The "curtilage" at common law was that portion of the "mansion house" tract
included within a fence, though later it included all portions which would be included within
a reasonable fencing. "Curtilage" had significant application in the common law of burglary
to define "dwelling house." See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 712
(1972). Suffice it to say that the word "curtilage" imports an area so closely connected in
space and function with a building as to be considered part and parcel thereof.
18. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
19. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
20. Id. at 349-50.
[Vol. 8
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Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted by incantation of
the phrase 'constitutionally protected area.' "I' Whether or not the
parties were entirely to blame for this incantation, the Court was
prepared to announce a radical departure from the property-
centered approach to the demarcation of the outer periphery of
"searching." The Court in Katz began to read the fourth amend-
ment as importing only a sense of what conduct is prohibited, and
declared "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."2 In
discounting the necessity of trespass, the Court held that the gov-
ernment had intruded upon the privacy on which Katz "justifiably
relied."23 This test, often phrased as a "reasonable expectation of
privacy,"2 4 today constitutes the central inquiry in determining
whether police conduct is a "search." Mr. Justice Harlan's concur-
ring opinion immediately challenged the workability of the major-
ity's test.
As the Court's opinion states, "the Fourth Amendment.pro-
tects people, not places." The question, however, is what
protection it affords to those people. Generally, as here, the
answer to that question requires reference to a "place."2
He then acknowledged that the majority had propounded a two-fold
requirement-that the expectation of privacy be (1) "actual"
(subjective) and (2) "reasonable" when measured against contem-
porary societal values (objective).2 Stated another way, there must
be an expectation, and the expectation must be justifiable.
Although Katz does not obviate the necessity to evaluate a
"place," it does broaden the inquiry to places not expressly stated
in the fourth amendment. Indeed, the fluid approach in Katz may
justify the substitution of "context" for "place."
Katz introduces another variable into the formula for delineat-
ing the outer limits of the fourth amendment. The government
argued that since the telephone booth was made of glass, petitioner
21. Id. at 350.
22. Id. at 351.
23. Id. at 353.
24. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
25. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
26. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring). Since "society's" evaluation of "reasonableness" is
difficult to ascertain, this requirement will ultimately depend on the courts' evaluation of
"reasonableness."
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should not have considered it a private place. The Court recognized
that Katz had "sought to exclude" not the "intruding eye" but the
"uninvited ear."27 The implication is that visual observation of Katz
in the phone booth was not a "search" since he entertained no
justifiable expectation not to be viewed, but only from being
overheard.2"
One should firmly keep in mind that a finding of "justifiable
expectation of privacy" in a given place at a given time does not
mean that the police may not invade such place. It means only that
if they do they are conducting a "search" and all searches must be
reasonable. Conversely, if the subject police conduct is not a search,
it is irrelevant to fourth amendment concerns that such conduct is
unreasonable.
B. JUSTIFIABLE EXPECTATION
Katz, then, suggests that courts should assess fact situations in
this area by reference to:
1) the "place" or context into which the police intrude;
2) the nature of the actual intrusion;
3) the defendant's subjective expectation of privacy in
such place from such intrusion;
4) the reasonableness of such expectation in accordance
with societal norms.
Several post-Katz cases in state and lower federal courts have dealt
with situations in which the defendant exhibited a surrender of his
expectation of privacy and several have turned on the type of intru-
sion involved where the intrusion was unforeseeable, or even bi-
zarre. 9 Most, however, focus on elements (1) and (2). The threshold
question, then, is: In a given place, does a person have a justifiable
expectation of privacy? The primary organizing focus is still
"places."
27. Id. at 352.
28. What if a policeman, watching Katz, had read his lips? It would seem since the
intrusion is visual, it should not be considered a search. Perhaps the case of seeing what one
says is similar to hearing what one does, as where an officer hears sounds emanating from a
dwelling indicating that evidence is being destroyed. In those cases even though the officer
may not have been initially permitted to enter, when he obtains a "plain hear" prior to
physical intrusion, such may not be considered a search.
29. See subsections I C and I D infra.
[Vol. 8
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1. "Houses," the "Curtilage," "Open Fields"
It is indisputable that absent unusual circumstances physical
intrusion into the home is a search, just as it was prior to Katz.3 0
So strong is the protection in this area that one court holds it to
survive substantial destruction of the home by fire."' The only deci-
sion treating police entry into a house as less than a "search" in-
volved a delinquent tenant who, the Court held, had abandoned the
house's protection notwithstanding some residual rights under state
property law."
The "open-field" doctrine of Hester v. United States33 has, sur-
prisingly, retained vitality in the wake of Katz. In Saiken v.
Bensinger4 the police, acting on a tip, dug up several sections of
defendant's twenty-acre farm looking for a buried body. The Sev-
enth Circuit remanded for a determination of "distances between
the various structures and the location of the body, the occupancy
of buildings and trailers" 35 evidencing a clear adhesion to the "curti-
lage" concept. Similarly, the Fourth Circuit held the entrance of
AFT officers onto defendant's land on an investigatory mission not
a search, stating:
[Ilt is a bit disquieting that we must countenance federal
snooping around farmers' barns as a legitimate investiga-
tive technique. There must surely be a better way than
Hester-type trespass but it is not readily discerned in light
of the strict standards for the issuance of search warrants
36
This apologetic application of Hester imports a tacit assumption
that it survived Katz intact. It is curious that the Court did not
inquire as to whether society sympathizes with one's expectation of
privacy to his entire homestead tract without reference to the "cur-
tilage."
It is interesting to note that courts have generally been careful
30. United States v. Matlock, 94 S. Ct. 988 (1974); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443 (1971).
31. People v. Dajnowicz, 43 Mich. App. 465, 204 N.W.2d 281 (1973).
32. United States v. Wilson, 472 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1973).
33. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
34. 489 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1973).
35. Id. at 868-69.
36. United States v. Brown, 487 F.2d 208, 210 (4th Cir. 1973).
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to apply the Katz analysis to "places" which, because of the strict
reading of the fourth amendment prior to Katz, had never been
thought of as private, but at the same time to adhere closely to pre-
Katz decisions which defined "house" at a time when that defini-
tion was considered crucial.
2. Other "Private" Places
In addition to homes, offices37 and hotel rooms" are places
where one's expectation of privacy is clearly justifiable. Automo-
biles, except where the intrusion amounts to no more than looking
through windows or examining the exterior for identification pur-
poses,39 are likewise given protection in this sphere.4"
Certain areas are within the fourth amendment's protection
because they are inherently private. Thus, intrusion into a woman's
purse has been deemed a search,4' presumably both because it is an
extension of the person and because, like a man's pocket, it is a
traditional receptacle for highly personal items. Similarly, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court recently held a public restroom stall to be a
place "which is ordinarily understood to afford personal privacy to
individual occupants."42 Testimony indicated that police had often
secreted themselves in the plumbing access room to view suspected
criminal activity within stalls. The court expressed shock that "pri-
vate parts and bodily functions are being exposed to the gaze of the
law"43 on mere suspicion. While hallways and semi-public buildings
such as office buildings or apartments are generally not "protected
places," the actual pattern of usage may render them so.44
37. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
38. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964). Likewise as to a room in a boarding house,
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
39. United States v. Powers, 439 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1971); United States v. Polk, 433
F 9d A4 (5th C'ir 1)701): Un t d qff.Q, nhn.-n, A1 F 9,1 139 (Ath Cir. 1Qr9, -,'d, Al
F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1970).
40. See cases collected in United States v. Powers, 439 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1971).
41. State v. Hough, - Mont. __, 516 P.2d 613 (1973).
42. People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 2d 884, 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973).
43. Id. at -, 506 P.2d at 238, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
44. Thus, in State v. DiBartelo, __ La. -, 376 So.2d 291 (1973), the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that the hallways of an apartment building were protected since all
tenants were issued keys to an outside door which was kept locked and since the hallways
were used to gain access to common bathroom facilities.
[Vol. 8Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 [1974], Art. 1
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Other "places," however, generate closer questions of societally
authorized expectations of privacy. Three state supreme courts have
addressed the issue of whether one retains a reasonable expectation
of privacy in materials discarded in trash containers. Arizona re-
fused such protection declaring that the action of discarding mate-
rial constitutes an abandonment." Alaska reached the same result
but there were indications in that case that defendant had evi-
denced a total lack of subjective expectation of privacy." Only Cali-
fornia has recognized a justifiable expectation of privacy in trash
"at least . ..until the trash has lost its identity and .meaning by
becoming part of a large conglomeration of trash elsewhere." 4 ' While
this decision rested in part on the ground the trash can was within
the "curtilage," language in the opinion and a more recent case4"
make it clear that an expectation of privacy in trash stands on its
own. Even though discarding trash may be an abandonment of
property rights, such fact is not, since Katz, dispositive of the pri-
vacy issue. It is not at all inconsistent to suggest that an individual
may no longer desire to possess property yet desire also that others
do not rummage through what he discards.
Several cases have held that it is not reasonable for a prisoner
to consider his cell private. In Lanza v. New York, decided prior to
Katz, the Supreme Court said:
[I]t is obvious that a jail shares none of the attributes of
privacy of a house, an automobile, an office, or a hotel
room. In prison, official surveillance has traditionally been
the order of the day.4"
This language would appear to survive Katz, and one circuit has so
held."
C. THE NATURE OF THE INTRUSION
Katz suggests that the "reasonable expectation" issue may
depend in certain instances on the intrusion actually suffered. As
police activity moves from casual observation toward elaborate
45. State v. Fassler, 108 Ariz. 586, 503 P.2d 807 (1972).
46. Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1973).
47. People v. Edwards, 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 458 P.2d 713, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
48. People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971).
49. 370 U.S. 139 (1962).
50. United States v. Hitchcock, 467 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1972).
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prying, society becomes more sensitive to matters of privacy. This
principle has been recognized both in visual observation and audi-
tory intrusion.
1. Visual Searches
In determining whether visual observation constitutes a search,
courts have looked to two variables as organizing principles-(1) the
extent of police effort and ingenuity necessary to obtaining the de-
sired view and (2) the presence or absence of artificial devices to aid
in observation.
It must be recognized initially, however, that the range of cases
in which such considerations become necessary is narrow. In certain
areas the most elaborate kind of investigation is not a search, and
in others, the most casual glance is. For example, digging large
sections of earth in an attempt to locate a buried body certainly
seems to be "searching." When the entire process occurs in an "open
field," however, it is not so considered-not because "looking" and
"digging" is not "searching," but because the place is not entitled
to fourth amendment protection.-' On the other hand, a policeman
in a private home who casually observes contraband in "plain view"
on a tabletop is engaged in a search-not because an inadvertent
glance is necessarily searching, but because both the policeman
and the contraband are within a clearly protected area.12 It is, then,
only in that range of cases in which the expectation of privacy is
neither clearly reasonable nor clearly unreasonable that the form of
intrusion may be significant. The most prevalent type of such situa-
tion involves a policeman standing in an "unprotected area" looking
into a "protected area."
In United States v. Hanahan,0 police officers, investigating a
tip that a garage was being used for a "cut-shop," and standing
either on a public alley or an adjacent unfenced apron, observed
an automobile. The court noted that "the interior of the garage was
clearly visible through the open overhead door from the outside of
51. See note 34 supra.
52. The validity of this "plain view" observation will depend on whether the policeman
has violated the defendant's fourth amendment rights by being in the house in the first place.
See Section V G infra for discussion of the "plain view" doctrine.
53. 442 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1971).
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the building" 4 and concluded that any expectation of privacy would
thus be unreasonable. Lorenzana v. Superior Court" involved a po-
lice officer standing on a strip of land not open to the public, peering
into defendant's home through a two-inch gap between the window
shade and sill. The officer testified that he could see nothing until
he pressed to within "five or six inches" of the window. The Court
held such activity a "search," noting that nothing in the topography
or function of the area would "lead the public to within six inches
of the window.""6 More important, however, the Court characterized
the police action as "spying" since it required such precise position-
ing and concluded:
Surely our state and federal Constitution and the cases
interpreting them foreclose a regression into an Orwellian
society in which a citizen, in order to preserve a modicum
of privacy, would be compelled to encase himself in a light-
tight, air-proof box. The shadow of 1984 has fortunately not
yet fallen upon us.57
This language suggests that the same result may be reached
even were the window located on a public sidewalk. Although it is
foreseeable that the public would pass the window, the expectation
that no one would go through the requisite gyrations in order to see
in is arguably justifiable. In Cohen v. Superior Court ,5 a police
officer looked into defendant's fourth-floor apartment from the fire
escape. The Court remanded for a consideration of "the customary
use or non-use of the fire-escape platforms for purposes other than
emergency escape," indicating that such facts bore heavily on the
reasonableness of any expectation of privacy. 59
The use of artificial devices to aid in observation tends to ele-
vate the intrusiveness of police observation. The use of a flashlight,
telescope or binoculars in a borderline situation may be crucial.
However, courts have not consistently treated such artificial means
as relevant. For example, in connection with flashlights, the Fifth
Circuit has stated categorically that "the use of a flashlight does not
54. Id. at 653.
55. 9 Cal. 3d. 626, 511 P.2d 33, 108 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973).
56. Id. at , 511 P.2d at 36, 108 Cal.Rptr. at 588.
57. Id. at -, 511 P.2d at 41, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
58. 5 Cal. App. 3d 429, 85 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1970).
59. Id. at -, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
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transmute what would be plain view in daytime to a search."6
Conversely, Judge Skelley Wright has observed, "certainly a flash-
light is not standard equipment for 'any curious passerby' ."..61
Because Katz essentially posits a balancing test, which leaves
courts somewhat free to assign varying weights to the components
to be balanced, the decisions in this sphere are often difficult to
reconcile. For example, a federal court has held that officers viewing
and photographing marijuana growing in defendant's yard from a
neighbor's porch were not conducting a search notwithstanding evi-
dence indicating that the officer had to stand on his toes or a box
or lean "around the side of the partition" to see the marijuana
growing "in plain view" behind a stake fence "approximately six
feet in height and overgrown with vines and bushes."62 A California
court, however, has held that an officer who squeezed between de-
fendant's fence and an acquiescing neighbor's garage to view grow-
ing marijuana was conducting an unreasonable search without the
necessity of reaching the added fact that the police used a tele-
scope. 3
The endless possibilities of such factual settings and varying
reactions of courts makes it difficult to evaluate the status of the
law in this area in any way other than highlighting the types of
factors the court may include in the balance. To say that a person
entertains a reasonable expectation of privacy compels the question:
"From whom?" At the extremes, case law demonstrates a citizen
must protect himself from the inadvertent gaze of the policeman
just "passing by" but not from one whose activities would pierce all
but the "light-tight air-proof box." Perhaps it is not too cavalier to
suggest that one need protect his privacy from the reasonably zeal-
ous policeman.
2. Auditory Searches
Although the rule of Katz applies to all types of intrusive con-
duct, the fact that it involved a listening and recording device gave
it a more concrete impact in the "auditory search" sphere, seriously
calling into question a number of prior court decisions.
60. Marshall v. United States, 422 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1970).
61. See L. HALL, Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 54
(Supp. 1973).
62. United States v. McMillon, 350 F. Supp. 593 (D.D.C. 1972).
63. People v. Fly, __ Cal. App. 3d __, 110 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1973).
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a. The "Misplaced Belief" Cases
The decision in Katz called into question the continued validity
of three earlier cases dealing with auditory intrusion-Hoffa v.
United States, 4 Lopez v. United States5 and On Lee v. United
States."
In Hoffa, Partin, a government agent, had managed to become
a trusted associate of defendant and was therefore privy to a number
of incriminating statements made during those conversations by
Hoffa and others. The Court held that even though some of these
conversations took place in a "protected place" (hotel room), the
agent's listening did not constitute a search. Defendant, said the
Court, "was not relying on the security of his hotel suite" vis-A-vis
Partin, but on a "misplaced belief" that Partin would not reveal the
statements. 7 Quoting an earlier decision, the Court concluded:
The risk of being overheard by an eavesdropper or betrayed
by an informer or deceived as to the identity of one with
whom one deals is probably inherent in the condition of
human society. It is the kind of risk we assume whenever
we speak. 8
In Lopez, decided before Hoffa, the government agent in which
defendant misplaced reliance was wearing a device which recorded
defendant's incriminating statements. The Court held the use of
such device was not "eavesdropping" or a "search" since it did not
permit the government to hear anything it "could not otherwise
have heard."69
In On Lee a government agent and former employee of defen-
dant spoke with him at his laundry. The agent wore a microphone
which transmitted the conversation to another agent, Lawrence Lee,
stationed outside the laundry. Lee testified to what he had heard.
The Court noted that defendant was "talking confidentially and
indiscreetly with one he trusted, and . . . was overheard."7 The
64. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
65. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
66. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
67. 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).
68. Id. at 303.
69. 373 U.S. 427, 440 (1963).
70. 343 U.S. 747, 753-54 (1952).
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case is substantially different from Hoffa, since the crucial intru-
sion was not committed by the "trusted" person, but by another in
whose discretion defendant placed no trust. The Court, notwith-
standing a constructive trespass by Lee through the device, rea-
soned that the use of the device had "the same effect on
[defendant's] privacy as if [agent Lee] had been eavesdropping
outside an open window."7' The Court analogized use of listening
devices to sight-aiding devices and concluded: "The use of bifocals,
field glasses or the telescope to magnify the object of a witness's
vision is not a forbidden search or seizure, even if they focus without
his knowledge or consent upon what one supposes to be private
indiscretions."" Finally, the Court held that labelling eavesdrop-
ping a "search" was a "farfetched analogy."73
One could reasonably have inferred after Katz that On Lee and
Lopez had no vitality and that Hoffa was questionable authority.
However, in United States v. White,74 the Court held that all had
survived Katz.
Katz involved no revelation to the Government by a party
to conversations with the defendant nor did the Court indi-
cate in any way that a defendant has a justifiable and con-
stitutionally protected expectation that a person with
whom he is conversing will not then or later reveal the
conversation to the police.75
Having thus reaffirmed the basic underpinning of Hoffa, the Court
continued:
If the law gives no protection to the wrongdoers whose
trusted accomplice is or becomes a police agent, neither
should it protect him when the same agent has recorded or
transmitted the conversations .... 76
The results of On Lee and Lopez were therefore reaffirmed. Now,
hIuweveI, iIey do not kest on tLe niu'trespassory nature of the intru-
sion, since Katz clearly buried that distinction, but rest instead on
71. Id. at 754.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
75. Id. at 749.
76. Id. at 752.
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the,"misplaced belief" rationale of Hoffa.
In one sense this reasoning is at odds with Katz's recognition
that an expectation of privacy in a given place may be reasonable
vis-A-vis one intrusion but not another. Had Katz been overheard
by a policeman standing outside the phone booth, rather than by a
"bug," or if the case turned on what someone saw inside the glass
phone booth, the considerations would have been much different.
It is possible, though, that the nature of the intrusion is deemed
important only when it bears on the extent of intrusion, The extent
of intrusion in White is greater than that in Hoffa only in the sense
that the conversation is memorialized in a more trustworthy way.
The agent listening to the transmissions hears no more than the
agent physically present. The same would not be true of a device
which magnifies a sound the naked governmental ear cannot hear.
To analogize to visual searches, binoculars, telescopes and flash-
lights all augment the ability to see and therefore intrude more than
the naked eye. A camera does not-it merely makes permanent the
scene visible by the naked eye. Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in
White, however, felt it was this very infallibility of recording devices
which increased the intrusiveness of the government's activities:
Were third-party bugging a prevalent practice, it might
well smother that spontaneity-reflected in frivolous, im-
petuous, sacrilegious, and defiant discourse-that liberates
daily life."
The Ninth Circuit has extended the White rationale to a nonwar-
rant wiretap with the consent of one party to the conversation."
These extensions of Hoff a appear to wrench it off its base. Hoffa
rests on the proposition that the risk of placing confidence in the
wrong persons is one "we necessarily assume whenever we speak.""
Thus, an expectation that he will not later report such conversation
is not justifiable. These later cases are built on a premise, if only
tacit, that persons have no justifiable expectation that any given
conversation is not being recorded or intercepted. It is hoped that
our society has not reached the point where such risks are "necessar-
ily assumed whenever we speak."
77. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 787 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
78. Holmes v. Burr, 486 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1973).
79. 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966).
19741
Berner: Search and Seizure: Status and Methodology
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1974
490 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
b. Eavesdropping
Less frequently, cases arise in which no party to a conversation
is participating in any way for the police, but such conversation is
"overheard." The relevant considerations in such cases should be
essentially the same as those in the visual search area. In United
States v. Fisch,s' agents checked into a motel room adjoining the
defendant's and listened at the connecting door. In holding such
activity was not a search, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that the
conversation became "loud and heated" and could be heard from
the middle of the adjoining room. The court held that any expecta-
tion, even if actually entertained, is outweighed by the "public in-
terest in law enforcement," and therefore not justifiable. 2 Finally,
the court advanced a "total atmosphere" approach in which the
following factors are to be considered:
1) the place
2) the presence or absence of "trespass"
3) the presence or absence of artificial means of probing
4) the gravity of the offense13
5) the type of information received from the surveil-
lance."4
Thus, "reasonable expectation" is the most prevalent factor in the
Katz inquiry, although other factors have played a major role as
well.
D. SUBJECTIVE EXPECTATION
There have been very few post-Katz cases decided on the ab-
sence of actual or subjective expectation of privacy, though courts
have occasionally urged such as alternative grounds.8 5 This lack of
80. It is clear that electronic eavesdropping, in the absence of consent which may trigger
the "misplaced belief" exception, is a "search" and therefore subject to the fourth amend-
men. Katz v. United btates, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); United States v. Kahn, 94 S. Ct. 977 (1974).
To be "reasonable" such searches must be conducted only upon probable cause and, with
few exceptions, pursuant to search warrant or court order.
81. 474 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1973).
82. Id. at 1077.
83. See Section I E 1 infra criticizing the inclusion of this factor in any Katz inquiry.
84. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that the fruits of a search cannot be
used to justify the search. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). It follows
that the fruits of police conduct should not be referred to in determining whether conduct is
a "search."
85. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1973).
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case law is understandable both because most people depend on
privacy and because the absence of an expectation which society
deems reasonable is very much like a waiver since the individual has
a right to privacy yet surrenders it. Without clearly so expressing,
courts appear to indulge the presumption that an individual may
expect privacy in any context in which society would deem that
expectation reasonable. It would seem that evidence of affirmative
surrender should be required. Since the reported cases all deal, of
course, with an individual who "had something to hide," it is not
surprising that such surrender cannot normally be demonstrated.
E. THE OVERLAP OF Katz AND OTHER ISSUES
Courts have tended to confuse the Katz issue with several other
search and seizure concepts which are referable to different inter-
ests. All of these conflicts present conceptual difficulties, but one in
particular, which is dealt with first, by focusing on irrelevant con-
siderations, tends to yield improper results.
1. Degree of Suspicion
Several courts have considered the degree of suspicion an
important variable in the expectation issue.86 This reasoning mis-
places the emphasis. Degree of suspicion, more particularly con-
cepts of "probable cause," "reasonable suspicion," "clear indica-
tion" and others, is often relevant in assessing the reasonableness
of a search. The need to intrude increases with the probability of
criminal enterprise and thus becomes more reasonable. Most search
and seizure cases therefore focus on police conduct. Katz does not.
It deals with a question wholly from the standpoint of the defen-
dant-what was his expectation of privacy and was it justifiable.
One's expectation of privacy is not a function of his innocence and
to suggest that society's recognition of his expectation depends on
his suspiciousness is very much like saying that certain rights
should not be extended to "guilty" persons. Even insofar as Katz
suggests examination of the nature of the intrusion, it does not
suggest that the reasonableness of such intrusion is relevant but
only its foreseeability-again an approach through the eyes of the
defendant. The confusion that must result from confusing the "rea-
86. United States v. Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1973); People v. Dumas, 9 Cal. 2d
871, 512 P.2d 1208, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1973).
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sonableness" of a search with the existence of a search is amply
demonstrated in People v. Dumas, in which the Court states: "Still
other sites [referring to "open fields"] are regarded as so public in
nature that searches are justifiable without any particular showing
of cause or exigency."" The choice of the noun "search" is illustra-
tive of the problem.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has suggested that the gravity of
the offense should be considered.88 It seems elementary that one's
right to privacy cannot depend on what it is he keeps private. 9
2. Third-Party Consent
The Illinois Supreme Court has recently held that the validity
of third-party consent to police intrusion should be judged by refer-
ence to the reasonable expectation of the defendant that such con-
sent would not be given.9 0 This application of Katz appears to be
superfluous and misleading. Theories of third-party consent,'
whether based on agency or control theories, revolve primarily
around issues of societally recognized expectations-e.g., one should
expect an agent to act in his absence, or one should expect that
persons with joint control may consent to certain intrusions. The
issue of a reasonable expectation of no consent is conceptually
inseparable from the validity of such consent. In addition to being
no more helpful in solving problems than traditional consent rules,
the use of Katz in this context presents an additional problem. For
example, assume a wife permitted the police to enter a closet she
shared with her husband. Under consent theories, this may be a
valid consent to a "search," but to argue that if the expectation of
nonconsent is unreasonable, there is no "search" being conducted
stretches that constitutional term beyond recognition.
3. Plain View
Casual observation by police in a public place has often been
up.l u dAerthe "plaii view ductrine.-- T here certainly is no need
87. 9 Cal. 2d 871, -, 512 P.2d 1208, 1216, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304, 312 (1973).
88. United States v. Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 1973).
89. In some situations, the "reasonableness" of a search may bear some relation to the
gravity of the offense being investigated. It is quite different, though, to suggest that one's
reasonable expectation of privacy depends on what he does in a "private place."
90. People v. Nunn, - Ill. 2d -, 304 N.E.2d 81 (1973).
91. See Section V B infra.
92. See Section V G infra.
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for a "doctrine" to explain the validity of such activity. "Plain
view" traditionally has arisen when the officer has already entered
a protected area. Such cases then turn on the validity of the officers'
presence in such place. If an officer sees contraband in "plain view"
on a bedroom nightstand, the validity of such discovery depends
primarily on the validity of his presence in the bedroom. If the entry
were unlawful, the fruits of such entry are excluded. When a police-
man opens a dresser drawer, the contents may be said to be in
"plain view," and yet this is hardly of the same mold as observing
the color or license number of an automobile on the street. Since the
"plain view" doctrine does nothing more than affirm that the use
of fruits of a search depend on its validity, it has no applicability
in a setting where no search is being conducted. In short, if a police-
man sees something in "plain view" in a public area, he has no need
of the "plain view" doctrine.
II. IS THERE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR SUCH SEARCH?
If the subject police conduct is not a "search," further scrutiny
is unnecessary for fourth amendment purposes. Once a "search" is
established, the next inquiry is into "probable cause." This is not
to say that the existence of probable cause is crucial to a valid
search; however, resolution of the probable cause question at this
stage will eliminate subsequent inquiry into irrelevant areas. For
example, if no probable cause exists, examining the formal require-
ments of any warrant, or searching for exceptions to the warrant
requirement would be fruitless-one need then only examine those
areas where probable cause is not essential to the validity of a
search.
The question "when does probable cause exist?" compels at
least three sub-questions.
A. WHAT MUST BE PROBABLE?
As a leading writer points out, the question of whether some-
thing is probable requires the anterior determination of what that
something is. 3 While the quantum and nature of components neces-
sary to make "probable cause" for arrest or search are nearly the
same, a given set of facts may render "probable cause" for one and
not the other. Basically the arrest question is "Has a crime been
93. LaFave, supra note 8, at 260-61.
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committed and has the arrestee committed it?" For a search, how-
ever, the question becomes, "Are the particular items sought suffi-
ciently connected with criminal activity, and are they to be found
in a particular place?" It must be noted that the latter inquiry does
not require identifying any particular person as the suspected of-
fender.94
B. How MUCH CAUSE TO BELIEVE IS "PROBABLE CAUSE" TO
BELIEVE?
Just as "reasonable men cannot agree on what is a reasonable
search,"95 neither can they propound a working definition of "proba-
ble" in probable cause. No cases, no attempted definitions, define
it; they only give a sense of what it is, helping us find it, but never
knowing exactly what it is we have found. The Supreme Court has
said that it exists when "facts and circumstances . . . [are] suffi-
cient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief that . . . ."" This indicates the type of person to whom a
thing must be probable, and as such is helpful, yet does nothing to
quantitate "probable." Nor do mathematical concepts such as
"more probable than not" or "50% or more probable" really explain
case results. Nothing indicates that "probable" is a word of art at
all-in fact, what one of "reasonable caution" in every day living
treats as "probable" may ultimately be the best explanation, with
one caveat. People tend to shade how "probable" is "probable
enough" in accordance with the consequences both good and bad
which are to follow from the determination. To drive downtown
believing a particular movie is "probably" showing differs from put-
ting one's hand on a transformer which is "probably" inoperative
both because the potential detriment is small in the one and final
in the other and because the utility in being entertained is less than
the utility of repairing essential equipment.9" Thus "probable
cause" is ultimately referable to the competition of the individual's
interest in being free of intrusion and society's interest in law en-
94. United States v. Kahn, 94 S. Ct. 977 (1974).
95. LaFave, supra note 8, at 255, quoting Thompson, Illinois Search and Seizure Law,
The New Treatise, 11 DEPAUL L. REV. 27, 27 (1961).
96. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
97. It may be argued that "probable" is the wrong word in the transformer case, that
"certain" would be more appropriate. Yet "certainty" in common usage is an amphibian as
well-we talk of things being "more" or "less" certain than others, indicating that the amount
of information we demand depends on what we plan to do with it.
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forcement and crime prevention, a competition which forms the
basis for the entire fourth amendment field.
Recognizing that these competing interests are at work influ-
encing "probable cause" lends understanding of why certain factors,
not really relating to "probability" in the strict sense, are deemed
relevant variables in determining "probable cause." Occassionally
courts refer to the relative gravity of an offense in determining the
existence of probable cause." In addition, there are sound indica-
tions that the intensity or duration of intrusion may bear on the
probable cause question. It is well settled that these types of factors
are to be utilized to determine "reasonableness" 99-but whether ar-
ticulated or not, they bear at least to some extent on the probable
cause question as well.
C. WHAT "FACTS" AND INFERENCES MAY BE USED TO SHOW
PROBABLE CAUSE?
Theoretically, when application for a search warrant is made,
the magistrate, from facts contained in the affidavit or given to him
orally, makes the probable cause judgment. In situations where no
warrant is obtained, the police make such judgment. In either case
the decision is reviewable through a motion to suppress. Such deci-
sion can be made only on (1) facts and (2) rational inferences there-
from.'1° "Conclusions" are improper unless based on facts known to
the decision-maker. The Supreme Court has held, for example the
statement that defendant was a "known bookmaker" cannot be
used in determining probable cause absent a showing of the facts
which make such status "known."' 01 However, an assertion that an
individual has been convicted before, or has a police record are
"facts" and may properly be used, in connection with other facts,
to establish probable cause.
The Supreme Court has demonstrated a very liberal attitude as
to the requirements of factual components which are examined in
98. See, e.g., People v. Morales, 22 N.Y.2d 55, 238 N.E.2d 307 (1968), rev'd and rem'd,
Morales v. New York, 396 U.S. 102 (1969).
99. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), discussed in Section V F infra, and
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), discussed in Section V D infra.
100. LaFave, supra note 8, at 259 n.40, quoting People v. Lavendowski, 329 Ill. 223, 160
N.E. 582 (1928).
101. Spinelli v. United States, 394 U.S. 410 (1969).
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connection with the probable cause question:
In dealing with probable cause, as the very name implies,
we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are
the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
act. 102
There seem to be only two types of facts which cannot be employed:
(1) facts having no probative value and (2) facts constituting fruits
of prior illegal police activity.'"3
Any untainted fact, then, which has any tendency to prove the
required conclusion may be used. The net effect of all such facts
must render the necessary conclusion "probable." It has been held,
for example, that reactions to police presence, such as fleeing or
"freezing," while certainly not enough in themselves, may, when
added to other facts, constitute probable cause for a search or ar-
rest.104 In addition, a policeman's expertise in making certain judg-
ments-such as smelling marijuana-is itself a conclusion and must
be based on facts, such as special schooling or extensive experience
in drug detection. °5 Certain types of facts, however, deserve special
consideration.
1. Hearsay
It is well settled that the police officer or magistrate may act
on evidence which would, at a trial, be inadmissible hearsay., 8 Nor
does the confrontation clause prohibit this.' 7 However, in accepting
a hearsay statement, facts must appear (and in the case of warrant
applications, facts must be given to the magistrate) establishing a
102. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1948).
103. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
104. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Santiago, 220 Pa. Super. 111, 283 A.2d 709 (1971);
Unitcd StatcG, 298 A.21 38 (D.C. Ct. 'pp. 1972),Sbv v. Nuw Yk,392
U.S. 40, 66 (1968); United States v. Peep, 490 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1974).
105. People v. Parisi, 46 Mich. App. 322, 208 N.W.2d 70 (1973).
106. Spinelli v. United States, 394 U.S. 410 (1969); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S.
307 (1959); United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
107. Confrontation need not occur at every point in the criminal process at which
evidence is utilized. It need occur, of course, at some point prior to conviction. See California
v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). Also, certain hearsay exceptions may obviate the need for
confrontation at any point. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
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foundation for the declarant's competency.' ° These facts may come
from other sources or the declarant himself. So if A tells the police,
"D possesses heroin," the statement contains no facts indicating A's
competency; but if A says "I saw D place heroin in his pocket,"
competency, for this purpose, is shown. In certain situations
hearsay-on-hearsay has been accepted when the competency of both
declarants is shown.'"9 A tells police, "B told me that he saw D place
heroin in his pocket." B is competent to state such because he
viewed it; A is competent to report B's statement because he heard
it. Recently, the Fifth Circuit accepted triple hearsay to aid in a
probable cause determination.10
2. Prior Police Record
It is well accepted that one who has committed crimes in the
past is more likely than one without a record to commit a crime in
the future. Yet evidence of past criminal conduct, even convictions,
is generally inadmissible at trial."' This is not due to a feeling that
it is not probative, but that its probative value is small compared
to the likelihood of prejudicial effect and misuse by the trier of fact.
Simply stated, while both hearsay and evidence of prior criminal
conduct have probative significance, jurors (and some judges) tend
to amplify that significance (1) by ignoring those factors which dim-
inish trustworthiness and (2) by drawing inferences which, because
they spring largely from emotion, are often illogical.
Why, then, may such information form the basis for probable
cause? Why is probable cause more like "practical considerations of
everyday life" than considerations which involve "legal techni-
cians?" The following factors, taken cumulatively, may explain this
attitude.
First, hearsay and prior police conduct are more dangerous in
a jury's hands than in a judge's. This clearly cannot suffice as the
sole basis since there is no general exception to hearsay testimony
at bench trials, although as a practical matter, much hearsay is
108. This is an outgrowth of the requirement of stating facts, not conclusions. The
prosecution must show a factual foundation for the belief that such statements are trustwor-
thy.
109. E.g., Commonwealth v. Eilers, 503 S.W.2d 724 (Ky. 1973).
110. United States v. Romano, 482 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1973).
111. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 572, 582 (1971).
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admitted at bench trials. The fact that afjudge, and not a jury, must
ultimately decide the existence of probable cause based on given
facts diminishes possibilities of abuse. It is true that police, in non-
warrant cases, make the probable cause determination initially, and
that police officers may tend to overweigh such facts; however, since
their judgment is subject to review by a judge, such a tendency
seems to argue more for the necessity of a warrant than for elimina-
tion of these types of facts in the probable cause determination.
Second, a primary objection to hearsay is the inability of the
defendant adequately to cross-examine a statement. In many states,
the defendant has no right to test any fact used in determining
probable cause or even directly to disprove them."' Hearsay in such
context presents no special deprivation as it does at trial.
Third, when hearsay or prior police records are introduced at
trial, there is a danger, notwithstanding limiting instructions, that
the jury (or judge) will include misuse of such information in finding
guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt." In such cases the defendant has
been deprived of the constitutional right to force the prosecution
through admissible evidence to carry its burden. In the case of hear-
say, the right to confrontation may be denied as well." 3 Evidence
utilized in determining probable cause, however, is not used to aid
"proof beyond a reasonable doubt," but only to search for evidence
which may in turn aid in the prosecution's burden. The Supreme
Court has held that the Constitution does not require a separate jury
determination of the constitutionality of police actions resulting in
obtaining evidence." 4 The defendant is entitled to demand only that
a jury find every element of a crime "beyond a reasonable doubt,"
and police conduct leading to evidence is not seen as such an ele-
ment, but only a preliminary step which does not form a part of the
prosecution's "case." In the same respect, a person tendering infor-
mation used to make out probable cause is not a "witness against"
the defendant since the testimonv is not used directly to provp the
case but only indirectly. Similarly, hearsay and even unconstitu-
tionally seized evidence, are admissible before a grand jury and a
judge at a preliminary hearing, since they lead to findings of proba-
112. See Section III B 4 infra.
113. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
114. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 488 (1971). See also United States v. Matlock,
94 S. Ct. 988 (1974).
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ble cause but do not directly influence the trial."5
3. The Unnamed Informant
A large segment of Supreme Court involvement with probable
cause has centered on the unnamed police informant. Many percep-
tive recent articles have examined this complex area;" 6 it is dealt
with here only briefly and only because it forms an important part
of the overall picture.
The Court has held that the interest in vigorous law enforce-
ment permits the prosecution, in most cases, to withhold the iden-
tity of one who supplies evidence used in reaching probable cause."'
This privilege prevents the "drying up" of police sources and insu-
lates the informant from feared retaliation, thus further motivating
disclosures. In a few cases, usually involving an informant who al-
legedly made a narcotics "buy," courts have held that due process
requires either disclosure at trial or dismissal."18 Recognizing the
wide application of the privilege, the Court in Aguilar v. Texas,"'
set forth guidelines for scrutinizing such "tips" in determining
probable cause. Simply stated, the affidavit must set forth facts
tending to show that the informant is (1) competent to make the
statements and (2) credible. The competency requirement is not
peculiar to informants-the value of any hearsay statement depends
in part on demonstrating a foundation. The informant is clearly
competent if he testifies to personal observation or to statements of
the suspect heard (or overheard) by him. Statements, other than by
the suspect, made to the informant are admissible only if facts
indicate the declarant, too, is competent and, if an unnamed in-
formant himself, credible.
The requisite credibility can be demonstrated in numerous
ways. By far the most common is the inclusion of the "fact" that
the informant has given information in the past which has proved
accurate.'20 Statements have been held credible if against the in-
115. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956) (grand juries). See also Lawn v.
United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958) and United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966) (prelimi-
nary hearings).
116. See, e.g., 28 BROOKLYN L. REv. 232 (1971) and 37 MISSOURi L. REv. 538 (1972).
117. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
118. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957). See also Commonwealth v. Ennis,
301 N.E.2d 589 (Mass. Ct. App. 1973).
119. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
120. The words "I have received information from an informant who has on many
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formant's penal interest, 2 ' or if the magistrate personally recollects
his past truthfulness.-' Of course, use of any statement by the in-
formant to the effect that he is trustworthy would be bootstrapping
at its worst.
An informant's tip satisfying the dual requirements of Aguilar
can, by itself, produce probable cause, provided of course the sub-
stance of the tip renders the required conclusion "probable." A tip
which taken independently falls short of Aguilar, however, may be
buttressed by independent corroborative facts which render it as
trustworthy as the uncorroborated tip which satisfies Aguilar. Sfich
corroborative facts may be used to buttress either the competency
or credibility requirements or both. These corroborative facts
usually take one of the following forms: (1) the police have verified
collateral statements by the informant;'23 (2) the special circum-
stance of the informant indicates he is credible (e.g., the Court in
United States v. Harris4 seemed to attach some significance to the
fact that the informant expressed fear for his life); (3) facts known
to the police square with the informant's information, even though
they do not verify it. In Harris, for example, an unnamed informant
was clearly competent (personal observation) but his credibility was
in question. The informant had made statements against his penal
interest, but the Court did not treat this as dispositive. Other facts
included in the warrant, however, demonstrated prior illegal con-
duct of the same character by the defendant. The Court held that
this tended to make the informant more credible. 5 When, in
"everyday life," one hears a statement which fits with information
already in his possession, the statement at least seems more trust-
worthy. Recently the Virginia Supreme Court held that tips from
two informants, each failing the Aguilar test, corroborated each
other's credibility under circumstances tending to show they were
unknown to each other. 2 6
Th spaat cedbiit rqurc 1n fr unnamedA1iV11k1
occasions supplied information which has proved to be accurate," or words to the same effect,
have become the litany of warrant affidavits.
121. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
122. United States v. Marihart, 472 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1972).
123. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
124. 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
125. Id. at 584.
126. Huff v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 710, 194 S.W.2d 690 (1973).
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arises partly because they remain anonymous but also because such
persons are often themselves from the "criminal milieu."'2 Courts,
therefore, have often relaxed the credibility requirement for so-
called "good citizen" informants who wish to remain anonymous.
The Seventh Circuit recently stated:
Various federal and state courts have distinguished the gov-
ernment informant considered in Aguilar and Spinelli from
the eyewitness, victim of a crime or a citizen who provides
information of a crime. These courts, while not overruling
the guidelines of Aguilar, have dispensed with specific alle-
gations of reliability or past reliable contact with the in-
formant, and inferred that reliability may be deducted
from the content of the complaint. The rationale of these
holdings is that the concomitant danger of self-interest does
not inure as easily as it would to a government informant.'2
In a recent case, police heard "mumbling" from a crowd, which
indicated defendant was the perpetrator of a shooting incident
which had just taken place. Although police could not later identify
the declarants, the utterances, "hard on the heels of an excited
situation" contained the indicia of reliability traditionally recog-
nized in the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule and the declara-
tions were, therefore, held credible.' 9
Use of an informant's tip can occur in searches with or without
a warrant. In either case, police misuse of the "informant's privi-
lege" (including complete fabrication of the informer) is possible.
When a warrant is involved, however, there are at least two natural
checks to this misuse: (1) the magistrate may refuse to issue the
warrant; (2) since the warrant procedure brings the matter to the
attention of many others in the criminal justice machinery (magis-
trate, police department officials, prosecutor's staff and others) a
police officer who conducts too many searches which produce noth-
ing may lose credibility and favor with those he depends on.
When an exception to the warrant requirement exists, however,
the possibilities of abuse are almost boundless. A policeman
searches someone whom he "suspects" of possessing a firearm or
127. W. LAFAVE AND A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 255 (1972).
128. United States v. Unger, 469 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1972).
129. United States v. Petterson, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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narcotics or, at the extreme, he searches at random. If nothing is
found, the "suspect" and the policeman immediately go their sepa-
rate ways. The transaction is of extremely "low visibility." In the
rare cage in which such suspect complains officially about the intru-
sion, and in all cases where evidence is found, the search is defended
by stating an informant (who need not be named) "who has given
reliable information in the past said he saw heroin (or a pistol) in
the suspect's possession." None of this is to suggest that this hap-
pens frequently (though it undoubtedly happens), but only that it
is nearly impossible to determine when it has. And the suggestion
that the warrant requirement should be stringently (even strictly)
required in all "tip" cases runs headlong into the reality that such
cases normally arise in the most explosive type of situations-where
firearms and impending criminal activity are suspected. 30 It is in
situations such as this where one fully appreciates Justice Traynor's
characterization of the exclusionary rule as the most "tormenting"
of the "two-faced problems in the law.''3
4. "Staleness" and Counterindication
The probable cause necessary to most searches and arrests not
only must exist, but must exist at two crucial periods-(1) the time
of the issuance of the warrant if the warrant is necessary to validate
the search or arrest and (2) the time the arrest or search is effected
whether or not pursuant to a warrant. A conclusion once "probable"
may become improbable either by the introduction of counterindi-
cative information (which may either directly challenge prior infor-
mation or do so indirectly by creating contrary inferences), 32 or by
going "stale" by the mere passage of time.'3
130. See also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (use of an unnamed informant
to validate a warrantless "stop and frisk").
131. LaFave, supra note 8 at 255.
132 Th .c.. cf countrindi atiflC scpar JJla frosy ULIntu prVUIlII L t Ib-
cussed infra in Section III B 4 whether the defense can challenge the "facts" used to show
probable cause by demonstrating they were, untrue or prejudiced. Counterindication in the
present context means facts coming to the attention of the officer before he searches which
remove probable cause which once existed. It is not surprising that case authority is virtually
non-existent in this area because if the police obtain strong counterindicative facts, they will
not arrest or search, or if they do, they may only report those facts tending to validate their
decision.
133. LaFave, supra note 8, at 264-66. See also Commonwealth v. Ezer, -Pa. 2d - ,
312 A.2d 398 (1973) (probable cause in connection with an illegal lottery was held stale after
61 days).
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Counterindicating facts may remove probable cause either in
arrest or search cases, but "staleness" is almost exclusively search-
connected. Once it becomes probable that a particular person com-
mitted a crime, the mere running of time does not detract from such
probability. However, as a search warrant depends in part on the
probable location of items, experience dictates that over a period of
time most items (especially crime-connected items) are moved.34
Courts have looked to a number of considerations in resolving
the staleness problem: (1) the length of time from the last observa-
tion to the search warrant application or to the search itself; (2) the
number of observations and the intervals between each; and (3) the
nature of the items and of the suspected crime. As to the latter,
fruits of a theft crime, for example, can be expected to move faster
than unlawfully possessed weapons in which the offense is charac-
terized as "continuing."' 3 5 Likewise, narcotics held for sale and evi-
dence of gambling can be expected to move rapidly, whereas evi-
dence of schemes carried out in connection with lawful commercial
enterprises would be comparatively stationary.' 6 In one recent case
an informant's tip indicated that persons "frequented" a place to
obtain controlled drugs. This was held a sufficient indication that
the possessory offense was a continuing one, and, therefore, had not
become stale.'37
While the length of time from observation to search is the most
crucial question (indeed, the threshold question), there appear to be
no magic numbers. Six days has been held unreasonably long (evi-
dence of gambling) and forty-nine days reasonable (counterfeit
cigarette tax stamps).'3
Statutes or rules of court requiring execution of warrants within
specified periods are not necessarily related to "staleness." For ex-
ample, rule 41(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure re-
quires execution and return of search warrants within ten days.
However, probable cause could become stale within the ten days,
and, conversely, a search beyond the ten days on another warrant
134. LaFave, supra note 8, at 264.
135. Bastida v. Henderson, 487 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1974); Huff v. Commonwealth, 213
Va. 710, 194 S.E.2d 690 (Va. 1973).
136. LaFave, supra note 8, at 264-66.
137. Guzewicz v. Slayton, 366 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Va. 1973).
138. LaFave, supra note 8, at 265.
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or circumstances where no warrant is necessary are not per se stale.
The ten-day limitation serves purposes other than the evaluation of
probable cause.
D. CHALLENGING THE UNDERLYING FACTS
Often at the motion to suppress, the defendant may wish to
challenge the "facts" used to find probable cause by showing such
"facts" to be untrue, recklessly collected or even the products of
perjury. To the extent the defendant is permitted to challenge such
facts at all, he may do so whether the search in question was pur-
suant to warrant or warrantless. Most cases addressing this issue
have arisen in the context of searches conducted on warrant;'39 for
that reason the problem is considered in Section III B 4 infra. The
reader should be aware, however, that facts underlying probable
cause may be challenged in connection with warrantless searches as
well.
E. PROBABLE CAUSE-DIFFERING STANDARDS
The question of differing standards of probable cause with ref-
erence to administrative searches will be considered in Section V D
infra. It is enough here to say that those cases represent a difference
not in the quantity of facts which render a result probable, but in
what must be probable.
There are indications from the Supreme Court of a strong pref-
erence for the use of warrants, and implications that the probable
cause standard may be different in warrant vis-6-vis warrantless
searches. 140 It is clear, though, that the Court has not attempted to
fashion separate quantitative standards. The best sense of these
statements is that probable cause is largely elusive to begin with
and that in "doubtful" or borderline cases, the presence or absence
of a warrant may become important. Clearly a result cannot be more
"probable" simply because a warrant is applied for. Yet, it seems
139. The explanation for this may lie in the fact that, once a police officer includes a
"fact" in a supportive affidavit, he is "stuck" with it. When the search is warrantless,
however, there is the possibility that he can later claim either (1) that he did not rely on such
fact now proved false or (2) that he was in possession of facts which in reality he did not obtain
until after the search or arrest. Several writers suggest strongly that this is common police
practice. See J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRAIL 215 (1966).
140. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) (as to arrest warrants); United States v. Ven-
tresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965) (as to search warrants).
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to be good policy to encourage the use of warrants, especially be-
cause of the numerous situations in which one is not required.'4 '
III. IF PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS, WAS THE SEARCH CON-
DUCTED PURSUANT TO A VALID WARRANT?
A. THE NECESSITY OF WARRANTS
The language in the fourth amendment does not require that
all searches be conducted pursuant to warrant or even that any
searches be so conducted. It requires only that all searches be
reasonable and that warrants, if employed, meet certain require-
ments. The Court, however, has stated repeatedly that, in most
situations, a search conducted without a warrant is per se "unrea-
sonable.' ' 4 2 It is only when requiring a warrant would frustrate some
compelling interest of law enforcement (almost invariably charac-
terized by an acute need for speed) that warrantless searches be-
come reasonable.
The warrant procedure intensifies protection from "unreasona-
ble" searches in a number of ways. An understanding of these is
essential to understanding the insistence on utilizing warrants for
most searches.
1. Interposition of "Neutral Magistrate"
The Court repeatedly has stressed the importance of condition-
ing police intrusion on the decision of a "neutral and detached"
magistrate. Since such person is not involved in "the competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime"'4 3 his judgment, presumably, will
be made strictly on facts and legitimate inferences untainted by
emotion, hunch or the compulsion of his job. There is no reason to
think a police officer is less aware of individual rights or the underly-
ing rationales for those rights than most others, and much to suggest
he is more aware than many. Yet the nature of his charge offers both
the opportunity and, often, the seeming necessity for the compro-
mise of such rights.
Apart from the legal prerequisite of "neutrality" and questions
141. See Sections IV and V infra.
142. E.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
143. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
144. L. HALL, Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 242 (3d
ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE]. The Supreme Court de-
nounced the "rubber stamp" process in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964).
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as to who is a "magistrate" (both considered in Section III B infra)
there are strong indications that this value of the warrant procedure
is not, in fact, being served. In many locales the issuance of a war-
rant becomes a stylistic ritual of "rubber-stamping" by the issuer
without any separate evaluation of the facts by a "detached" per-
son.'44 This may be because the magistrate is not, in fact, "de-
tached" but more often because time constraints do not permit
careful examination or because such practice has become habitual.
The probable cause determination either by a magistrate or
policeman, if incorrect, will result in suppression upon judicial-re-
view. The all too easy conclusion that the warrant, therefore, is not
crucial must be resisted. First, the facts giving probable cause are
memorialized by the warrant application and prevent retroactive
assertion of facts not extant prior to the search. (See discussion in
Section III A 2 infra.) Most important, however, such a conclusion
presupposes that the exclusionary rule has devoured the fourth
amendment. The primary enforcement mechanism for fourth
amendment rights is exclusion of evidence illegally obtained."'4 This
must not obscure the fact that the fourth amendment speaks of the
right to be "secure" from unreasonable searches and seizures not
merely to have redress when they occur. The interposition of the
neutral, detached magistrate is designed to prevent violations. If the
warrant requirement is not met, only those to whom evidence is
found have any remedy at all, except for tort actions, which long ago
proved insufficient.'
2. Insuring Memorialization
Usually search warrants are issued on the basis of written affi-
davits of police officers or others, although oral testimony is occa-
sionally accepted.'47 In any case, the "facts" must be sworn to.'
This procedure insures that those facts constituting probable cause
are memorialized. At the suppression hearing, the prosecution is
generaily not permitted to proffer facts not communicated to the
145. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1971).
146. Id. at 651.
147. See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 220.1 (Proposed Official Draft
No. 1, 1972).
148. LaFave, supra note 8, at 259.
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magistrate,'49 there is no danger that facts gathered subsequent to
the warrant (including facts gathered as fruits of the search itself)
can be used to validate it. The use of such facts, not present at the
time of warrant application, can of course be the product of perjury.
In addition, differentiating between what one knew at a prior time
and what one has assimilated since then often requires difficult
mental gymnastics. It is understandable that a policeman would
tend to resolve honest doubts so as to legitimate his conduct. One
writer has observed:
[A]s one District Attorney expressed it, "The policeman
fabricates probable cause." By saying this, he did not mean
to assert that the policeman is a liar, but rather that he
finds it necessary to construct an ex post facto description
of the preceding events so that these conform to legal arrest
[or search] requirements, whether in fact the events ac-
tually did so or not at the time of arrest. Thus, the police-
man respects the necessity for "complying" with the arrest
[or search] laws.'5 °
3. Defining the Scope of the Search
The warrant must describe "the particular place to be searched
and the particular persons or things to be seized."' 5 ' The warrant
search is thus limited to a particular place and, further, to areas
within that place where the particular items could conceivably be
located.' 2 The Court has pointed out that the warrant operates to
limit carefully the extent, duration, place and objects of the search.
The scope of a warrantless search on the other hand, is limited only
by the policeman's discretion.
4. Rendering the Search More "Visible"
Because the warrant procedure requires involvement of more
people, the decision to search and the search itself become more
visible. This "visibility" may provide natural checks to police
abuses. If it becomes evident that particular policemen "strike-out"
149. United States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers, 270 F. Supp. 734, 738 (E.D. Pa. 1967)
citing Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
150. J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE wITHOUT TRIAL 215 (1966).
151. See Section III B 2 infra.
152. Schlichter, The Outwardly Sufficient Search Warrant Affidavit: What If It's
False?, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 96, 106 (1971).
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consistently in searches (and especially in the dramatic case when
later facts prove police misconduct), his credibility, to the judge and
to members of the law-enforcement team as well, is weakened or
lost. Whether or not such abuses are widespread, it is important to
design procedures most likely to unearth them if they occur.
B. REQUIREMENTS OF WARRANT
1. "Neutral and Detached" Judicial Officer
a. "Neutrality"
Although the language of the fourth amendment does not pre-
scribe who shall issue the warrant, the Supreme Court has held the
requirement of "neutral and detached magistrate" to be of constitu-
tional dimension.'53 In Coolidge v. New Hampshire'54 the Court
struck down a warrant issued by the state Attorney General in his
capacity as a Justice of the Peace, noting that his prosecutorial role
rendered him biased. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has
held that Maryland J.P.'s may issue warrants notwithstanding their
limited power of arrest and their denomination as "conservators of
the peace," reasoning that, unlike the prosecutor in Coolidge, the
J.P. does not serve a prosecutorial function and there is thus "no
unacceptable bias built into his job.""'5 To the extent the J.P. per-
formed a law-enforcement function, clearly it was secondary to his
judicial responsibilities, whereas in Coolidge the judicial function
was secondary.
In situations where the judicial officer aids the affiant in draft-
ing the affidavit, or types it based on oral statements of the affiant,
neutrality is not destroyed.'56 The Fifth Circuit has held that this
activity in fact "demonstrates" neutrality since it proves the ab-
sence of "rubber-stamping.' 15
"Neutrality," then, means generally that the issuer may not
possess an unreasonably high. usually job-connected, prosecution
orientation.
153. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972).
154. 403 U.S. 443, 450 (1971). See also Commonwealth v. Davis, - Pa. Super. -'
310 A.2d 334 (1973).
155. United States v. Haywood, 464 F.2d 756, 761 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
156. United States v. Steed, 465 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1972).
157. Albitez v. Beto, 465 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1972).
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In Shadwick v. City of Tampa' the Supreme Court held that
an arrest warrant for a municipal ordinance violation was validly
issued by a municipal court clerk. The Court first traced the judicial
history of the "neutral magistrate" requirement noting that the
terms "magistrate" and "judicial officer" have been employed in-
terchangeably. The Court reserved decision on the question of
whether the issuer must be in the judicial branch'59 and held that
the issuer must be (1) neutral and (2) competent to determine prob-
able cause." Legal training, the Court added, is not indispensible
in showing competency to judge probable cause.'6 ' This is consistent
with earlier Court decisions describing the probable cause decision
as "common sense,"'6 2 "everyday,"' 63 "designed to be applied by
laymen"164 and not necessarily for "legal technicians"' 65 only.
The Court's decision covers only arrests for municipal viola-
tions. However, if the probable cause decision is indeed one which
laymen can apply, there appears no natural check on extending the
decision to arrest warrants for serious offenses, which one state su-
preme court has done, 66 or to search warrants. Yet there are strong
reasons for not doing so. First, with reference to arrest warrants for
minor offenses where "rubber-stamping" is most prevalent, judicial
scrutiny may be "an already abdicated function."'6 7 In many cases
the subject arrest warrants are not even constitutionally required.6 8
Second, notwithstanding the Court's repetitive statements that
probable cause is "common sense" and does not require "legal tech-
158. 407 U.S. 345 (1972).
159. Id. at 349.
160. Id. at 350; most courts prior to Shadwick had invalidated warrants issued by non-
judges. State v. Matthews, 270 N.C. 435, 153 S.E.2d 791 (1967); State v. Paulick, 277 Minn.
140, 151 N.W.2d 591 (1967); State ex rel. White v. Simon, 28 Wis. 2d 590, 137 N.W.2d 391
(1965). Contra, State v. Ruotolo, 52 N.J. 508, 247 A.2d 1 (1968). In Mancusi v. Deforte, 392
U.S. 364 (1968), the Court held that subpoena duces tecum could not be treated as a search
warrant since the district attorney who issued it was not a neutral and detached magistrate.
161. 407 U.S. at 351-52.
162. 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1964).
163. 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1948).
164. State v. Ruotolo, 52 N.J. 508, 514, 247 A.2d 1, 4 (1968).
165. 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1948).
166. Woodmansee v. Smith, 130 Vt. 383, 296 A.2d 182 (1972).
167. Comment, Constitutional Requirements for Authority to Issue Warrants, 1972
WASH. U.L.Q. 777, 781 (1972).
168. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 475-76 (1971).
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nicians," decisions requiring recitation of underlying facts, not
conclusions, factual foundations for "competence" and "credibil-
ity," sophisticated application of the "particularity" requirement,
the direction to "carefully limit the scope of the search," all suggest
that issuing warrants is hardly equatable with "practical considera-
tions of everyday life." Third, while court clerks may not be as likely
to abdicate the probable cause determination function because of
time constraints as have judicial officers in some locales,' it is
possible that such persons would be more susceptible to direct or
indirect pressure to accommodate applicants who represent govern-
mental power. As one's appreciation of his own governmental charge
is diminished, he may lose "neutrality." This has undoubtedly been
a cause of "rubber-stamping" as to the lower-level judiciary and
granting this responsibility to persons lower yet can only increase
this tendency.
2. Particularity
a. "the place to be searched"
The fourth amendment commands that all warrants particu-
larly" 7 describe "the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized." Undoubtedly, this language was generated by the
Framers' fear of "general warrants" under which the police "rum-
mage" for anything which may prove incriminating.' The degree
of particularity required, however, must, according to the Supreme
Court, be measured in a "common sense and realistic fashion."',
Warrants and supportive affidavits "are not entries in an essay
contest"'7 but are "normally drafted by non-lawyers in the midst
and haste of a criminal investigation."' 74 Resolution of the particu-
larity problem is, like others in the fourth amendment area, ulti-
mately referable to the continuing tension between the exigencies
of police work and the interests of individuals.
particular "if the officer . . . can, with reasonable effort, ascertain
169. MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 144, at 242.
170. See generally Cook, Requisite Particularity in Search Warrant Authorizations, 38
TENN. L. REV. 496 (1971).
171. U.S. v. Matlock, 94 S. Ct. 988, 996 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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and identify the place intended."'75 Courts have demonstrated a
high tolerance for "technical" inaccuracies. For example, courts
have often upheld warrants containing the improper address if other
factors "cure" the error.' In a case in which the address failed to
indicate the town, the court pointed to the "common-sense" ap-
proach in United States v. Ventresca77 and found sufficient "partic-
ularity."'7 Where the place involved is a multi-dwelling or multi-
office building, the warrant should specify the unit to be searched. 7 ,
The same "common-sense" attitude controls when the warrant
is for the search of an automobile (a rare situation due to the broad
automobile warrant exception). One writer has summed up the
cases by noting " . . . the issue is simply whether the identity of
the vehicle can reasonably be determined, and some inaccuracies
may be tolerated."'' 0 As to searches of persons, the warrant must
enable the police reasonably to identify such person, but his name
is not an indispensable ingredient of that reasonableness.''
b. "the persons or things to be seized"
The distinction of "seizable" and "non-seizable" items, long a
perplexing issue, was virtually eliminated by the Supreme Court's
decision in Warden v. Hayden' holding that "mere evidence" of a
crime was seizable, as well as contraband, fruits and instrumental-
ities of crime. With rare exception today, subject to proof of proba-
ble cause, any item may be seized pursuant to a warrant, if the
warrant describes such item with sufficient "particularity" as re-
quired by the fourth amendment. Generally speaking, the items to
be seized "must be described with such certainty that they may be
identified and with such particularity that the officer charged with
the execution of the warrant will be left with no discretion respect-
175. LaFave, supra note 8, at 266 n. 79, quoting People v. Martens, 338 Ill. 170, 171,
170 N.E. 275, 276 (1930).
176. Hurley v. Delaware, 365 F. Supp. 282 (D. Del. 1973). See also LaFave, supra note
8, at 267.
177. 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
178. Nottingham v. State, 505 P.2d 1345 (Okla. 1973).
179. Cook, Requisite Particularity In Search Warrant Authorization, 38 TENN. L. REV.
496, 498 (1971).
180. Id. at 499, n. 24, quoting Wangrow v. United States, 399 F.2d 106, 115 (8th Cir.
1968) (mistake of one letter in license tag description insignificant). See also Bowling v. State,
219 Tenn. 224, 408 S.W.2d 660 (1966) (warrant was correct as to auto license number, incor-
rect as to color, year, and model of car). See also Annot., 47 A.L.R.2d 1444 (1956).
181. See Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 1609 (1956).
182. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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ing the property to be taken."'83
There are too many irreconcilable decisions for one to suggest
a working "test." There are a number of considerations, however,
which are generally recognized as relevant:
Susceptibility of description and risk of confusion with un-
sought items. Things contain varying amounts of recognizable
attributes. An automobile, for instance, can be described by color,
year, make, model, various identifying marks including license tags,
serial numbers, and so forth. Thus, inclusion of an automobile in a
search warrant would require a high degree of particularity, both
because it is usually possible and because the sheer number of auto-
mobiles suggests that the chance of seizing the wrong vehicle is high.
In contrast, the recitation of "about twenty beef hides and about
twelve calfhides and one horse hide"' 8 was held sufficient primarily
because a nonexpert would have difficulty describing such items
more particularly, and the risk of seizing unsought items was mini-
mal.
Specification of Character. If a search warrant specifies "auto-
mobile" at a given address, there is a definite probability that the
wrong "automobile" will be seized. As such, this recital may fail for
insufficient particularity. It would be indeed rare, however, for po-
lice to have probable cause to seize an automobile without knowing
enough about it to describe it so as to exclude any significant risk
of seizing the wrong car. When items are defined by character,
rather than identity, the risk of seizure of innocent items increases
as the definition becomes more imprecise. The danger inheres in the
increased discretion in the police to collect items defined in broad
terms. In a recent case a warrant to seize "seditious materials" was
deemed too vague.'85 The fear of general searches was evident in
what was actually seized in that case as "seditious"-including a
book of William Cullen Bryant poetry and a volume entitled "Tricks
and Training for Cats.": These seizures were clearly outrageous,
183. LaFave, supra note 8, at 268 n. 91, quoting People v. Sovetsky, 343 Il1. 583, 588-
89, 175 N.E. 844, 846 (1931), in which the court said: "The verified complaint, upon which a
search warrant is issued, must state the facts on which the complainant bases his be-
liefs... "
184. LaFave, supra note 8, at 268.
185. United States v. McSurely, 473 F.2d 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
186. Id. at 1187-88.
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but a seizure of the Communist Manifesto would be just as offensive
though much more likely. Courts have struck down warrants speci-
fying "any evidence pertaining to the felonious killing of," or allow-
ing an officer to "enter said premises . . . to investigate and search
into and concerning said violations."'' 7 These are general explora-
tory searches in the worst sense. Courts have, however, upheld war-
rants containing similar language, such as "instruments of the
crime." 1 The Minnesota Supreme Court recently upheld a warrant
specifying "items of identification to show constructive possession
of above contraband such as rent receipts, utility bills, personal
letters and other personal I.D."'' 9 In such recital, there is less chance
of confusing non-related items, but there is an additional problem.
It is perplexing how one who cannot identify items with any more
specificity than that can have probable cause that those items are
present. The warrant in that case included specification of contra-
band, and such other evidentiary items such as "rent receipts"
could have been seized if observed during the search for contraband
under the plain view doctrine. 90 Of course, the police must cease
searching when they have found all the enumerated items, and enu-
merating such other evidentiary items will increase the duration
and intensity of the search.
Particularizing contraband. Courts have been extremely liberal
in judging the needed specificity of contraband. Warrants reciting
"a quantity of heroin," "controlled drugs" and "gaming implements
and apparatus" have been upheld. 9' To some extent these cases can
be explained on the grounds that (1) contraband does not admit of
detailed description, (2) the risk of confusion with unsought items
is unimportant since contraband is by definition always illegally
possessed and (3) knowledge of its attributes does not necessarily
inhere in knowledge of its presence.'92 Beyond this, however, it has
187. Cook, Requisite Particularity in Search Warrant Authorization, 38 TENN. L. REV.
496, 506 n. 72 (1971), quoting Giles v. United States, 284 F. 208, 215 (1st Cir. 1922).
188. Id. at 505-06.
189. State v. Wiley, - Minn. __, 205 N.W.2d 667 (1973).
190. See Section V G infra.
191. Cook, Requisite Particularity in Search Warrant Authorization, 38 TENN. L. REV.
496, 505-06 (1971).
192. It would be odd, for instance, for police to have probable cause of the presence of
"mere evidence" such as clothing and not be able to describe it extensively. Often, however,
probable cause as to the presence of narcotics occurs with very little idea as to the exact type,
quantity, etc.
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been recognized that the purpose of search warrants for contraband
"is not to seize specified property, but only property of a specified
character.""'
3. The Return
A search warrant expires upon the running of the statutory
validity period or upon return, whichever occurs first." 4 It is, of
course, necessary that the warrant be executed before it expires.
Many state statutes require that items seized under warrant be
included in the "return.' 9 5 The Supreme Court has recently indi-
cated that the use of a return or its form, if used, is not of constitu-
tional moment and entirely a matter of state law.' 6
4. Challenging "Facts" in Supporting Affidavits
When a policeman's decision to conduct a warrantless search
comes under review, it is clear that if he fabricated facts justifying
probable cause, probable cause did not exist and he knew it. Like-
wise, if he is reckless in gathering such facts, probable cause does
not exist to the man of "reasonable caution." If, however, facts
which he reasonably believes to be true and which constitute proba-
ble cause, are later shown to be inaccurate, probable cause at the
time of the search-the crucial time-is not disproved. To say that
what proves false on Tuesday could not have been "probable" on
Monday is to ignore that a probability is a prediction.'97
Probable cause in the abstract is meaningless-a thing must be
"probable" to a particular person. For example, if an informant lies
to the police about A's criminal activity, the police may have "prob-
able cause," but clearly the informant does not. In the case of war-
rantless searches then, as to "facts" which are later shown to be
false, only facts reasonably and honestly believed by the police offi-
cer will support a determination of probable cause.
When a warrant is involved, many new considerations are in-
193. LaFave, supra note 8, at 268 n.98 quoting People v. Prall, 314 Ill. 518, 523, 145 N.E.
610, 612 (1924).
194. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 220.4 (Proposed Official Draft No.
1, 1972).
195. Id.
196. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
197. In Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971), the Court found that though the wrong
person was arrested, the arrest was with probable cause.
[Vol. 8Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 [1974], Art. 1
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fused. Most important, however, is the interposition of a magistrate
who determines probable cause. Case law makes it clear that it is
the magistrate whose determination is reviewed on motion to sup-
press evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant and not the police-
man's.' 0 But what if the policeman lies in the affidavit or recites
facts recklessly believed? The policeman does not have probable
cause, but the magistrate may.
The extent to which a defendant can delve below facts in a
supporting affidavit has not been decided by the Supreme Court'99
and has led to widely differing results in state and lower federal
courts. Traditionally, the courts have refused to permit the defense
to attempt to show that facts in an affidavit are inaccurate or even
perjured. 00 Various reasons have been offered to justify this stance:
(1) such showing is irrelevant to a review of the magistrate's deci-
sion, since he had no knowledge of the inaccuracies; (2) probabilities
are predictions and can be wrong; (3) the opposite holding will
discourage use of the warrant procedure; (4) courts would be inun-
dated with "fishing-expedition" litigation of the truthfulness of
underlying facts.
Several courts have recently held that the defendant is entitled
to challenge inaccurate facts in supportive affidavits at least to
some extent. Permitting police abuse to constitute the basis for a
search is seen as a serious erosion of fourth amendment protection.
And yet even these jurisdictions have carefully limited examination
of affidavits. The Supreme Court has held that the discrediting of
"peripheral" facts not essential for probable cause will not result in
suppression.20' A few courts have reasoned, however, that if the in-
clusion of facts unnecessary to probable cause springs from inten-
tional police abuse, the deterrent rationale of the exclusionary rule
is served by suppression.' 2
As to "necessary" facts, several courts have suppressed evi-
198. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
199. The Court expressly left the main question open in Rugendorf v. United States,
376 U.S. 528, 532 (1964).
200. Schlichter, The Outwardly Sufficient Search Warrant Affidavit: What if It's
False?, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 96, 106 (1971).
201. Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 532 (1964).
202. United States v. Harwood, 470 F.2d 322 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Pearce,
275 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1960).
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dence when such facts were intentionally misrepresented by the
affiant or "recklessly" or "unreasonably" believed. 03 Inaccurate
facts "reasonably" believed are generally not excised because (a)
inclusion of such facts is not deterrable and (b) such errors do not
in fact negate probable cause at the relevant time.
Recognizing the fear of "fishing-expeditions," the Seventh Cir-
cuit has propounded a two-step procedure for examining supportive
affidavits. 04 In order to obtain a hearing to examine the affidavit,
the defendant must make an affirmative preliminary showing that
(a) an included material fact is inaccurate or (b) a fact, material or
not, has been intentionally misrepresented. If the resultant hearing
discloses an intentional misrepresentation of any fact or that any
material fact was "recklessly" believed, the warrant will fail. Some
courts express this by suppressing evidence if the inaccuracies go to
the "integrity" of the affidavit. 05 This procedure is responsive to
several of the traditional arguments for not permitting review of
affidavit facts. First, since an affirmative showing of some abuse is
necessary to trigger the hearing, the "fishing-expedition" fear is
obviated, though clearly much additional court time would be re-
quired. Second, since inaccurate beliefs must be "unreasonable"
before suppression will result, warrant searches remain on the same
footing with warrantless searches where reasonably believed inac-
curate facts are permitted and there is no discouragement of the
warrant process. One court has held that intentional misrepresen-
tations which are the product of "ill will, bad faith or malice" can
result in civil liability to the affiant.2 11
The fact that the magistrate's decision is under review remains
a problem. And yet there appears to be a solution-even assuming
that there is probable cause to the magistrate when facts are misrep-
resented intentionally or recklessly, may it not be argued that a
search based on such warrant is unreasonable? Certainly there is
nothing in the languaae of the fourth amendment comuelling the
decision that all searches on valid warrants are reasonable; and
203. See authorities collected in United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983 (7th Cir.
1973).
204. Id. The Fifth Circuit has adopted the same basic test. United States v. Thomas,
489 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1973). See also State v. McMannis, - Ore. -, 517 P.2d 250 (1973)
and Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 77, 501 P.2d 234, 104 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1972).
205. E.g., Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 532 (1964).
206. Cashen v. Spann, - N.J. ___, 311 A.2d 192 (1973).
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when the warrant issues on probable cause improperly created, the
sense of the amendment is not impaired in the least if the search is
held unreasonable.
The Seventh Circuit has indicated that an informant's identity
need not be disclosed in an affidavit hearing.' 7 While it may be that
an informant (professional or of the "good citizen" type) has per-
jured himself, it would appear that such fact bears neither on proba-
ble cause (which in such case would exist both to the affiant and
the magistrate) nor reasonableness of the search since such abuses
are not abuses by government." 8 A subtle fear that going behind
affidavits leads to cross-examination of informants and other police
sources thus seems unfounded.
Once the court permits a hearing on the accuracy of facts in-
cluded in an affidavit, the prosecution may attempt to rehabilitate
the affiant. Occasionally this takes the form of showing additional
facts, not contained in the affidavit, used to establish probable
cause. Most courts deny to the police the right to support a warrant
with facts not communicated to the judge.0 9 Since the inquiry is
into the magistrate's decision, reference to facts unknown to him is
wholly irrelevant. Many courts, however, permit the introduction of
additional facts upon a showing that they were orally communi-
cated to the magistrate. 10
Some courts have held specifically that the fourth amendment
requires that such oral communication be sworn to.2 1I The Third
Circuit has recently announced that sworn oral testimony may be
admitted in federal habeas corpus review of a state court conviction
to rehabilitate a facially insufficient warrant affidavit. 212
C. EXECUTION OF THE WARRANT
There are situations in which a search conducted pursuant to
207. United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983, 986-87 (7th Cir. 1973).
208. It is conceivable that as to the professional informant an established pattern of
collaboration with police may bring his activities within the sphere of state action.
209. United States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers, 270 F. Supp. 734, 738 (E.D. Pa. 1967),
citing Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
210. See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 220.1 (Proposed Official Draft
No. 1, 1972); United States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers, 270 F. Supp. 734, 737-38 (E.D. Pa.
1967).
211. Campbell v. Minnesota, 487 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1973). Of course all written communi-
cations are sworn to in affidavit form.
212. Gaugler v. Brierly, 477 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1973).
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a validly issued warrant may be unreasonable. If the probable cause
existing at time of issuance is terminated by "staleness" or counter-
indications, the search cannot be justified under the warrant. Even
in cases where probable cause exists, however, the method of execu-
tion may render the search unreasonable.
1. Time of Execution
Many state statutes impose a maximum time limit on the exe-
cution of search warrants.213 Rule 41(d) of the Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure requires execution within ten days. These periods are
outer limits only-a search conducted within such period may be
"stale" or otherwise too late. If the search is conducted beyond these
periods, it will be valid only if a new warrant has been issued or an
exception to the warrant requirement can be shown. In addition, it
is common for statutes to restrict the execution of warrants to day-
time hours, though many such statutes permit nighttime searches
upon a showing of certain compelling circumstances."1 Some stat-
utes require that such additional showing be made to the magistrate
who must include authorization for nighttime entry into the warrant
itself."' The Supreme Court has not considered whether any such
time requirements are of constitutional dimension.
2. The Announcement Requirement-Forcible Entry
After Announcement
The Court has held that announcement of the officer's author-
ity and purpose prior to effecting an entry with or without warrant
to make an arrest is compelled by the fourth amendment.21 Court
dictum indicates that entry to conduct a search would likewise re-
quire such notice.217 It is clear from the few court decisions in this
area that the rule of announcement before breaking, while constitu-
tionally required in the normal situation, may admit of a number
of valid exceptions. The decisions, then, seem to envision a
213. See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 220.1 (Proposed Official Draft
No. 1, 1972).
214. Id. at § 220.2(3).
215. Id.
216. Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23
(1963); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
217. See generally Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
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(-e.g., "FBI Agents. We have a warrant to search the premises.")
and a forced entry only after a refusal or a conclusion that no one is
present. ' It is clear that such a refusal may be implied as where
sounds from within indicate the presence of persons but no attempt
to open the door."19
The requirement of announcement appears to have common
law origins, and courts in states with no statute on the subject have
applied such common law. The rationales for the announcement
requirement appear to be: (1) the reduction of the potential for
violence inhering in the explosiveness of forced, unanhounced en-
tries into homes, especially at night; (2) the reduction in unneces-
sary damage to private property; (3) respect for privacy requires
that its invasion be as inoffensive as possible.
Although "announcement" is now of constitutional dimension,
many states have delineated exceptions either by statute or judicial
creation. Congress has enacted legislation codifying the common
law.22" The following exceptions are widely recognized: (1) persons
within are aware of the officer's presence and know his authority
and purpose; (2) persons within are in imminent danger of bodily
harm; (3) the officer reasonably concludes that persons inside are
destroying evidence or attempting to escape; (4) unannounced entry
would minimize risk to the officers.22 ' These last two, clearly the
most common, are often included in the all-encompassing phrase
"exigent circumstances." This is somewhat unfortunate since "exi-
gent circumstances" has developed a fairly well-defined meaning in
another context-circumstances permitting the dispensing with the
warrant requirement.222 The cases seem to indicate that circumstan-
ces bearing only on the method of the intrusion need not be as
"exigent" as those which permit the intrusion in the first place. For
instance, courts have consistently held that forced entry is proper
when the announcement is followed by "scuffling" and other noises
indicating evidence was being destroyed.12 3 It is inconceivable that
218. E.g., United States v. Allende, 486 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1973). See also Morens v.
States, 277 So. 2d 81 (Fla. Ct. App. 1973).
219. United States v. Allende, 486 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1973).
220. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1970).
221. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 46 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
222. See Section IV infra.
223. United States v. Allende, 486 F.2d 1351, 1353 (9th Cir. 1973).
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such facts alone could trigger the initial right to intrude.
3. Dispensing with Announcement- "No-Knock"
The distinction between the right to break in following a "re-
fusal" or the arising of "exigent circumstances" and cases where the
initial knock and announcement may be dispensed with must be
understood. It is this latter situation-usually denominated "no-
knock"-which has caused considerable controversy. Generally
speaking, facts permitting an unannounced, forced entry should be
strong. Where the suspect poses a serious threat to the safety of
police, a "no-knock" entry would, in all probability comport with
the Constitution.24 It has been suggested that requiring prior sanc-
tion in the warrant itself for this type of entry may afford added
protection to the suspect. 225 Others have suggested, however, that
such use of the warrant procedure is improper since "exigent cir-
cumstances" generally arise at the scene, and do not pre-exist. 2 1
Courts generally have been unwilling to sanction unannounced
forced entry on the sole ground that the evidence sought is readily
disposable, holding that it is the "particular facts of the case" and
not the class of case which forms the exception. 2 17 When evidence,
such as drugs or bookmaking paraphernalia, is readily disposable,
courts will, however, permit a forced entry which follows almost
immediately after the announcement. 5 Slight deviations from the
appropriate statute have been excused. For example, the unlatching
of a screen door before making the announcement or the failure to
announce at the suspect's detached garage after announcing at the
house have been held proper since "substantial compliance" was
indicated.22
224. Sonnenreich and Ebner, No-Knock and Nonsense, An Alleged Constitutional
Problem, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 626, 649-50 (1970); [hereinafter cited as Sonnenreich and
Ebner]. See also People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P.2d 6, - Cal. Rptr. -, cert.
dened, 352 U.S. 858 (1956); State v. Furry, 3iU Ohio App. Zd IMI, 286 N.E.2d 301 (1971).
225. Sonnenreich and Ebner, supra note 224, at 651.
226. Id. at 649.
227. Meyer v. United States, 386 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1967); People v. Gastels, 67 Cal.
2d 586, 432 P.2d 706, 63 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1967); State v. Dusch, - Ind. -, 33 Ind. Dec.
658, 289 N.E.2d 515 (1972).
228. Sonnenreich and Ebner, supra note 224, at 632.
229. People v. Peterson, 9 Cal. 3d 717, 511 P.2d 1187, 108 Cal. Rptr. 835 (1973).
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IV. DOES THE CASE FIT AN EXCEPTION TO THE WAR-
RANT REQUIREMENT?
All searches and seizures must be "reasonable" pursuant to the
fourth amendment, and the Court has held that the procurement
of a warrant is indispensible to "reasonableness" in most cases.131
The warrant process, however, involves time, and in certain situa-
tions the inflexible requirement for a warrant would frustrate legiti-
mate law-enforcement interests. When the opportunity to search,
assuming probable cause, is fleeting, a warrantless search may be
reasonable. Other situations, not characterized by the need for
speed, in which warrantless searches may be reasonable are treated
in Section V, infra. In those cases, though, probable cause is not
required, and the search is not engaged in primarily to locate crime-
connected items, but to serve some other interests.13 Suffice it to
say that all warrantless searches conducted for the sole purpose of
discovering evidence of crime must, to be valid, arise in a context
in which speed is essential.
A. EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES-EMERGENCY
The term "exigent circumstances" is often used in a generic
sense to denote all situations in which warrantless searches are rea-
sonable; thus, all valid searches incident to arrest or all searches of
vehicles on probable cause may be referred to as "exigent circum-
stances" searches. The term is also used to identify a smaller class
of cases-those which the situation suggests the immediate threat
of removal, concealment or destruction of evidence thought to be
present-which cannot be neatly pigeonholed into a single excep-
tion like the automobile exception. The terms used to describe such
cases are "emergency" or "exigent circumstances" in the narrower
sense. Such cases arise in several contexts.
1. Searches of the Person
It is a rare case in which the police have probable cause to
search a person for criminal items, yet do not have probable cause
for an arrest of that person. If probable cause for arrest exists, such
search will be valid as incident to arrest even when no arrest in fact
230. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973).
231. For example, an automobile inventory is conducted to protect the police from civil
liability and to protect the owner's property.
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takes place.3 In cases in which probable cause to search exists
independent of probable cause to arrest, nothing in the fourth
amendment suggests a per se exception to the warrant requirement.
In several situations, however, a warrantless search may be valid.
a. Highly Intrusive Searches-Schmerber v.
California
Police may, incident to a valid arrest, conduct a rather exten-
sive search of the arrestee without a search warrant. The fact of
arrest does not, however, permit unlimited invasion of personal pri-
vacy.
In Schmerber v. California,3 3 police arrested defendant for
drunk driving and drew a blood sample to secure evidence of intoxi-
cation. This invasion was held to be beyond the scope of the normal
search incident to arrest. The Court held that the police must dem-
onstrate an unusually high level of suspicion-a "clear indica-
tion"-to validate such a search.134 Once a "clear indication" is
shown, however, the search may be warrantless since the "evidence"
(alcoholic content in bloodstream) disappears rapidly.25 Thus the
Schmerber Court found that a "clear indication" had existed and
therefore approved the search. If such highly intrusive searches are
"clearly indicated" in a context where such a need for speed is not
demonstrated, presumably a warrant would have to be obtained and
the magistrate convinced to the "clear indication" standard.
b. Searching Persons Located on Premises Lawfully
Being Searched
In United States v. Di Re, 23 the Court stated that during a
lawful search of a residence or automobile, the police could not
conduct a blanket search of all persons who happened to be on the
premises at that time. More recent cases and statutes have, how-
ever, upheld such searches when the person searched bore some
relationship to the purpose of the residence search and was more
than "casually" present.2 37 These cases do not speak in terms of
232. See Section V A infra.
233. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
234. Id. at 770.
235. Id. 770-71.
236. 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
237. E.g., United States v. Peep, 490 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1974).
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probable cause, but in terms of "reasonableness," suggesting that
the suspicion may be less than probable cause. These cases, consid-
ered together with statutes touching on this area,218 indicate that Di
Re's influence is presently weak.
A recent trend is to denominate such police conduct a "frisk"
thereby automatically diminishing the needed quantum of proof to
"reasonable suspicion" and obviating the need for dealing with Di
Re. 239 The facts in several of these cases do not suggest any suspicion
at all apart from presence. 20 Behind many of these decisions is the
realization that any drug-related search is more person related than
searches for most other evidence. Drugs are often carried on the
person and many premises searches or automobile searches could be
frustrated by the simple expedient of placing the sought items on
one's person."' Often, also, in narcotics-law enforcement, the police
may obtain probable cause to search a particular location yet not
have probable cause to arrest any particular person, at least until
possession of or control over the premises is determined.
2. Residence Searches-VALE v. LOUISIANA
Warrantless searches of residence upon probable cause have
been permitted in several contexts in which imminent destruction,
concealment or removal of evidence is threatened. For example, if
a residence, automobile or other "private place" is on fire, exigent
circumstances exist for a search for items provided the police have
probable cause to believe the items are crime-connected and located
in the burning place. 42 This probable cause must first be demon-
strated, however, since the question of an item's existence is always
anterior to the question of its destruction.
The most recurrent problem in this area is the threat of destruc-
tion of evidence by those in concert or symphathy with an individual
arrested in or near his home. In Vale v. Louisiana,4 3 the Court
addressed the admissibility of evidence discovered during a search
of defendant's house following his arrest on the front steps. The
238. E.g., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 144, at 71 and at 261.
239. E.g., People v. Noreen, __ Colo. _, 509 P.2d 313 (1973).
240. United States v. Peep, 490 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1974).
241. LaFave, supra note 8, at 273.
242. Steigler v. Anderson, 360 F. Supp. 1286 (D. Del. 1973).
243. 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
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Court assumed, arguendo, the existence of probable cause to search
the house for narcotics which, the state argued, "are easily removed,
hidden or destroyed." '44 The prosecution urged it was unreasonable
"to require the officers under the facts of the case to first secure a
search warrant before searching the premises, as time is of the es-
sence inasmuch as the officers never know whether there is anyone
on the premises to be searched who could very easily destroy the
evidence." '45 The Court struck down the search, stating that the
state bore the burden of showing the existence of an "exceptional
situation" to validate such warrantless searches and that it had not
done so. 4'
Due both to the unusual facts of Vale and the Court's conclu-
sory treatment of the "confederate" issue, a number of unanswered
questions remain. Must the police show they had reason to believe
other persons were in fact on the premises before searching either
for such persons or for evidence, or may they always make a "protec-
tive sweep," as some courts have held?247 Must the police confine
such search to a search for persons, at least until such persons are
found? If such persons are found, may the police then search for
evidence, or should they preserve the status quo until a warrant can
be obtained by controlling ingress, egress and other actions of such
persons?248
Several courts have held that specific knowledge of other poten-
tial arrestees acting in concert with the arrestee may permit a war-
rantless search if such persons are on the premises or at large and
in the general vicinity. 49 Many of these cases assume that the police
need not, if the initial burden of showing the existence of such
persons is met, guard the premises or automobile, but may search
it immediately.
The "protective sweep" cases are perplexing. These cases pro-
ceed on the theory that arrests in a home always trigger a right to
244. Id. at 34.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. United States v. Harris, 435 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v. Broomfield,
336 F. Supp. 179 (E.D. Mich. 1972); People v. Block, 6 Cal. 3d 239, 491 P.2d 9, 90 Cal. Rptr.
657 (1971).
248. Griswold, Criminal Procedure, 1969- "Is it a Means or An End? ", 29 MD. L. REV.
307, 317 (1969).
249. Mattern v. McGinnis, - F. Supp. -, 13 Cr. L. Rptr. 2316 (D. Ala. 1973).
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search for confederates if destructive evidence is suspected. When
the police search a home for persons who may conceal or destroy
evidence incriminating to an arrestee, however, it seems clear that
such action is not only preliminary to the search for evidence, but
is a search itself. It would seem that some quantum of suspicion as
to the presence of such confederates should be required before such
search can be conducted.
3. Automobiles
For many years, when probable cause has been directed at the
presence of items in an automobile, the mobility of such automobile
gave rise to exigent circumstances (per se). 10 Several recent deci-
sions have limited the mobility doctrine, and police have now been
compelled in several cases to identify "exigent circumstances" other
than the fact of mobility to conduct a warrantless automobile
search. Those cases are considered next with the automobile cases.
B. AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES ON PROBABLE CAUSE
1. Supreme Court Decisions-From CARROLL to COOLIDGE
The general warrant exception for the searches of automobiles
is today both extremely important and extremely complex.25 Its
importance lies in the American public's love affair with the auto-
mobile and the currently high incidence of possessory crimes,
chiefly drugs and firearms. The complexity is generated by the vari-
ety of factual patterns in which the police search cars, recent Court
decisions which conflict with one another and by-pass resolution of
certain central inquiries, and the ease with which the automobile
doctrine can be confused and overlapped with other search and
seizure doctrines not peculiarly applicable to automobiles. 2
It will avoid some confusion to recognize initially that there are
really two automobile exceptions to the warrant requirement-the
classic exception in which probable cause is required, and a more
recent line of cases, dispensing with both the warrant and probable
cause requirements. (The latter is discussed in Section V C infra.)
250. See Section III B infra.
251. See generally Miles and Wefing, The Automobile Search and Fourth Amendment:
A Troubled Relationship, 4 SEroN HALL L. REV. 105 (1972).
252. The following relatively lengthy discussion of two Court decisions may appear out
of joint with the summary nature of this article. Presently, however, these cases form the only
authority in a situation which occurs daily and both are complex.
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The classic exception was originally announced in Carroll v.
United States.2 53 Prohibition agents stopped an automobile believed
to contain contraband liquor and conducted a warrantless search on
the street pursuant to authorization in the Volstead Act. Most cases
prior to Carroll had turned on whether such search could be upheld
as incident to the arrest of the occupants.254 The Court upheld the
search but stated clearly that the right to search is wholly indepen-
dent of any right to arrest the occupants or anyone else. The Court
pointed out that when there is probable cause for a search of the car,
the warrant requirement would be unduly frustrating since the car
has high "mobility" and the opportunity to search is "fleeting." 5
The existence of probable cause is indispensible to the rationale
since a "fleeting" opportunity is hardly meaningful unless there is
something which may fly. Carroll thus rests on the concurrence of
probable cause and a mobile vehicle.
Subsequent cases indicated that two facts in Carroll-(1) car
stopped in transit and (2) warrantless search congressionally au-
thorized-were descriptive, not operative. In Scher v. United
States"' the warrantless search of a parked, unoccupied automobile
was held valid under Carroll since it was potentially mobile; and in
Brinegar v. United States,257 the Court assumed sub silentio that no
statutory authorization was necessary to uphold warrantless auto-
mobile searches.
Since a parked, unoccupied car is mobile enough to satisfy
Carroll, the inquiry becomes: When, if ever, does an automobile
become so immobile that Carroll does not apply? Preston v. United
States258 appeared to hold that impounded vehicles were outside
Carroll. The police arrested three men for vagrancy and towed the
car to a garage where it was searched. The Government urged up-
holding the search primarily as incident to arrest. Clearly since
defendants were all in custody and separated from the car, the
253. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
254. Miles and Wefing, The Automobile Search and the Fourth Amendment: A Trou-
bled Relationship, 4 SETON HALL L. REV. 105, 114 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Miles and
Wefing].
255. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151 (1925).
256. 305 U.S. 251 (1938).
257. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
258. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
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officer's safety by use of weapons contained in the car and the threat
of immediate destruction of evidence-were absent. On this issue
Preston was clear and undoubtedly is the law today. Yet Preston,
at the time, appeared to say more. The Court said:
Here, we may assume, as the Government urges, that, ei-
ther because the arrests were valid or because the police
had probable cause to think the car stolen, the police had
the right to search the car when they first came on the
scene. But this does not decide the question of the reason-
ableness of a search at a later time and another place.2 59
Since the evidence was suppressed, Preston seemed to mean that an
impounded vehicle was no longer mobile.
If it meant that, Chambers v. Maroney6 ° overruled it. Petition-
ers were stopped and arrested for armed robbery. The Court found
that the police had probable cause to search the car for fruits and
instrumentalities of the crime. There was no question but that a
Carroll search could have been conducted on the street. However,
the car was towed to the police station and then searched. The Court
stated:
[T]he probable cause factor still obtained at the station
house and so did the mobility of the car unless the Fourth
Amendment permits a warrantless seizure of the car and
the denial of its use to anyone until a warrant is secured.
In that event there is little to choose in terms of practical
consequences between an immediate search without a war-
rant and the car's immobilization until a warrant is ob-
tained.2'
Chambers, then, argues (1) that an impounded car is mobile unless
the police can "immobilize" it, (2) that "immobilization" implies
a seizure, at least temporarily, (3) that a seizure is no less intrusive
than a search, and therefore (4) the search is reasonable. Preston
was distinguished as turning on incident-to-arrest grounds, which
was not wholly true, as the Preston Court had assumed probable
259. Id. at 367-68.
260. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
261. Id. at 52.
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cause to search the car."'2
The Court expressed doubt in Chambers as to whether the
fourth amendment would permit a warrantless seizure of a car until
a warrant is obtained. Yet in United States v. Van Leeuwen, 263
decided earlier in the same term, the Court upheld the warrantless
seizure of first-class mail until a warrant could be obtained. In
fact,in Van Leeuwen the probable cause did not materialize until
after the seizure. The seizure itself was upheld on an extension of
the stop-and-frisk rationale of Terry v. Ohio .2 In Van Leeuwen, the
Court indicated that if the police could temporarily seize persons on
less than probable cause, a fortiori they could seize mail. Temporary
seizure of an automobile on probable cause seems to follow as well,
yet no one in Chambers alluded to Terry or Van Leeuwen.
The impounded automobile quickly came under court scrutiny
again in Coolidge v. New Hampshire.26 It is a matter of speculation
whether Coolidge solved more problems than Chambers raised, but
it is clear that Chambers and Coolidge in combination are perplex-
ing if only because Coolidge does not purport to overrule Chambers.
When Coolidge became a suspect in a murder investigation, he
voluntarily produced guns for police inspection, voluntarily took a
polygraph examination and was generally "cooperative." The police
finally determined that they had probable cause that Coolidge had
committed the crime and that crime-connected items were con-
tained in his house and two cars. The Court found that probable
cause for the arrest and searches in fact existed.
Armed with an arrest warrant for Coolidge and a search warrant
for the house and both cars (all of which were held defective), 6" local
police arrested Coolidge for murder, took him into custody, trans-
ported his wife and children (the sole remaining occupants of the
house) to the home of a relative, placed a guard at the house who
remained even after the subject car had been taken from Coolidge's
driveway and towed to the station house. There it was vacuumed
two days later, and twice more over a year later. Sweepings ob-
262. Id. at 50.
263. 397 U.S. 249 (1970).
264. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
265. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
266. They had not been issued by a neutral party. Id. at 449.
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tained during these searches were introduced at Coolidge's trial.267
Only four Justices of nine voting unequivocally concurred in the
automobile aspect of the majority opinion, which struck down the
warrantless search. Four Justices dissented, but only Justice Black
relied on Chambers.26 Justice Harlan concurred in the decision but
specifically only on other issues.2 ' Any attempt to define the
Coolidge holding on the automobile issue is haunted by a fear that
it held nothing at all.
The Court held Carroll inapplicable since the car was immo-
bile, not only at the station house, but as it sat in defendant's
driveway. This immobility was based on the following facts: (1) the
car was unoccupied in defendant's driveway when the police ar-
rived; (2) Coolidge was taken into police custody and his wife sent
away; (3) the car had been under police guard at all times after the
initial entry; (4) Coolidge had been under suspicion for two weeks
and had not made any attempt to elude the authorities; (5) the
evidence sought (sweepings indicating deceased's presence in car)
was not readily disposable. The Court noted:
A person who had the keys and could slip by the guard
could drive it away. We attach no constitutional signifi-
cance to this sort of mobility.270
Coolidge seems to say (1) temporary warrantless seizure of a car on
probable cause may be permissible (resolving the doubt Chambers
created) but a search of it impermissible; and (2) "mobility" is a
fact to be determined in a practical, common-sense way.
The Chambers holding that an impounded vehicle was mobile
seemed doomed. The Court avoided rejecting Chambers, however,
267. Id. at 448.
268. Id. at 493 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun and
the Chief Justice, relied on the Cooper-Harris line of cases. See Section V C infra for discus-
sion of those cases.
269. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion is a bit mysterious. He concurs in parts I, II-
D and Ill and in the decision, but does not join in part H-B, the section holding Carroll
inapplicable. Clearly, however, the prosecution need show only one basis for validating a
search and to concur in the result one would perforce have to exclude the Carroll exception.
Section II-D, in which Harlan joins, deals with Carroll also but does not definitively set forth
a theory for its inapplicability apart from that posited in I-B. The fairest assessment of the
matter is that Harlan was convinced of Carroll's inapplicability but could not agree entirely
with the I-B analysis and did not articulate his own reasons for his conclusion.
270. 403 U.S. at 461 n. 18.
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by stating that it said no such thing. Chambers, the Court argued,
involved a situation where a Carroll search could have been made
on the street at the initial seizure, and in such situations, the police
simply do not lose the power to search by moving the car. In
Coolidge there is never a mobile vehicle. But Chambers expressly
turned on the mobility at the station. Coolidge does not explain,
reconcile or overrule Chambers but changes its meaning. Coolidge
compels the following analysis: Was the car "mobile" in a common-
sense way immediately before seizure? If not, no Carroll-type search
is permissible. If so, that right will continue notwithstanding the
near-total immobilization by impoundment. Yet if this is what
Coolidge means, it overlooks that "mobility" is an "exigent circum-
stance" and triggers a warrantless search only because the oppor-
tunity to search is fleeting. As mobility disappears, so too does the
exigency. The Coolidge Court seemed, in other portions of the opin-
ion, extremely sensitive to the need for carefully limiting warrant
exceptions.21 The theory that a Carroll right to search, once at-
tached, does not disappear is not necessary to the decision, is at
odds with the sense of the opinion, and exists, perhaps, only to avoid
overruling Chambers outright.
It is not entirely clear why Coolidge's car should be considered
immobile as it sat in his driveway. The fact that the police secured
it by guarding it and ushering away all those with a propensity to
move it does not appear dispositive since, as the Court says,
Chambers presents a vehicle mobile where it was seized. But in
Chambers all those with a motivation to move it were arrested. The
"mobility" is one, if Chambers means what Coolidge says, which
must be measured prior to seizure since all seized vehicles are im-
mobile. (If immobility is to be temporary, as where the occupants
are not to be arrested or where it is inconvenient for the police to
"secure" the car, the potential "mobility" is real and a Carroll
search is authorized upon probable cause.) Both Chambers and
Coolidge, then, involved cars truly "immobilized" by seizure. The
only difference in mobility seems to be that in Coolidge the motiva-
tion to move the car and dispose of the evidence was absent (1)
because the defendant, perhaps, had no reason to suspect the car
contained "evidence," and (2) the evidence was of a type not readily
disposable. As to mobility at the scene, then, Chambers and
271. See Section II-D of the Court's opinion.
[Vol. 8
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 [1974], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol8/iss3/1
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Coolidge standing together admit of three interpretations: (1) the
lack of motivation to dispose and "ready disposability" are the only
operative differences, and Coolidge is therefore an "extreme" case
and Chambers remains largely viable (this does not appear to be the
"sense" of Coolidge); (2) Coolidge overrules everything in Chambers
but the result (this requires some imagination since the result of a
prior case needs no protection if the rationale is to be destroyed);
(3) Coolidge limits Chambers by re-exploring it (the problem here
is that it does not limit Chambers nearly enough since in both cases
the cars were "mobile" before seizure except for "motivation" and
ready disposability.
When police seize and impound a vehicle, the warrant require-
ment frustrates no immediate police need, and there appears no
sound reason for permitting a Carroll-type search and dispensing
with the warrant requirement since both turn on the same
thing-existence of probable cause-and since the warrant affords
greater protection. It is hard to discern what outbalances the indi-
vidual's interest in being accorded the extra protection of a warrant
in what is admittedly a balancing procedure. 2 The individual's
right is protected in two ways: (1) if the magistrate does not find
probable cause, the intrusion will not take place at all and (2) if the
magistrate does so find, review of probable cause will be only on
facts actually extant before the search.
The Court has often asserted in this context, and others, that
"the question is not whether it is reasonable for the police to search
without a warrant, the question is whether the search is reason-
able. 213 It is perplexing why the second question is not merely an-
other way of expressing the first.
2. Lower Courts-Post-COOLIDGE
State and federal courts have responded differently to
Chambers and Coolidge. The Fourth Circuit recently evidenced
some frustration with the "state of flux" created by Coolidge and
272. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
536-37 (1967). The only conceivable arguments are: (1) it is inconvenient to get a warrant in
the limited sense that it takes time and effort; (2) the magistrate would refuse to issue even
where there is probable cause; (3) the intrusion of seizure has already occurred and a further
intrusion should not raise constitutional problems.
273. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474 n. 29 (1971), quoting United States
v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950).
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Cady v. Dombrowski."4 Since Dombrowski, unlike the Carroll line,
involved a probable cause exception, it should be separated from
Coolidge to avoid confusion."'
The Fourth Circuit recognized at least one constant running
through all Supreme Court automobile cases-the danger of loss of
evidence at some point and holds proof of such danger
indispensible.276 Since the officers could have temporarily guarded
the car while another obtained a warrant, the Court continued, such
danger was not present. While the decision may represent good
fourth amendment law, it is not compelled by Coolidge.
Recent cases upholding warrantless automobile searches have
been forced to deal with Coolidge. Although there is an occasional
suggestion that the automobile issue in Coolidge did not command
a majority and is, therefore, not controlling,2" two patterns of dis-
tinction are developing.
Several courts, recognizing that the immobility determination
in Coolidge rested on a combination of factors disproving any need
for speed, distinguish situations where immobility is not as strong.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, for example, distinguished
Coolidge from a case before them, noting (1) that the car was ini-
tially confronted in the street, not the suspect's driveway, and (2)
the search, unlike Coolidge, was made immediately after probable
cause arose so that the risk of loss was higher.278 The Sixth Circuit,
on the other hand, found the facts in Lewis v. Cardwell2 indistin-
guishable from Coolidge since probable cause had been extant for
two weeks in that case also, and the fear of loss was minimal.
One inevitable trend has gained momentum. As Carroll clearly
permitted warrantless auto searches because "mobility" was itself
an "exigent circumstance," it was thought unnecessary to identify
other exigent circumstances to uphold an automobile search. Since
Coolidge, however, courts have upheld searches of autos on probable
274. United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097 (4th Cir. 1974).
275. Dombrowski in fact involved a quasi-inventory. While there was some indication
that the police expected to find a particular item (a revolver), the Court did not express a
finding of probable cause, but based the decision on a rationale separable from those in
Chambers and Coolidge.
276. United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097 (4th Cir. 1974).
277. State v. LaPorte, 62 N.J. 312, 301 A.2d 146 (1973).
278. Id.
279. 476 F.2d 467 (6th Cir. 1973).
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cause with proof of the same types of exigencies long accepted for
house searches.380 The most prevalent is proof of others in a position
to dispose of evidence, such as in Vale."8' The Ninth Circuit has
pointed out that the presence of confederates must exceed a "gener-
alized fear," but when demonstrated will permit a warrantless
search." The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that exigent cir-
cumstances must be shown to permit warrantless searches of auto-
mobiles under police seizure and struck down the search, on proba-
ble cause, of a vehicle stopped in transit.8 This result is clearly
beyond anything required by Coolidge.
Finally, some courts have resolved the precise Chambers ques-
tion-automobile, "mobile" at scene, impounded and then
searched-both ways. Many speak of the immobility at the police
station as operative. 84 While this may be within the spirit of
Coolidge, the Court in Coolidge seemed insistent on saving the
Chambers result. Others find mobility at the scene determinative.2 115
Justice Harlan, concurring in Coolidge, spoke of the need for an
"overhauling" of search and seizure law."8 If such is to take place,
the automobile doctrine warrants early treatment. Until the Court
clarifies Carroll-Chambers-Coolidge, lower courts will continue to
decide cases on an almost wholly ad hoc basis.
V. DOES THE CASE FIT AN EXCEPTION TO THE PROBA-
BLE CAUSE REQUIREMENT?
Although probable cause is a necessary ingredient of a valid
warrant, a search may be "reasonable," and therefore valid under
the fourth amendment, absent both probable cause and a warrant.
It should be borne in mind throughout this section that the exis-
tence of probable cause or the use of a warrant are irrelevant in the
context of a search which falls under one of the probable cause
exceptions. The following are the most commonly recognized excep-
tions to the probable cause requirement.
280. People v. Dumas, 9 Cal. 2d 871, 512 P.2d 1208, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1973).
281. 399 U.S. 30 (1973).
282. United States v. Connally, 479 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1973).
283. State v. Hargiss, 288 So. 2d 633 (La. Sup. Ct. 1974).
284. Mobley v. State, 270 Md. 76, 310 A.2d 803 (1973).
285. People v. Wiseman, - Ill. App. 3d -, 303 N.E.2d 522 (1973).
286. 403 U.S. 443, 490 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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A. SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
The question of the availability, scope and consequences of a
search conducted incident to arrest probably has occupied more
Supreme Court time than any other fourth amendment issue. Its
history has been tortuous-cases have been rejected, reinstated,
only to be abandoned again. The present state of the law is perhaps
less intellectually satisfying than former approaches, yet it is rela-
tively easy to apply. This is important since policemen must make
judgments in this sphere almost daily.
1. Lawful Arrest
Any evidence discovered by a search incident to an unlawful
arrest is excluded as a fruit of the poisonous tree. 87 The legality of
an arrest, for its own sake, has received scant judicial treatment
since little turns on it.2m If the arrest is quashed, the defendant is
generally susceptible to immediate re-arrest. In addition, the valid-
ity of the arrest cannot be challenged at many stages in the pro-
cess. 89 Thus, the law of arrest has developed in cases where the
arrest formed the putative basis for a search because the search was
incident to arrest, because a "plain view" discovery was made dur-
ing the arrest procedure, or because a confession was obtained as a
result of that detention.2 10
a. Necessity of Probable Cause
Since an arrest is a "seizure" of a person, it must be reasonable
to comply with the fourth amendment. 9' In all but the area of "stop
and frisk" (see Section V F infra), probable cause for arrest is an
indispensible element of this "reasonableness." Probable cause for
arrest differs from probable cause to search only insofar as the set
of conclusions which must be probable are different. The conclu-
sions that (1) a crime has been committed, and (2) that the arrestee
committed it, must both be probable in order to justify arrest. Ques-
tions of qualifying the concept of "probable cause," and of what
287. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
288. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 475 (1971).
289. See Note, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 1182, 1207-08 (1952).
290. The fourth amendment and the exclusionary rule apply not only to hard evidence
but to confessions which are the product of unlawful arrests. Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963).
291. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
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types of facts, including hearsay, police records and tips from in-
formants, may properly be used are resolved just as they are in the
search context (see Sections II B, II C supra).
The Supreme Court has announced a decided preference for
arrests made pursuant to warrant, so that in a case where probable
cause is borderline, the presence or absence of a warrant may be
determinative.21 2
b. Necessity of Arrest Warrant
It is a strange curiosity that the Supreme Court, long emphasiz-
ing the necessity for search warrants in a variety of contexts, has
not, with perhaps one short-lived exception, 23 addressed the necess-
ity of warrants for arrest. The Court recently remarked in Coolidge
v. New Hampshire:
It might appear that the difficult inquiry would be when it
is that the police can enter upon a person's property to seize
his "person . . . papers and effects," without prior judicial
approval. The question of the scope of search and seizure
once the police are on the premises would appear to be
subsidiary to the basic issue of when intrusion is permissi-
ble. But the law has not developed in this fashion. . . It
is clear then, that the notion that the warrantless entry of
a man's house in order to arrest him on probable cause is
per se legitimate is in fundamental conflict with the basic
principle of fourth amendment law that searches and sei-
zures inside a man's house without warrant are per se un-
reasonable in the absence of some one of a number of well-
defined "exigent circumstances. '294
Yet in Coolidge itself, the Court "assumed" an arrest inside the
defendant's house was valid without attempting to identify any
exigent circumstances.95
In the absence of Court decisions delineating when the fourth
amendment requires warrants for arrests, most states have adopted
the common law rule permitting warrantless arrests in all felony
292. Id.
293. See MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 144, at 270-71, referring to Trupiano
v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948) and United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
294. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 475-77 (1971).
295. 403 U.S. at 455.
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cases and for all misdemeanors committed in the officer's pres-
ence.296 The percentage of arrests for misdemeanors committed out-
side the presence of police is minimal, and, even in those situations,
warrantless searches may be upheld upon the showing of certain
exigencies.297 Until the Court speaks and acts with reference to ar-
rest warrants, there is no reason to suspect this approach will be
modified. The fourth amendment, thus provides exceedingly greater
protection against the invasion of a man's house, car or other private
place than against the invasion of his person and restraint of his
liberty.29
2. The Scope of the Search-CHIMEL v. CALIFORNIA
The primary focus of the long line of Court decisions concerning
searches incident to arrest has been the permissible scope of those
searches. The most recent decision, Chimel v. California,299 modi-
fied a 1950 case which had required merely that the search be
"reasonable" in scope 00 and added much needed predictability into
this area. Chimel held that searches incident to arrest are reasona-
ble insofar as they are necessary to prevent the arrestee from pro-
ducing a weapon and threatening the officer's safety or effectuating
an escape, or concealing or disposing of evidence, a danger most
prevalent in narcotics cases. Recognizing that there is no "point of
rational limitation once the search is allowed to go beyond the area
from which the person arrested might obtain weapons or evidentiary
items," the Court strictly limited the scope to (1) the arrestee's
person and (2) the area within his immediate control. 01
The right to conduct a search incident to arrest is limited not
only by scope and some triggering factor (see Section V A 3 infra),
but by two other limitations. First, the search must be reasonably
contemporaneous with the arrest to be "incidental" thereto. If the
search comes too early (i.e., before probable cause to arrest devel-
ops) it clearly cannot be considered incidental to the arrest. Unless
there is some other basis for upholding such search, the fruits clearly
296. See MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 144, at 270.
297. Id.
298. If entry into the arrestee's house is necessary to effectuate the arrest, requirements
of daytime hours and knock and announce are applicable. See Section I C supra.
299. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
300. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
301. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
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cannot be used for any purpose. This does not mean, however, that
the police must have announced the arrest or even effected it prior
to the search. Mr. Justice Harlan observed in his concurring opinion
in Peters v. New York:
The Court implies, however, that although there is no prob-
lem about whether the arrest of Peters occurred late
enough, i.e., after probable cause developed, there might be
a problem about whether it occurred early enough, i.e.,
before Peters was searched. This seems to me a false prob-
lem. Of course, the fruits of a search may not be used to
justify an arrest to which it is incident, but this means only
that probable cause to arrest must precede the search. If
the prosecution shows probable cause to arrest prior to a
search of a man's person, it has met its total burden. There
is no case in which a defendant may validly say, "Although
the officer had a right to arrest me at the moment he seized
me and searched my person, the search is invalid because
he did not in fact arrest me until afterwards". . . . Hence
while certain police actions will undoubtedly turn an en-
counter into an arrest requiring antecedent probable cause,
the prosecution must be able to date the arrest as early as
it chooses following the obtaining of probable cause. 32
A search may also fail the "contemporaneous" requirement if
it comes too long after the arrest, even though it is within the physi-
cal scope of Chimel. The recent Supreme Court case of United
States v. Edwards3 3 indicates, however, a broadening of the concept
of contemporaneity in this regard. In that case, ten hours after the
arrest of defendant and while he was still in custody, police seized
the clothes he was wearing and subjected them to laboratory analy-
sis. The court upheld this warrantless search and seizure noting (1)
that the clothing was still within defendant's immediate control and
thus within the spatial scope of incident searches and (2) that since
defendant was still in custody resulting from the arrest, the search
was contemporaneous thereto. Both of these points are critical. In
Preston v. United States34 the Court held that a search of defen-
302. 392 U.S. 40, 76-77 (1968) (emphasis added).
303. 94 S. Ct. 1234 (1974). See also United States v. Williams, 416 F.2d 4 (5th Cir.
1969).
304. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
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dant's car while he was in jail was not incident to arrest because a
search at a time and place removed from the arrest is not contem-
poraneous thereto. It must be recognized, however, that in Preston
the automobile was not within defendant's immediate control when
it was searched.
The Court in Edwards seems to imply that an arrest involving
station-house custody is in fact a continuing arrest, and the search
need only be incident to the custody which is a product of such
arrest. For example, if the police were to arrest an individual and
release him immediately, a search ten hours later clearly could hot
be incident thereto. The only basic difference between such case and
Edwards is that the police never gave up their custody in Edwards
and the "arrest" therefore was still operative ten hours later.
The second limitation on the right to make a search incident
to an arrest deals with highly intrusive personal searches which
pierce the body shell such as "body-cavity" searches, or drawing
blood for chemical testing. Proof of a high level of suspicion (usually
expressed as a "clear indication") must be made to justify such
searches .305
In addressing the question of whether a search remained inside
an area within the arrestee's "immediate control," lower courts
since Chimel have recognized a number of relevant factors in addi-
tion to the threshold questions of distance, and general accessibility.
The two most prevalent of these factors are the extent of police
restraint of the arrestee and the objective indications of danger at
the scene of the arrest.
The Fifth Circuit held that a briefcase one and one-half feet
from the defendant was not within defendant's immediate control
after he had been handcuffed by FBI agents.3 16 Similarly, the Sec-
ond Circuit, rejecting "the notion that Chimel's 'immediate control'
test permits law-enforcement agents to search the entire room in
which an arrest takes place," struck down a search of a closet in a
one-room apartment since six BNDD agents had the arrestee under
restraint and one agent stood between her and the closet. 07 On the
305. See discussion of Schmerber v. California, 394 U.S. 757 (1966), supra note 233 and
accompanying text.
306. United States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1973).
307. United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1973).
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other hand, a Maryland court upheld a search under the front seat
of an automobile as one arrestee stood, unshackled, at the door and
the other sat on the passenger side of the front seat."8 These cases
are clearly explained in terms of the degree to which the arrested
defendants were restrained or controlled by the officers involved.
But some courts have apparently ignored the fact of police restraint
entirely and have upheld searches which would be within the arres-
tee's immediate control if such restraint were absent.'"' This is a
misapplication of both the letter and the spirit of Chimel.
In Preston v. United States"' a search of an impounded vehicle
at the police station after the arrestee was in custody was held not
to be incident to arrest because too remote in time and place and
therefore not contemporaneous. Preston was, however, decided be-
fore Chimel; such searches today are also defective as incident to
arrest since the automobile, whatever may have been the case at the
scene of arrest, is clearly beyond the arrestee's immediate control
once he is permanently separated from it. A seeming paradox is
presented, however, by situations in which police do not intend to
take the arrestee into more permanent custody at the station house
or jail, but intend to release him immediately. Presumably the area
within his immediate control is now increased since he may, when
the temporary restraint is lifted, more readily obtain a weapon or
evidence. This would mean that such searches could be more exten-
sive when less restraint is exercised. Yet two recent Court decisions
(see Section V A infra) have indicated that searches incident to non-
custodial arrests must be based on demonstrable indications that
dangerous weapons may be present or that destruction of evidence
is threatened. It would seem that these proofs could seldom be made
in non-custodial arrests since such arrests normally involve petty
offenses.
The Sixth Circuit recently upheld a search of a desk-type table,
three to five feet from an arrestee who was forced to stand against
the wall.31' The court noted that he had not been handcuffed (as
the arresting officers had none) and was "still resisting and trying
to move in directions other than those described by the officers,"
308. Howell v. State, - Md. App. -, 306 A.2d 554 (Ct. Spec. App. 1973).
309. State v. Reynolds, 32 Ohio St.2d 101, 290 N.E. 2d 557 (1972).
310. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
311. United States v. Becker, 485 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1973).
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and, all in all, "the situation was not completely under control."3',
The court distinguished an earlier case in which an officer had
blocked arrestees' path to the place searched and both arrestees
were entirely controlled. While the matter of restraint was impor-
tant, the court pointed out that the arrestee was potentially danger-
ous and had, by his actions, given cause to be more concerned about
his reaching a weapon or evidence.3"3 In a decision invalidating a
search of a closet urged as incident to arrest, the Second Circuit
stated:
Nor did the officers here involved point to any articulable
reasons leading them to believe that [the arrestee] was an
especially dangerous person against whom extraordinary
measures may have been required, or that the search was
actually an attempt to secure an area which the officers, in
good faith, subjectively believed was within [her] area of
immediate control.3 1 4
Several recent decisions have upheld "protective sweeps" of a house
after an arrest to search for persons who may be inclined to destroy
evidence left behind." 5 The Seventh Circuit makes it clear that such
practices cannot be upheld as incident to arrest since they are
clearly beyond the scope authorized in Chimel.3 They may, how-
ever, be valid under the "exigent circumstance" doctrine of Vale v.
Louisiana311 (see Section IV A 2 supra) if there is evidence of the
presence of others and probable cause as to the presence of crime-
connected items.
3. Triggering the Right to Search Incident to Arrest
Chimel defined the scope of a search incident to arrest, but left
open the question of whether every arrest triggers the right to make
a search within that scope. The rationales for such searches were
clearly identified as (1) protecting the officer's personal safety by
renuvlig weapons and (2) preventing immediate destruction of evi-
dence.31 8 The Court did not make it clear whether the right to search
312. Id. at 55.
313. Id.
314. United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 80 (2d Cir. 1973).
315. See note 247 supra and accompanying text.
316. United States v. Gamble, 473 F.2d 1274 (7th Cir. 1973).
317. 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
318. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
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was limited to arrests in which one of these dangers could be demon-
strated, or whether, since these possibilities occur in some situa-
tions, the search is reasonable in all. It is obvious that in many
arrests, especially for minor offenses, there is no threat to the safety
of the arresting officer, nor evidence capable of immediate disposal,
either because the offense is one which carries no tangible evidence
(such as most traffic violations) or because attendant circumstances
indicate the evidence cannot be present.
The answer appears to have come in the recent companion
cases, Robinson v. United States319 and Gustafson v. Florida;"" not
uncommonly, however, these cases raise new, unresolved problems.
Basically these cases hold that the mere fact of "custodial arrest"
triggers the power to make a Chimel-scope search.3"' (Nothing in
these cases changes Chimel's definition of the scope of such
searches.)3 ' -' "Custodial arrest" is somewhat misleading since every
arrest involves the restriction of freedom at least temporarily. The
term is, however, used to label an arrest involving a police decision
to render the custody more premanent by taking the arrestee to the
319. 94 S. Ct. 467 (1973).
320. 94 S. Ct. 488 (1973).
321. Id. at 491-92.
321.1. The text proceeds on the assumption that a search incident to a custodial arrest,
even where there is no evidence which could be destroyed and when no indications of "danger-
ousness" are present, is of the scope set down in Chimel-(1) the person and (2) the area
within his immediate control. This conclusion may be somewhat facile in light of the persist-
ent use in Robinson and Gustafson of the term "arrestee's person" without a concomitant
use of "area within his immediate control." Indeed, in Robinson the Court breaks down the
history of the search incident to arrest into two components: (1) the search of the person (the
Court intimates that the right to search the person was never in doubt); and (2) the scope of
the search incident to arrest beyond the person (which has, of course had a tortuous history).
94 S. Ct. at 471-73. After making this distinction, the Court concentrates on the search of
the person and specifically authorizes searches incident to custodial arrest as to "person"
searches. It is of course possible to conclude from this that a mere custodial arrest, in which
there is no danger of evidence destruction or threat of force, authorizes a search of the person
only, but not of the "area within his immediate control." Several considerations militate
against this interpretation. First, the Court does not speak in these cases of the inventory of
a person's belongings typical in connection with custody at the police station or local jail. If
it did the decisions could be viewed as a stepped-up inventory. Instead, the Court deals with
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and with the need of police to protect themselves in suspect
confrontations. Since an arrest, and especially a custodial arrest, is a more serious invasion
of personal liberty than a "stop," the Court refuses to require even the "reasonable suspicion"
of dangerousness requirement that Terry imposes prior to making a frisk. 94 S. Ct. at 473.
The Court firmly rests the right to make a custodial arrest on the arresting officer's interest
in protecting himself. 94 S. Ct. at 476. Second, Chimel's definition of the scope of a search
incident to arrest was different in kind than all the cases preceding it and did not merely
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station house or jail.322 Taken with Chimel these cases indicate that
proof of any one of the following three conclusions will trigger the
right to search incident to arrest: (1) the officer's personal safety is
threatened; (2) disposal of evidence is threatened; (3) a "custodial
arrest" has been made. Thus a search incident to a non-custodial
arrest may still be valid under (1) and (2).
Robinson and Gustafson provoke three pertinent questions: (1)
Must it be shown that the decision to take the subject into "cus-
tody" was reached prior to the search? (2) Must this decision be
announced prior to the search? and (3) Are there constitutional
limitations on the decision to take a subject into custody?
As to the first, it seems reasonably certain that, insofar as the
fact of the custodial arrest gives rise to the right to search, the
decision to conduct such an arrest must be a fact prior to the search
itself. Clearly it is the arrest for the crime initially suspected, and
not the arrest generated by items uncovered by the search, which
must be "custodial."
The second question is more difficult and in one sense nearly
inseparable from the first. If the decision to make a "custodial ar-
rest" need not be announced prior to the search, the procedure of
searching and then making the "custody" decision based on the
result of the search becomes possible, if not invited. Moreover, it
would be extremely difficult to prove that this is, in fact, what
happened. The most obvious solution would be to require an an-
nouncement to the arrestee that he is the subject of a "custodial
arrest." Of course, the policeman could lie about having given the
warning, or the suspect could lie about having received it; yet this
is preferable to resolving the issue solely by reference to the state of
mind of one person. If the search is made because of the safety or
restrict the area of permissible scope. Unlike earlier cases, the scope set down in Chimel,
whichi reached beyond the arrestee's person itself, was not an effort to delineate an additional
area of search (such as a house or a room or an automobile) but was instead a recognition
that the search of the person of the arrestee might be meaningless if areas within his immedi-
ate grasp could not be searched as well. It seems fair to conclude that when Robinson and
Gustafson refer to a search of an arrestee's "person," the area within his immediate control
is meant to be included. The fact remains, however, that the Court's opinions in these cases
leaves the issue in doubt when the arrest is custodial but not accompanied with indications
of "dangerousness" or the threat of evidence destruction. If either of these indications are
present, it is clear that the full Chimel-scope search is permissible.
322. Robinson v. United States, 94 S. Ct. 467, 476-77 (1973).
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evidence-preservation grounds, the need for speed may outweigh
any requirement for announcement. In such situations, however, the
same danger is not present since the officer must be able to articu-
late some facts to support his conclusion that one of these conditions
existed.
Mr. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Gustafson raises
the third question:
It seems to me that a persuasive claim might have been
made in this case that the custodial arrest of the petitioner
for a minor traffic offense [failure to have driver's license
in his possession] violated his rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments.32
The reasonableness of an arrest, like the reasonableness of a search,
is ultimately referable to the balancing of the interests of law en-
forcement and of the particular individual. The Court has, in vary-
ing contexts, clearly held that the extent and duration of the intru-
sion is a matter to be balanced. 31 In Robinson and Gustafson the
evidence indicated that custodial arrests for the violation in ques-
tion were not invariable, though not uncommon.3 25 Evidence of past
police practices would appear to be relevant in resolving the reason-
ableness inquiry, but it is likewise arguable that no amount of past
police practices can render all custodial arrests reasonable. Apart
from the fourth amendment issue, principles of selective enforce-
ment and equal protection may be applicable in certain circumstan-
ces though such cases often require enormous proof.
32
4. "Pretext" and "Timed" Arrests
Occasionally the situation arises in which, given a valid arrest
and a search apparently incident thereto, courts have excluded the
evidence because the arrest was a "pretext" made only to trigger a
search not independently justifiable due to the absence of probable
cause. Thus, for example, a policeman with mere suspicion that X
possesses narcotics, may arrest him on a minor offense (often a
traffic offense such as failure to have an operative license plate
323. Gustafson v. Florida, 94 S. Ct. 488, 492 (Stewart, J., concurring).
324. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
325. 94 S. Ct. 488, 491 n. 3.
326. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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light) for the primary purpose of making the "incidental" search to
recover the narcotics. In these situations it is the arrest which is
incidental to the search and not the reverse.
Because showing an arrest was a "pretext" requires proof of a
policeman's subjective intent, it is difficult to prove even when sus-
pected. The relatively few successful attacks on this ground have
invariably included objective indications that the primary police
desire was the "incidental" search. In one recent case the police,
knowing a suspect had been driving on a suspended license, waited
until they believed he possessed narcotics before arresting on the
license charge and found narcotics during the "incidental" search." 7
The court suppressed the evidence, stating the arrest was made "for
the purpose of circumventing his fourth amendment rights." '28 Oc-
casionally proof of the pretext can be made not by showing the
actual intent of the officer, but by reference to his function in the
department. For example, proof that the detective who stopped and
arrested defendant for doing 36 M.P.H. in a 30 M.P.H. zone and
discovered narcotics in the incidental search was assigned to the
narcotics division and did "not generally make traffic arrests" (es-
pecially of so minor a character) was a crucial factor in the court's
decision to suppress.32
Circumstances present at the scene may turn an invalid pretext
arrest into a permissable arrest and Chimel search. In Green v.
United States,3 3 police officers suspected that four persons were
involved in a confidence game. Before probable cause developed,
the police stopped three of the men for questioning. Two were ar-
rested for vagrancy and searched. The fruits of those searches were
suppressed since the vagrancy ordinance had been "corrupted in use
so as to constitute a tool of avoidance or shortcut to the basic re-
quirements of due process in the adminstration of justice." 33' During
the questioning, however, the police noticed a straight-edged razor
protruding from the third man's pocket and arrested him on a con-
cealed weapons charge. The search incident to that arrest was
upheld though "motivated by the same suspicion.1 32
327. Blazak v. Eyman, 339 F. Supp. 40 (D. Ariz. 1971).
328. Id. at 43.
329. Amador-Gonzales v. United States, 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968).
330. 386 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1967).
331. Id. at 955.
332. Id. at 956.
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It is difficult to articulate a test for pretext arrests. One court
stated that it is a "question of the motivation or primary purpose
of the arresting officer."3 3 This approach, which concededly identi-
fies the chief characteristic of pretext arrests, may be unworkable
in certain situations. For example, it is difficult in the weapons
arrest in Green to identify which purpose was primary. It may be
too restrictive of surveillance practices to require that the offense
which triggers the arrest present a graver problem than the offense
subjectively suspected. Perhaps the test should be whether, in light
of all the circumstances, the arrest would have been made absent
the pre-existing desire to search in connection with another offense.
Therefore in Green, the police could be expected to make an arrest
for concealed weapons. However, the officers would not have made
the vagrancy arrest but for the pre-existing desire to conduct a
search.
Closely allied to the "pretext" arrest is one which is "timed."
Here the arrest is for the same offense for which the police desire to
search, but is delayed until the suspect is in a place (such as his
house, or automobile) where the incident search is most likely to
yield fruits. Here, as in the "pretext" cases, the arrest itself may be
upheld, but the search incident to that arrest invalidated.3 m Proofs
in a "timed" arrest case must show that the police deliberately
disdained earlier clear opportunities to arrest for the sole purpose
of enhancing chances on the incident search. There are many
legitimate reasons for delaying arrest such as developing more evi-
dence, or minimizing the risk to the policeman or bystanders. When
such factors are shown, the search will be upheld even though the
time and place of the actual arrest may also increase the likelihood
of discovering evidence in a search incident thereto. And of course
there is no objections to an arrest "timed" to occur as quickly as
possible and before the suspect disposes of evidence, provided only
there is antecedent probable cause.
"Timed" arrests are a less serious problem after Chimel limited
the scope of incidental searches. No longer can police, by the expedi-
ent of delaying an arrest until a suspect is in his house, search the
entire house incident to that arrest. "Pretext" arrests, however, may
333. Williams v. United States, 418 F.2d 159, 161 (9th Cir. 1969).
334. McKnight v. United States, 87 U.S. App. D.C. 151, 183 F.2d 977 (1950).
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be more of a danger today because of the widespread narcotics
traffic and the fact that narcotics are often carried on the person,
an area clearly within the Chimel scope.
B. CONSENT
1. Consent by Defendant
As with most rights, the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures can be relinquished by voluntary consent. In
the recent case of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,1'5 the Supreme Court
set down standards by which alleged consent should be evaluated.
Initially, the prosecution bears the burden of showing the existence
of consent "freely and voluntarily given. ,36 "Voluntariness" is itself
an "amphibian ' 337 reflecting a balancing of society's interest in law
enforcement and the individual's interest. In determining voluntari-
ness in each case, reference should be had to the "totality of circum-
stances" including the defendant's age, education, and intelligence,
the length of detention, the intensity and duration of police contact,
the presence or absence of physical or psychological punishment or
"third degree" methods, and whether or not defendant was in-
formed of his constitutional right not to consent.3
The defendant argued, as one circuit had held, 339 that, similar
to Miranda's340 treatment of in-custody confessions, no consent
should be valid absent prior announcement of the right not to con-
sent. The Court rejected this notion, stating:
[I]t would be thoroughly impractical to impose on the
normal consent search the detailed requirements of an
effective warning. Consent searches are part of the standard
investigating technique of law-enforcement agencies. They
normally occur on the highway, or in a person's home or
office, and under informal and unstructured conditions.
The circumstances that prompt the initial request to search
335. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
336. Id. at 222.
337. Id. at 224.
338. Id. at 248-49.
339. Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
340. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court held that confessions pro-
duced by custodial interrogation were admissible only if the defendant was first advised,
among other things, of his constitutional right not to speak.
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may develop quickly or be a logical extension of investiga-
tive police questioning. 4'
The Court went on to point out that such setting is "a far cry from
the structured atmosphere of a trial" and "while surely a closer
question," "immeasurably far removed from 'custodial interroga-
tion.' "34 Responding to the assertion that consent acts as a waiver,
and that waivers, at least of constitutional rights, must be "an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right," the
Court stated that waivers, as so defined, apply to rights necessary
to a fair trial, but that the fourth amendment has "nothing to do
with the fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial." '43 The Court
stressed that failure to instruct as to the right to refuse consent is a
factor in determining "voluntariness" but not a sine qua non. In
addition, the Court stated that it would ask too much of police
officers in an unstructured street setting to make difficult on-the-
spot determinations of "waiver." Yet, the "totality of circumstan-
ces" test itself appears to call for just such a sophisticated judg-
ment. If the police have no other valid ground for conducting a valid
search, acting pursuant to questionable consent may result in sup-
pression of the fruits. The police decision to search, then, involves
more than an evaluation of the consent: it also involves a judgment
on whether alternative investigative techniques, including surveil-
lance, may offer a higher probability of obtaining usable evidence.
Once a bad search occurs, it becomes difficult-impossible in some
cases- to cure it.
344
Bustamonte is strictly limited to consents given by persons not
in custody. Other courts have held, both before and after
Bustamonte, that consent given while in custody should be closely
scrutinized, and several courts have stated that no in-custody con-
sent is valid because of the implicit coercion involved. Certainly, in
custodial settings, the announcement of the right to refuse would
normally be required, although one post-Bustamonte case held an
in-custody consent with no announcement valid stressing the defen-
dant's experience and education. There is authority that if the de-
fendant's consent is motivated by a desire to receive a benefit from
341. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231-32 (1973).
342. Id. at 232.
343. Id. at 242.
344. See United States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1973).
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the state (such as a recommended light sentence or a promise to "go
easy" on others) it is valid.m5 On the other hand, a non-custody
consent given after a warning may be invalid under the "totality"
test.
Several common police practices have been challenged as per
se coercive. In Bumper v. North Carolina34 1 the Court held invalid
any consent given after the police indicate they have a warrant since
"he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the
search. '347 Bustamonte should have little effect in this area as the
Bumper Court held such practice implicitly coercive, indicating
that a consent under such circumstances would be "voluntary" only
in an extreme case. 348
2. Third-Party Consent
It is well accepted that an individual's rights under the fourth
amendment, unlike other constitutional rights, can be lost through
the action of a third party. The Court recently re-affirmed that "a
consent search is fundamentally different in nature from the waiver
of a trial right '349 and, therefore, the consent may come from some-
one other than the putative defendant.
Several theories have been advanced over the years both to
explain the rationale and delimit the effectiveness of third-party
consent. The earliest appears to have been the agency-or apparent
authority-test, which reasoned that the ultimate defendant had,
in law if not in fact, appointed the third person his agent. This
test has largely fallen into disuse, not only due to the patent absurd-
ity of an appointment, fictional or otherwise, of persons to waive
one's constitutional rights, but also because the statement of the
rule did not suggest any natural guidelines for its application.
Presently, nearly all third-party consents are measured by the
;45. United States v. Culp, 472 F.2d 459 (8th Cir. 1973).
346. 391 U.S. 543 (1968). See also Holloway v. Wolff, 482 F.2d 110 (8th Cir. 1973).
347. 391 U.S. at 548 (1968).
348. In Earls v. State, __ Tenn. -, 496 S.W.2d 464 (1973), the defendant, who had
"some college education," after being told the police had a warrant (which later proved
defective), stated "you needn't have brought a search warrant. You gentlemen are welcome
to search anywhere on my premises you want to search and take anything you find." The
Court held this "invitation" to search overcame the Bumper rule.
349. United States v. Matlock, 94 S. Ct. 988 (1974).
350. Id. at 992.
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relationship of the consenting party to the place searched, and not
his relationship to the ultimate defendant. The authority to consent
to the search of a place turns on "mutual use of the property by
persons generally having joint access or control for most pur-
poses, ' '31 1 and not on "subtle distinctions, developed and refined by
the common law in evolving the body of property law which, more
than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinc-
tions largely historical. 352
Thus, a person with joint access and control over a house may
consent to a search thereof as against a spouse, paramour, child or
casual guest.353 With respect to children, especially minors, courts
generally presume total access and control by parents. 5' Yet the rule
of joint access has two limitations. First, a person with a legally
recognized right of access who, in fact, does not normally exercise
such a right, does not have a sufficient relationship with the "place"
to consent to its search. Thus, a mother who had, for a period,
respected her 19-year-old son's stated desire that she not enter his
room, could not consent to a search of the room, especially since the
son had locked it.315 Second, while one may enjoy actual control or
access over most portions of a house, he may not consent to a search
of areas which are in actuality held privately by the suspect.3 5 For
example, consent by a homeowner to search the room occupied by
his brother-in-law, a casual guest, was held valid, but consent to
search his duffel bag located within that room was not since the
evidence indicated no right of access or actual access to it.317 Thus,
if X and Y share an apartment but each maintains a separate bed-
room kept private from the other, X may consent to a search of his
351. Id. at 993 n.7
352. Jones v. United States, 372 U.S. 256, 267 (1960).
353. United States v. Robinson, 479 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1973) (paramour); Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (spouse); People v. Nunn, __ Ill. 2d __, 304 N.E.2d
81 (1973) (child); State v. Jackson, 85 N.M. 465, 513 P.2d 399 (1973) (casual guest).
354. Bender, Third Party Consent to Search and Seizure: A Request for Reevaluation,
4 CRIM. L. BULL. 343, 344 (1968).
355. People v. Nunn, __ Ill.2d _, 304 N.E.2d 81 (1973). The court announced a
new test for third-party consent-whether the suspect has a reasonable expectation that a
given individual will not consent to a search. For discussion of this aspect of the case, see
note 90 supra and accompanying text.
356. Bender, Third Party Consent to Search and Seizure: A Request for Reevaluation,
4 CrM. L. BULL. 343, 350 (1968).
357. State v. Johnson, 85 N.M. 465, 513 P.2d 399 (1973).
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bedroom and the common living quarters but not to Y's bedroom.
That notions of property law are largely irrelevant in this con-
text is demonstrated most vividly by landlord-tenant cases. A land-
lord who normally gives temporary but exclusive control to the ten-
ant may not consent as against the tenant. 8 Possession, not title,
is the keynote. This is likewise true of the owner of a rooming
house"' or, television crime-drama notwithstanding, the owner-
proprietor of a hotel or motel.38 Such labels as "landlord," "head
of household," or "casual guest" are used not because such legalities
are determinative, but to import the actual physical arrangement
practiced with respect to a given area. An employer may, for exam-
ple, consent to a search of the work area of an employee, but not to
an area set aside for the private use of the employee.361 The general
rule of actual control applies as well to partners, co-tenants and
agents.3
2
The test of access and control applies equally to the consent
search of movable personal property. Thus, the consent to search a
suitcase or duffel bag depends on the consenting party's past use of
such container.36 3 In Frazier v. Cupp,8 4 the Supreme Court "dis-
missed rather quickly" the argument that, while a duffel bag was
used in common by defendant and a third party, part of the bag was
used exclusively by defendant, and consent to search that part was,
therefore, invalid. This does not mean that part of a "place" or
"thing" may not be the subject of consent though the rest is, but
only that such argument, when directed at a duffel bag, represents
a "metaphysical subtlety.113
Property law concerning custody of personal property is, like-
wise, not determinative. A bailee, for example, may consent to a
358. Bender, Third Party Consent to Search and Seizure: A Request for Reevaluation,
4 CRIM. L. BULL. 343, 350 (1968).
359. McDonaid v. Uaited States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
360. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
361. Bender, Third Party Consent to Search and Seizure: A Request for Reevaluation,
4 CRIM. L. BULL. 343, 347 (1968).
362. Mintz, Search of Premises by Consent, 73 DICK. L. REV. 44, 53-56 (1968).
363. Erickson v. State, 507 F.2d 508 (Alaska 1973).
364. 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
365. Id. at 740. The Court in United States v. Matlock makes it clear that the state
must show that the consenting party had control over the particular portion of the house
searched.
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search of bailed goods only when the nature of the bailment suggests
a conveyance of sufficient control. Containers bailed for transporta-
tion or storage have been held not a subject of consent by the bai-
lee,"'6 though factors such as the simultaneous bailment of a key, or
actual instructions by the bailor, are important. 3 1 Often, however,
when the law effects the transfer of custody of personal property (as
with the baggage of a defaulting guest of an innkeeper under a
statutory lien) the custodian may consent to its search since the
custody is not limited by agreement or the intent of the parties.38
One class of case-the consent by high school officials to
searches of areas of supposed privacy, such as lockers-is difficult
to explain with reference to the "control" theory. These cases, often
criticized, rest on the theory that high school officials stand in loco
parentis to the students and, therefore, can consent on the same
basis as parents."' There is, presently, a tendency to relax the fourth
amendment in the school-drug area;3 0 yet, the problem deserves
scrutiny on that honest level, not by denominating as a "parent"
someone whose loyalties to his "child" are normally subordinate to
his loyalty to police authorities with whom he often develops a pat-
tern of collaboration."' Such consent arising at the college level has
generally been held invalid. 2" This result can be explained on the
decreased need for direct supervision, the increased age of the
"child," and higher judicial respect for a dormitory room (a
"house") than for a locker or desk.
One other test for the validity of third-party consent recently
advanced by a few writers 33 and adopted in at least one state3' is
whether the suspect has a "justifiable expectation" that others will
not consent. It is highly unlikely that this approach will gain wide-
366. Mintz, Search of Premises by Consent, 73 DICK. L. REv. 44, 64 (1968).
367. Id. at 84.
368. Id. at 64.
369. See, eg., People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 299 N.E.2d 596, 283 N.Y.S.2d 22
(1967), remanded, Overton v. New York, 303 U.S. 85 (1968).
370. Waters v. United States, 311 A.2d 835 (D.C. Ct. App. 1973).
371. Note, Admissibility of Evidence Seized by Private University Officials in Violation
of Fourth Amendment Standards, 56 CORNELL L. REv. (1971).
372. E.g., Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971).
373. Tigar, Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HAiv. L. REv.
1, 14-16 (1970).
374. People v. Nunn, - Ill. 2d -, 404 N.E.2d 81 (1973).
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spread acceptance. Although the Court hinted in Frazier v. Cupp375
that the Katz language may be useful in the consent context, a
recent Supreme Court case dealt with third-party consent strictly
on the control theory without mentioning this aspect of Frazier.7
In addition, like the agency approach, the "justifiable expectation"
analysis (sometimes expressed as "assumption of risk") is concep-
tually difficult to apply. The principal inquiry is whether society
deems an expectation reasonable (assuming it exists at all) and,
thus worthy of protection. Such an approach assumes that society
is willing to tolerate some third-party waivers of fourth amendment
rights, but not all. If one accepts the first premise, it becomes diffi-
cult, other than arbitrarily, to define the second. So long as the
third-party consent area is in general soluble only on arbitrary
grounds, the arbitrariness ought at least be predictable. Such pred-
ictablity is extremely important to police in the consent setting
since decisions must be made rapidly in "unstructured" settings
which break quickly. The "control" approach has at least this bene-
fit. Perhaps it is not completely unfair to suggest that the sense of
the law is that the expectation of non-consent from someone with
requisite control is not justifiable.
Finally, the Court recently held that, apart from the power to
consent, third persons who consent must, as the suspect himself, do
so "voluntarily" under the guidelines of Bustamonte.3 7 It would
appear, however, that the prosecution's burden will be lighter in
these cases since the party in question does not view himself as a
suspect and would more likely consent absent any coercion.
3. Implied Consent
Recent statutes, expecially prevalent in the drunk-driving, air-
port and military contexts, have provided that certain activities of
an individual will imply a consent to specified governmental intru-
sion. 378 Such consent is fictional and generally survives an express
indication of non-consent. In fact, "implied consent" has little to do
with consent. Though an over-simplification, the validity of such
statutes depends ultimately on whether the intrusion "consented
375. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
376. United States v. Matlock, 94 S. Ct. 988 (1974).
377. Id. at 993.
378. E.g., IND. CODE § 9-4-4.5-1 (1971).
[Vol. 8
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 [1974], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol8/iss3/1
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
to" is one which would be reasonable without consent.
C. AUTOMOBILE INVENTORIES
The police seizure of an automobile incident to arrest of the
occupant is generally defensible as serving interests in road safety,
the protection of the car itself, and the convenience of the owner.
When no probable cause exists as to the presence of crime-
connected items in the car, the right to search is not controlled by
the Carroll line of cases. 79 Often, warrantless searches of seized
automobiles without probable cause are sought to be upheld as
"inventories." The urged rationales are the police's duty to protect
items belonging to the car's owner and a need to protect themselves
from civil liability for the actual or alleged loss or destruction of
valuables. The inventory process protects the police in two ways: (1)
by reducing valuables to their exculsive control, it prevents loss or
destruction; and (2) by making a record of the valuables, it facili-
tates a defense against unjust claims by embittered arrestees.380
The Supreme Court has, since 1967, decided three cases which
could have been decided squarely on the "inventory" issue. In each
case, it upheld police procedures which, without probable cause to
search, resulted in discovery of evidence in a seized automobile; but
in each case it avoided squarely deciding the inventory issue and
rested the holding on other considerations. Yet the decisions do
suggest Court approval of several of the underlying justifications for
the inventory process, and to that extent foster a mood of
acceptance.
In Cooper v. California"' the police had arrested defendant in
his car for selling heroin and by state law were required to impound
the car and hold it pending forfeiture proceedings. A week later
while forfeiture proceedings were still pending, a police search dis-
covered incriminating evidence in the glove box. Despite the con-
ceded absence of probable cause, the Court upheld the search.
They seized it to impound it and they had to keep it until
forfeiture proceedings were concluded. . . .The forfeiture
of petitioner's car did not take place until over four months
379. See Section IV B supra.
380. Miles and Wefing, supra note 254, at 145-53.
381. 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
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after it was lawfully seized. It would be unreasonable to
hold that the police, having to retain the car in their cus-
tody for such a length of time, had no right, even for their
own protection, to search it.382
The dissenters in a recent Court decision have suggested that
Cooper rests on the proposition that "the police were authorized to
treat the car in their custody as if it were their own, and the search
was sustainable as an integral part of their right to retention."3 3 Yet
while Cooper does contain an element of colorable title, its rationale
is broader-a search conducted for the protection of the police. But
what interest of the police is protected by such right? Absent indica-
tions that the auto's presence represents a threat to safety, such
searching appears to protect police only from unjust civil
claims-the chief justification offered for inventories in general.
Most courts have read Cooper narrowly as extending the right to
search only impounded automobiles subject to forfeiture proceed-
ings, 4 yet a few have read it as authorizing inventories in other
situations as well.3 5
In Harris v. United States,388 a policeman, pursuant to manda-
tory department regulations, searched an impounded vehicle to in-
ventory and protect valuables. At the conclusion of the search, while
securing the doors and windows, he saw a registration card bearing
the name of the robbery victim on the metal stripping over which
the door closed. The Court found it unnecessary to decide the inven-
tory issue since the evidence was not found as a result of the search,
but after the search had ended and while the officer was taking
measures only "to protect the car while it was in custody." au This
part of the officer's conduct was not a search at all, but a discovery
made "while engaged in the performance of [his] duty to protect
the car. .... ",388 The decision, then, recognizes some duty to protect
the car itself, if not the contents. Since this duty gives the police
the right to be near the car and to lock doors and windows, evidence
visible from any vantage point at which the police have the right to
382. Id. at 61-62.
383. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 450 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
384. O'Reilly v. United States, 486 F.2d 208 (8th Cir. 1973).
385. Miles and Wefing, supra note 254, at 135-43.
386. 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
387, Id. at 236.
388, Id.
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be would not be the fruits of a search. Such viewing of crime-
connected items would, in turn, create probable cause as to the
presence of those items, and a warrant to seize the items seen would
probably not be required. 8 ' Finding such items may, in addition,
create probable cause as to the presence of other items within the
car. It would seem, pursuant to Coolidge,90 that a warrant would be
required to search for such items since probable cause and mobility
never co-existed. 9' Notwithstanding the fact that the court did not
rest Harris squarely on the inventory ground, many courts have read
it to authorize inventory.
The most recent and most apposite Court decision in the area
is Cady v. Dombrowski." ' Driving in Wisconsin, defendant Dom-
browski lost control and his car crashed through a guard rail into a
bridge abutment. He subsequently called the police to report the
matter, telling them he was a Chicago police officer. When the
police confronted him, they judged him drunk and arrested him for
drunk driving. The car was towed to a private garage at police
direction. The police, under the impression that Chicago police were
required to carry their service revolvers at all times and not having
found it on Dombrowski's person, searched the car for it pursuant
to "standard procedure" in such cases. The police testified that they
were concerned, due to low security at the private garage, that the
gun could have been stolen and fallen into the wrong hands. A
search of the trunk produced bloodstained items later admitted at
defendant's murder trial. There is no indication the police had the
slightest suspicion of a murder prior to this discovery. 3
The Court denominated this procedure a "search" and held it
reasonable. 9 The decision is, at the threshold, not controlled by
Carroll-Chambers-Coolidge394 . 1 because probable cause did not
exist. Even if there was probable cause to believe the revolver was
in the car (the Court concludes only that the officer "reasonably
believed" it was there) there was no probable cause that the item
sought was crime-connected. It was sought only so that the wrong
389. See Section V G 2 infra.
390. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
391. See note 255 supra and accompanying text.
392. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
393. Id. at 447.
394. Id. at 442.
394.1. See Section IV B supra.
19741
Berner: Search and Seizure: Status and Methodology
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1974
556 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
persons would not obtain possession of it. Rather the search was
upheld on principles "extrapolated" from Cooper and Harris. The
Cooper search protected the custodian's "safety;" the Harris intru-
sion protected the owner's property; and the search in Dombrowski
protected the general public "who might be endangered if an in-
truder recovered a revolver from the trunk of the vehicle. ' ' 315 This
public safety interest undoubtedly represents the bare holding, yet
broad language in the opinion can be taken as forecasting Court
acceptance of the inventory procedure.
The Court's previous recognition of the distinction between
motor vehicles and dwelling places leads us to conclude
that the type of caretaking "search" conducted here of a
vehicle that was neither in the custody of nor on the prem-
ises of its owner, and that had been placed where it was by
lawful police action, was not unreasonable solely because a
warrant had not been obtained. 9
It seems not entirely implausible to suggest that "caretaking"
searches of automobiles to protect judically recognized interests of
the police, the owner, and the public at large are inventories; the
remaining difference is that Dombrowski involved actual belief that
the inventory was particularly necessary under the facts known to
the police.
With notable exceptions, lower courts have generally upheld
police inventories. Various justifications have been advanced. Sev-
eral courts have held, since Harris, that a police inventory itself is
not a search since it is conducted not to uncover evidence, but to
protect interests of the police and the owner." 7 One court, relying
on the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure definition of auto-
mobile search as "an intrusion under color of authority . . . for the
purpose of seizing things," held that an inventory is not a search
since the avowed purpose is not to seize things. 9 On the other hand,
the California Supreme Court has stated that "regardless of pro-
fessed benevolent purposes and euphemistic explication . . . an
inventory search involves a thorough exploration by the police into
395. Id. at 447.
396. Id.
397. Miles and Wefing, supra note 254, at 135.
398. People v. Sullivan, 29 N.Y.2d 69, 272 N.E.2d 464, 323 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1971).
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the private property of an individual. ' 309 The Eighth Circuit re-
cently remarked: "To consider an inventory procedure not to be a
'search' does violence to the concept of the fourth amendment as a
protection of the privacy of the citizenry against unwarranted inva-
sion by governmental officials."4 °°
The Supreme Court has, in other contexts, held that state in-
trusion becomes no less a "search" simply because the discovery of
criminal evidence is not the purpose for the intrusion. In Camara
v. Municipal Court, the Court stated:
It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his
private property are fully protected by the fourth amend-
ment only when the individual is suspected of criminal be-
havior.40" '
Later in the same opinion, however, the Court listed the fact that
the search was not aimed at discovering evidence of crime as a factor
tending to show reasonableness. This seems, at least, to put the
fight in the right ring. Asserting that a policeman opening an auto-
mobile trunk is not engaged in a search because there is a legitimate
need apart from ferreting out crime is only slightly better than
saying: (1) a search is an intrusion into an area justifiably expected
to be private; (2) no one can justifiably expect to be free from rea-
sonable searches; therefore (3) all reasonable searches are not
searches. Katz cannot mean this. The "no search" theory simply
does not comport with established fourth amendment principles. In
addition, the theory is not even necessary as the inventory can, with
less torture, be upheld as a reasonable search.
The most plausible argument for upholding inventories is sim-
ply that they are reasonable. The Court has stated "there can be no
ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing
the need to search against the invasion which the search entails.4 02
A number of proffered factors appear on the governmental interest
side of the scale: (1) protection of the police officers when the car's
399. Miles and Wefing, supra note 254, at 138 n.152, citing Mozzetti v. Superior Court,
4 Cal. 2d 699, 705-6, 484 P.2d 84, 88, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412, 416 (1971).
400. United States v. Lawson, 483 F.2d 535 (8th Cir. 1973).
401. 387 U.S. 523, 530 n.6 (1967) citing Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 254-56
(1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting); District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
402. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
19741
Berner: Search and Seizure: Status and Methodology
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1974
558 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
presence is a threat to their safety; (2) protection from spurious
claims; (3) protection of the owner's property; (4) protection of the
public from objects, especially firearms, within the car coming into
the hands of others; (5) it is "standard procedure.14 3 None is
completely persuasive. The last is, at best, a bald assertion of rea-
sonableness, and at worst, a suggestion that all police conduct
which becomes "standard" ought to be tolerated. Factors (1) and
(4) represent highly unusual cases. When articulable evidence indi-
cates the presence of such dangers, a search properly limited to its
purpose would undoubtedly be reasonable. Factors (2) and (3) rep-
resent the heart of the governmental interest and are present in
nearly every case. As to (3), however, the owner is in the best posi-
tion to judge whether he desires this protection and if he does, he
can request or consent to such a procedure. The fear of spurious civil
claims or loss to the owner is surely real yet may be exaggerated.
One Arizona court observed:
Unscrupulous persons who desire to steal articles will sim-
ply not list them on the inventory. Owners who wish to
assert spurious claims against law enforcement officers or
the garage owners can simply claim that the officers did not
list them on the inventory. In fact, we can envision instan-
ces when the taking of an inventory may actually alert po-
tential thieves to the value of items contained in the auto-
mobile. 4
In combination with the advanced positive goals of police in-
ventory is a recognition that a police inventory is, by its nature, less
intrusive in fact than a search for items of crime. 0 5 Two limitations
on the way an inventory is conducted would serve to make it more
reasonable, and some courts have insisted the inventory remain
with these limits.
First, since the avowed purpose is to protect valuable items, the
search should be limited to those portions of the car where such
items are normally kept. Thus a search of the visible portions of the
cab, the glove box, the trunk, and perhaps under the front seat, may
be reasonable, but a prying behind seats, under rugs, under the
403. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 443 (1973).
404. Miles and Wefing, supra note 254, at 141 n.169, citing In re One 1965 Econoline,
17 Ariz. App. 64, -, 495 P.2d 504, 506 (1972).
405. Id. at 136.
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hood, or into the structural portions would clearly go beyond the
stated purpose.'"' When the police have the right to search a car for
evidence, they are limited as well to places where the objects may
be found, but items of crime, expecially contraband, are often in-
geniously hidden and the scope is therefore relatively broad.
Second, since an inventory is a protective technique, not a
quest, it need not involve the opening of all natural containers. The
Supreme Court of Oregon recently suppressed evidence found inside
a fishing tackle box during an inventory.
The officers testified they were not searching for evidence,
but were only inventorying the automobile's contents. With
no exigent circumstances present they could easily have
inventoried "one fishing tackle box," along with other items
in plain view.'" 7
One last approach is espoused by the D.C. Court of Appeals in
Mayfield v. United States."' The court there held that extensive
inventory searches were not "unconstitutional" but that any evi-
dence obtained during the inventory is inadmissible. While the re-
sult is beguiling in that it seems to protect all interests, it is a
mysterious application of the exclusionary rule. The rule exists only
to enforce fourth amendment rights. If the search is constitutional,
it is hard to see what interest of the defendant is being enforced by
suppression other than an interest to be free from incriminating
evidence, an interest not entitled to protection for its own sake. The
net effect of the decision, which may indeed be the intent, is to make
such searches unreasonable in the criminal process context but rea-
sonable for the purposes of any civil liability of the police. In any
event, since the search is not denominated as unconstitutional, such
use of the exclusionary rule cannot be constitutionally mandated
but results from the appellate court's supervisory power over lower
406. Id. at 137 n. 143. See People v. Andrews, 6 Cal. App. 3d 428, 85 Cal. Rptr. 908,
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 908 (1970). See also People v. Garrison, 189 Cal. App. 2d 549, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 398 (1961).
407. See State v. Keller, - Ore. 510 P.2d 568, 570 (1973). See also State
v. Florance,__ Ore. App. -, 515 P.2d 195 (1973); contra, Boulet v. State, 109 Ariz. 433,
511 P.2d 168 (1973). In searching persons incident to arrest, however, the police generally may
open closed containers found on the person. State v. Duboy, - Me. __, 313 A.2d 708
(1974).
408. 276 A.2d 123 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971).
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federal courts. Under this theory, states would be free to admit
evidence so found.
D. ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES
The overwhelming majority of "search" law has developed in
the context of a police quest for evidence of criminality. It is that
context which forms the primary focus of this article. However,
since certain rationales employed in the "administrative search"
cases are easily, perhaps too easily, extended to the "competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime,"4 9 these cases are briefly consid-
ered.
In Camara v. Municipal Court,"" the Supreme Court examined
the reasonableness of an inspection by a local housing inspector
pursuant to an ordinance to establish compliance or non-
compliance with health regulations. Overruling a prior decision
which had upheld such inspections as touching "at most upon the
periphery of the important interests safeguarded by [the fourth and
fourteenth amendments]," 4" the Court reasoned:
[i]t is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his
private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment only when the individual is suspected of criminal be-
havior.4"2
The Court held that such administrative searches were unreason-
able unless consent was given or a warrant procured. The Court
identified the evil of such searches as follows:
Under the present system, when the inspector demands
entry, the occupant has no way of knowing whether enforce-
ment of the municipal code involved requires inspection of
his premises, no way of knowing the lawful limits of the
inspector's power to search, and no way of knowing whether
the inspector himself is acting under proper authoriza-
tion."'
409. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
410. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
411. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
412. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 n.6 (1967) citing Abel v. United
States, 362 U.S. 217, 254-56 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting); District of Columbia v. Little,
178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
413. 387 U.S. at 532.
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The warrant procedure, presumably, would diminish these evils,
but so could other forms of documentary proof. In rejecting respon-
dent's contention that "the warrant process could not function
effectively in this field,"4"4 the Court presented itself with a perplex-
ing problem. The fourth amendment provides that "no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause;" there is, however, nothing
"probable" which triggers such inspections-if anything, the
inspector will "probably" find compliance. The Court concluded:
[I]t is obvious that "probable cause" to issue a warrant to
inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administra-
tive standards for conducting an area inspection are satis-
fied with respect to a particular dwelling."5
The essence of the holding is that an administrative search con-
ducted pursuant to a search warrant is reasonable if the inspection
scheme is reasonably necessary. Since a warrant cannot be valid
apart from probable cause, the concept of "probable cause," which
has a definite, if undefinable,traditional meaning is unfortunately
compromised in the process. The holding may be reducible to this:
if inspection schemes are reasonably necessary such inspections are
reasonable when conducted pursuant to warrant, and such warrant
shall issue upon probable cause to believe such searches are reason-
able.
The Court listed the following bases for the reasonableness of
such searches: (1) a "long history of judicial and public accep-
tance;" (2) public interest demands that dangerous conditions be
abated; (3) the intrusion occasioned is "relatively limited" because
"the inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the
discovery of evidence of crime."4 ' These are basically the same
arguments made by respondent to urge upholding warrantless
inspections. They explain the conclusion of "reasonableness;" they
do not explain probable cause.
And yet the compromising of "probable cause" is not crucial in
Camara itself since a strong argument in favor of reasonable war-
rantless searches can be made. Therefore, requiring a warrant which
imports some notice to the homeowner in fact increases protection.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 538.
416. Id. at 535-37.
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It is conceivable, however, that this use of "probable cause" can
result in validating searches unreasonable if warrantless partly
because of the absence of probable cause. For instance, in Davis v.
Mississippi,"7 it was suggested that temporary detention of a crimi-
nal suspect for fingerprinting on less than probable cause to arrest
may be reasonable if done pursuant to warrant."' The primary (if
not only) defect of such warrantless arrest is the absence of probable
cause. The issuance of such warrant would have to be on Camara-
type probable cause, which is contrived probable cause. When the
absence of probable cause is the primary defect in a warrantless
search, it is hard to accept a Camara-warrant as curative. The only
protection it affords is notice, and in the context of police seizure,
lack of notice is certainly not the problem.
Recently, Justice Powell suggested that although random
searches by border patrols outside the "functional equivalent" of
the border were unreasonable, the use of "area warrants" (describ-
ing an area identified as one where there is a high incidence of alien
traffic) may validate such random searching."9 While the opinion
stresses the need for empirical showings of high incidence, probable
cause in the traditional sense is not envisioned as the test, since
probable cause in that sense could rarely be shown. Camara-type
probable cause is meant-yet, again, it is the lack of probable cause
which renders such searches unreasonable to begin with. (Clearly
the lack of a warrant is generally immaterial since these random
searches involve the stopping of moving vehicles, long an exception
to the warrant requirement.2 )
Cases since Camara disclose a retreat from its warrant
requirement, though the opinions are always careful to distinguish
the case on facts. Thus in United States v. Biswell2 the Court
upheld a warrantless inspection of a federally licensed gun dealer,
stressing (1) that such searches were a reasonable exercise of license
policing and (2) unlike Camara and See v. Seattle2 in which any
417. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
418. For a discussion of Davis, see Section V F 3 infra.
419. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 275 (1973) (Powell, J., concur-
ring).
420. See Section IV B supra.
421. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
422. 387 U.S. 541 (1967). See was the companion case of Camara. The Court extended
the Camara ruling to warrantless, forced entry of a locked warehouse at night. Id. at 545.
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violation would be "relatively difficult to conceal or correct in a
short time," the requirement of a warrant in Biswell would frustrate
inspection since advance notice would be given.4"3 In conducting
administrative searches, as the Court pointed out in Camara, the
inspector would first seek consent, which would be given in most
cases. Only when withheld would a warrant be procured. If evidence
of a violation were easily disposable, the inspectors would be forced
to obtain a warrant for every inspection-otherwise, any person in
violation could refuse initial entry and conceal evidence before the
warrant could be obtained. To the extent that the Camara-Davis
warrant may gain acceptance in searches conducted -primarily to
uncover crime, the initial attempt for consensual entry would be
foolish except in cases in which the evidence sought could not easily
be concealed, such as fingerprints or voice or handwriting character-
istics.
In Wyman v. James424 the Court held home visits by ADC case-
workers a "reasonable search" without a warrant noting that ad-
vance notice was generally given anyway. The Court distinguished
Camara stating that refusal to admit the caseworker was not a crime
as was refusing the housing inspector in Camara. It is difficult to
see why such difference should be operative. First, commission of
the crime of refusing entry depends itself on the reasonableness of
the search-it is not a fact arguing for or against reasonableness.
Second, the continuation of ADC benefits cannot be conditioned on
waiving constitutional rights."5 Perhaps this part of James can be
taken as forecasting the eventual demise of the Camara warrant
requirement. It is hoped that if this happens, Camara-type probable
case dies as well.
E. BORDER SEARCHES 4
26
The Supreme Court in the recent case of Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States417 reaffirmed the long standing proposition that,
though within the purview of the fourth amendment, searches of
423. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972).
424. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
425. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
426. A border search is, of course, a type of administrative search; however, since its
development antedated Camara and rests essentially on different rationales, it is considered
separately.
427. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
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incoming persons and things at the international border are reason-
able in many situations where the same conduct would be unreason-
able in the interior. Although many reasons have been advanced for
the different standard, such as a long history of public acceptance,
minimal intrusion, the high incidence of unlawful entry of persons
and items, the primary basis is the need for national self-protection
from the entry of certain unwanted persons and items.4 18
1. Degree of Suspicion
While many cases speak of the right to search at the border
upon "mere suspicion" or "unsupported suspicion," the fact is that
border searches are upheld absent any suspicion.4 21 It is "reason-
able" in all cases to require one entering the country "to identify
himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which
may be lawfully brought in. 430 The fact is that at many ports of
entry everyone is searched regardless of whether or not he is sus-
pected of carrying unlawful items. Clearly, then, the fact of border
crossing triggers a right in the government to conduct a full search
of that person's luggage, automobile and other effects and a search
of the person's outer clothing.431
As the search of the person increases in intrusiveness, however,
escalating standards of suspicion must be met. If a "strip" search
is to be conducted, for example, "real suspicion" must be shown.432
If the body's outer shell is to be pierced, as by a search of the rectum
or vagina, or by forced vomiting, a "clear indication" must be
shown-a standard initially imposed by the Supreme Court for the
drawing of blood samples.4 Some cases indicate, however, that
"clear indication" is less stringently applied in this context so that
the test produces results similar to the standard of probable cause
in non-border cases. However, at any level of required suspicion, no
court has required the obtaining of a warrant for searches at the
border.
2. The "Border" and its "Functional Equivalents"
The Court stated in A lmeida-Sanchez that
428. 267 U.S. 132, 160 (1925).
429. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 289 (1973) (White, J., dissent-
ing).
430. Id. at 272 quoting from Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
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[W]hatever the permissible scope of intrusiveness of a rou-
tine border search might be, searches of this kind may in
certain circumstances take place not only at the border
itself, but at its functional equivalents as well.434
As examples of such functional equivalents, the Court listed "an
established station near the border, at a point marking the conflu-
ence of two or more roads that extend from the border," and any
airport terminal with respect to international arrivals.13 5
The search of defendant's car in Almeida-Sanchez had been
made by a "roving patrol" twenty-five air miles north of the Mexi-
can border at a point past the confluences of other roads, not all of
which led into Mexico. Notwithstanding the Government's urging
to label the search reasonable due to the high use of this road for
unlawful alien traffic, and the wide expanse of unpatrolled border
in the region, the Court found that such a search was not function-
ally equivalent to a search at the border.
Not every search conducted on the open road or past a specified
distance from the border is outside the border search category, how-
ever. Language of the Ninth Circuit is particularly instructive:
Where, however, a search for contraband by Customs offi-
cers is not made at or in the immediate vicinity of the point
of international border crossing, the legality of the search
must be tested by a determination whether the totality of
the surrounding circumstances, including the time and
distance elapsed as well as the manner and extent of sur-
veillance are such as to convince the factfinder with reason-
able certainty that any contraband which might be found
in or on the vehicle at the time of search was aboard the
vehicle at the time of entry into the jurisdiction of the
United States. 3 '
F. STOP AND FRISK
1. The "Stop" on "Reasonable Suspicion"
In Terry v. Ohio437 and companion cases,438 the Court scruti-
434. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973).
435. Id. at 273.
436. Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1966) quoted in 8 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 435, 438 (1971).
437. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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nized the early phase of police-suspect confrontation, theretofore a
"low visibility" procedure. Pressed on the one side to invalidate all
encounters not satisfying traditional arrest and search theories, and
on the other to keep such preliminary encounters isolated from
fourth amendment scrutiny, the Court did neither. Rather, it held
that a "stop" was enough of an arrest to activate fourth amendment
concerns yet not so much as to require "probable cause," the mini-
mum requirement for traditional arrest. Likewise, a "frisk" was a
"search" but not a "full-blown" search, and something less than
probable cause would suffice. In fashioning tests for "stops" and
"frisks," the Court announced that the issue could be resolved only
by a balancing of interests.439 On the one side is the critical need for
aggressive law enforcement and crime prevention, and the fact that
"stops" or "frisks," as defined in Terry, are lesser intrusions than
"arrests" and "searches." On the other hand, even temporary re-
straint and limited searching "is a serious intrusion upon the
sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse
strong resentment.""44
Of course, the events which may trigger a policeman's suspicion
are nearly infinite-yet Terry attempts to formulate a workable test
to decide when an officer may pass from observation and surveil-
lance to the imposition of detention, however temporary. To vali-
date a "stop," the police must show (a) that "specific and articula-
ble facts . . . taken together with rational inferences from those
facts" (b) lead him "reasonably to conclude in light of his experi-
ence that criminal activity may be afoot."44' This language, usually
shortened to "reasonable suspicion," remains the central inquiry in
evaluating a police decision to "stop" a suspect.
Terry seemingly imposed other restrictions, but the more recent
case, Adams v. Williams,442 renounces their importance. First, in
Terry the "specific, articulable facts" came from direct police obser-
vation but in Williams the "stop" was predicated entirely on an
informant's tip, yet was held proper. More important, Terry in-
volved observed activity which indicated that the suspect was an
438. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
439. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
440. Id. at 17.
441. Id. at 30.
442. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
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immediate threat to the police or others (actions suggesting impend-
ing robbery attempt). In Williams the suspected offenses were pos-
sessory only and even though possession of a firearm was "reason-
ably suspected," nothing suggested that the suspect's activities
pointed toward the attempted commission of any crime beyond pos-
session. Many courts have extended the Terry rationale to
"stops" for possessory offenses, even when the facts do not raise any
suspicion about firearms or other incipient danger.44 3
Recent decisions in the "reasonable suspicion" area are largely
irreconcilable. The Second Circuit has upheld a stop on little more,
apparently, than the observation of a "known" drug dealer emerg-
ing from a "restaurant known to be a headquarters for the narcotics
trade" possessing "the brown paper bag which has long been a sort
of hallmark of the narcotics business." '444 In so holding, the Court
referred to "the rather lenient test for a stop" enunciated in
Williams.445 On the other hand, the D.C. Court of Appeals recently
invalidated a stop made on school grounds after the suspect had
shoved money into an envelope after meeting with a known addict
and engaged in "furtive" movements to conceal the envelope from
the approaching officer.446
The point is that the outcome of any balancing test is deter-
mined, perhaps even pre-determined, by the weight one subjectively
ascribes to the factors being balanced. It is true that probable cause,
admittedly importing a higher suspicion than "reasonable suspi-
cion" is also partially subjective; however, while incapable of pre-
cise definition, "probable cause" has been molded by thousands of
cases and is today substantially an objective measure. "Reasonable
suspicion" is as yet too young to have acquired a well-recognized
sense.
Several factors in the "reasonable suspicion" inquiry, however,
should be considered, but often are not. Many recent cases have
relied at least in part on "furtive" conduct as justifying initial police
intrusion.447 Insofar as Terry requires "specific, articulable facts,"
443. E.g., McKessick v. State, - Ala. __, 284 So. 2d 516 (1973).
444. United States v. Santana, 485 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1973).
445. Id. at 368.
446. Waters v. United States, 311 A.2d 835 (D.C. Ct. App. 1973).
447. E.g., State v. Sheffield, 62 N.J. 441, 303 A.2d 68 (1973). See also State v. Streeter,
283 N.C. 203, 195 S.E.2d 502 (1973).
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the assertion of "furtiveness" is conclusory and therefore inade-
quate. Just as in the probable cause determination, facts, and not
conclusions, should be required. For example, in applying the Terry
rationale to airport "stops," many courts have completely ignored
the requirement of "specific, articulable facts" and have sanctioned
the limited intrusion of a magnetometer search to everyone who
passes a given point.44
Second, many courts, in determining whether "reasonable sus-
picion" exists, refer to conduct of the suspect, such as flight or
nervousness, which is responsive to police presence or actioA. 449
Flight or other reactions at the recognition of police may be consid-
ered, but it is elementary that the prosecution cannot use evidence
(including a suspect's statement or conduct) caused by the "stop"
to justify the "stop.""45 The key question is: When did the stop
occur? For instance, if a person flees at the sight of police, whether
or not the police are actively engaging in surveillance of that sus-
pect, such fact may be considered with others to prove "reasonable
suspicion."45' It is clear in that instance that the suspicious conduct
pre-dated the stop. In a recent Seventh Circuit case, however,45 the
facts were not so clear. During a race riot at a high school, police
were tipped that three male Negroes with firearms had been seen
entering a yellow car. Upon seeing such a car with such occupants,
the police sounded the siren. The occupants then were seen "reach-
ing down," presumably either to hide weapons or to secure them for
use. The court utilized this "reaching down" in part to posit "rea-
sonable suspicion" without pinpointing the time of the "stop. 4 53
The dissent very correctly questions the use of such fact.",
Clearly a policeman who casually "stops" someone on the street
to ask for a match is not conducting a "stop." First, the policeman
does not intend to impose significant detention, and second, the
subject recognizes he is free to go. If he decides to walk away, the
448. McGinley and Downs, Airport Searches and Seizures-A Reasonable Approach,
41 FORDHAM L. REV. 293, 313-15 (1972).
449. See, e.g., State v. Wausnock, - Del. -, 303 A.2d 636 (1973) and United
States v. Adams, 484 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1973).
450. See Wong Sun v. United States, 461 U.S. 471 (1963).
451. E.g., United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1973).
452. United States v. Adams, 484 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1973).
453. Id. at 358.
454. Id. at 362 (Swygert, Chief Judge, dissenting).
[Vol. 8
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 [1974], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol8/iss3/1
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
officer will undoubtedly conclude that he is impolite, but certainly
would not impose physical restraint. A "stop" at the least, must
involve police-citizen contact in which the citizen, for however tem-
porarily, is not free to go. Sounding a siren and pulling a car off the
road inherently imports such contact. Police do not stop moving
vehicles to ask for a match, and the Ninth Circuit has held that
stopping a motorist to ask him questions about another suspect is a
"seizure" and thus a "stop." '455 Judicial use of an individual's
conduct which is responsive to the imposition of this contact per-
mits the police not merely to acquire "reasonable suspicion" but to
provoke it or, worse, create it.
If a policeman with probable cause to arrest stops a suspect, the
encounter will be judged by arrest standards even though no words
of arrest are spoken-even when the officer is not subjectively cer-
tain of probable cause.4"' The effect of this is to validate any discov-
ery of evidence through a "search" even when the procedure goes
beyond the permissible scope of a "frisk" (see Section V A 2 supra).
If an initial, forcible detention rests only on "reasonable suspicion,"
the discovery of evidence, at least theoretically, depends on the
policeman's remaining inside the "stop" and "frisk" scope.
Even inside that scope, however, many confrontations com-
mencing as "stops" ripen into arrest. The most common way this
occurs is through discovery of concealed weapons pursuant to the
"weapons frisk." In addition, during the "stop" for questioning or
the "frisk" for weapons, the officer may obtain a "plain view" (in-
cluding "plain smell," "plain touch" or "plain hear") which will
elevate suspicion to probable cause and trigger an arrest and inci-
dent search. 5 '
2. The "Frisk"
Since Terry involved a "stop" and "frisk" of an individual who
posed an immediate threat of violent activity, the question of
whether a "frisk" is a separately justifiable activity or depends on
a valid "stop" was raised. Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion,
stated: "I would make it perfectly clear that the right to frisk in this
455. United States v. Ward, 488 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1973).
456. See Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 76 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Cupp
v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973), discussed at note 481 infra and accompanying text.
457. E.g., United States v. Zamora, 364 F. Supp. 1170 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
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case depends upon the reasonableness of a forcible stop to investi-
gate a suspected crime," since "[a]ny person, including a police-
man, is at liberty to avoid a person he considers dangerous. .4" A
policeman's response to a "dangerous" person differs from the aver-
age citizen's response only when the "dangerousness" carries indicia
of criminality, extant or potential. The indication is that Justice
Harlan's resolution of this issue has been accepted-a "frisk," at the
very least, requires a prior right to conduct a "stop." But a "stop"
does not automatically trigger the right to "frisk." The officer, to
conduct a "frisk," "need not be absolutely certain that the individ-
ual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or
that of others was in danger."459 As Justice Harlan points out "the
right to frisk [after a valid "stop"] must be immediate and auto-
matic if the reason for the stop is, as here, an articulable suspicion
of a crime of violence." 6 If the presence of weapons is not normally
associated with the suspected criminal activity which validates the
stop, the police presumably must articulate "specific facts" on
which they concluded the suspect was "dangerous."
Once any "frisk" is justified, the actual procedure of "frisking"
like all searches, must not be broader than the rationale for its
initiation. "[L]imitations upon the fruit to be gathered tend to
limit the quest itself."46' The Court stated the purpose of, and the
intended "fruit" of a frisk:
The sole justification of [a frisk] is the protection of the
police officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be
confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to
discover guns, knives, clubs or other hidden instruments for
the assault of the police officer." 2
Clearly a "frisk" is not justified "by any need to prevent the disap-
pearance or destruction of evidence of crime," '463 but is limited to a
weapons search. In Terry the officer's frisk consisted in a "pat-
down" of the outer clothing and a reaching in only as to those who
458. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 33 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
459. Id. at 27.
460. Id. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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he believed from the pat-down to possess weapons. The Court held
this intrusion was within the permissible limit. This does not mean,
however, that a "frisk" to be valid must entail this two-step pat-
down process. The Court left the matter for development "in the
concrete factual circumstances of individual cases."484 In Williams,
the officer's first move upon confrontation was a reaching into de-
fendant's waistband precisely where an anonymous tipster had indi-
cated the firearm would be. This, the Court held, was a reasonable
frisk. The Fourth Circuit has extended the Williams-type frisk to a
valise carried by a suspect, since an informant had suggested that
the suspect often carried a pistol in the valise.4 5
The Ninth Circuit recently warned, however, that "frisks"
must be reasonably limited. The court, clearly exasperated with the
BNDD agents involved in the case, stated that the agent's fear
approaches paranoia. Even when 6 or 8 agents, all armed,
have a group of citizens herded into a room, a search of a
citizen's wallet is justified on the ground that it might con-
tain a razor blade. . . .The agents also showed that their
conception of a "frisk" includes seizing and inspecting all
papers in the wallets, pockets and purses of all residents."'
One other trend is developing in the area. An old (by search and
seizure standards) Court decision prohibits, in connection with a
valid premises search, the automatic searching of all persons on
those premises. 4"7 If the prosecution is careful, however, to denomi-
nate the activity a "frisk," several courts have validated the proce-
dure, apparently with little other evidence to suggest "dangerous-
ness" and without any "articulable facts" showing the person
"frisked" is engaged in criminal activity. 8 These decisions are espe-
cially troublesome in light of the blurred "search"-"frisk" line in the
wake of Williams.
If the frisk is properly limited, any discovery, whether of weap-
ons or not, is protected. Thus, if a policeman conducting a two-step
pat-down removes what feels like a gun but turns out to be drugs
464. Id.
465. United States v. Poms, 484 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1973).
466. United States v. Marshall, 488 F.2d 1169 (9th Cir. 1973).
467. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
468. United States v. Peep, 490 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1974). See also People v. Noreen,
- Colo. -, 509 P.2d 513 (1973).
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in a hard container, the drugs are admissible." 9 This outcome is
clearly proper under traditional "plain-view" concepts. [See Sec-
tion V G infra.] The valid discovery of evidence other than weapons
is possible in another way as well. Assume an officer conducting a
two-step pat-down touches what feels like contraband (this requires
a little imagination). Clearly the officer cannot remove it as part of
the "frisk" for weapons. But this valid tactile operation may give
rise to probable cause to arrest. Then a search incident to that arrest
will result in admissible evidence.
These results are all theoretically proper, yet they tend to invite
"stops" and "frisks" which are pretextual-which have as their pri-
mary desire the recovery of evidence other than weapons. 70
3. Temporary Detention-"Long Stop" or "Short Ar-
rest"?
Terry and Williams dealt with momentary detention for inves-
tigation. After a short encounter period, the policeman's options are
(1) conduct a "frisk" if justified by the Terry test, (2) effect an arrest
if probable cause develops, or (3) permit the suspect to go on his
way. Even in the last situation, Justice White saw a crime-
prevention value in that the suspect is now aware he is the subject
of official scrutiny and may abandon, at least temporarily, any
criminal design. 7'
The Court generally has invalidated "stops" of longer duration,
especially when a suspect is taken to headquarters. In Morales v.
New York 72 the defendant had confessed (after Miranda warnings)
during police-station detention. The Court remanded to the New
York courts indicating that the confession's admissibility under the
fourth amendment depended on the prosecution's showing (1) prob-
able cause existed for arrest and the detention represented a valid
arrest, (2) the defendant's presence at the station was voluntary, or
(3) the confession was not the "product" of the detention. The Court
left open the "question of legality of custodial questioning on less
than probable cause for full-fledged arrest.' 7 3 Less than a month
469. Comment, Constitutional Standards for Stop and Frisk, Guidelines and
Implementation, 5 CALIF. W.L. REv. 265, 274 (1969).
470. See Section V A 4 supra.
471. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34-35 (1968) (White, J., concurring).
472. 396 U.S. 102 (1969).
473. Id. at 105-06.
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later the Court decided Terry and upheld such questioning in a
street setting.
In Davis v. Mississippi,"' decided after Terry, the Court sup-
pressed fingerprint evidence obtained during the dragnet detention
of 24 persons, being satisfied that no probable cause existed. Since
the "reasonable suspicion" test is not alluded to, Terry is at least
tacitly limited to briefer, more informal, detention. In his opinion,
in Davis, Justice Brennan suggested that detention for fingerprint-
ing on less than probable cause to arrest may be valid if "narrowly
circumscribed procedures" were utilized.475 Two features of this
statement bear attention. First, Justice Brennan indicates that the
fingerprinting process is (1) highly scientific and reliable, (2) not
susceptible to a great deal of official abuse, (3) not repetitive and
(4) involves none of the "probing into an individual's private life
and thoughts which marks an interrogation or search.""47 Interroga-
tion and line-ups are expressly recognized as different, and
detention for such purposes, even on warrant, is most likely uncon-
stitutional.477 Second, the opinion states that
the general requirement that the authorization of a judicial
officer be obtained in advance of detention would seem not
to admit of any exception in the fingerprinting context.478
While the word "warrant" does not appear in that statement, Jus-
tice Harlan's concurring opinion takes it to import a warrant,479 and
it is hard to imagine what other form of prior judicial authorization
does not "admit of any exception" in this context. The fourth
amendment makes it clear that "no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause. . . ." The Court stated that probable cause for
arrest did not exist. Clearly probable cause for the "search" for
fingerprints can hardly exist independent of probable cause to arrest
the subject of the printing. There is, then, some mystery as to what
it is that must be probable. Justice Brennan refers to Camara v.
Municipal Court'0 in which the Court in an "administrative search"
474. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
475. Id. at 728.
476. Id. at 727.
477. But see Wise v. Murphy, 275 A.2d 205 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971).
478. Davis v. Mississippi, 384 U.S. 721, 728 (1969).
479. Id. at 728-29 (Harlan, J., concurring).
480. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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context wrenched probable cause from its traditional moorings. In
Camara, however, the search was arguably reasonable without prob-
able cause and the substitution of a new type of probable cause had
relatively little significance. The arrest and incident search in
Davis, however, fails initially because probable cause is lacking. Use
of Camara-type probable cause in this context is troublesome.
In Cupp v. Murphy,481 the Court recently upheld a station house
detention for the purpose of extracting scrapings from under the
suspect's fingernails. The police had not arrested Murphy, and in
fact did not arrest him until a month later. However, the Court
found that probable cause for the arrest had existed and that the
"search" was valid under Chimel as being incident to arrest.," The
Court here follows a point Justice Harlan made in Peters v. New
York-a search incident to arrest must be subsequent to probable
cause for arrest, but need not antedate the decision to arrest. Thus,
Murphy does not authorize station house detention on "reasonable
suspicion."
Two other recent cases are tangentially relevant. In United
States v. Dionisio4 - and United States v. Mara"4 the Court held that
a subpoena compelling a subject to appear before a grand jury and
give voice or handwriting exemplars was not an unreasonable sei-
zure absent probable cause. Whatever the rectitude of these cases
may be, however, they clearly rest on the traditionally broader
power of the grand jury, vis-i-vis the police, to develop evidence
through forced encounters.
G. PLAIN VIEW
1. Justified Prior Intrusion
The "plain view doctrine" is probably the most misunderstood
area of search and seizure. For one thing, the doctrine's title is too
narrow since "plain hearing," "plain smell" or "plain touch" are
likewise recognized. More important, however, is the fact that no
"doctrine" is necessary to explain the core principle-that any use
or derivative use of a police observation depends on proof that such
observation was not itself obtained during the course of conduct
481. 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
482. Id. at 295.
483. 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
484. 410 U.S. 19 (1973).
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violative of the fourth amendment. 85 Thus, the validity of the plain
view depends on the officer "being in a place he has a right to be.'" 8
It is necessary to differentiate the pure "plain view" cases from
cases where no intrusion has taken place. Thus, for example, a
policeman who, while walking down a sidewalk, inadvertently spies
contraband on the front seat of a parked car has in common usage
had a "plain view." Yet, since he had not entered any zone of pri-
vacy, the "plain view" doctrine is not involved, though utilizing it
here will lead to the correct result. The observation is protected
simply because no "search" or arrest took place. If, however, a po-
liceman in someone's house sees contraband in "plain view" on a
table, the entire matter turns on whether his being in the house was
justified. The Court stated recently:
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that
the police officer in each of them had a prior justification
for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvert-
ently across a piece of evidence incriminating the ac-
cused.48'
One recent case held that a police officer, standing on a cooperative
neighbor's porch, spied marijuana growing in defendant's backyard
in "plain view" notwithstanding that it was located behind a six-
foot fence. '88 The simple truth is that anything is in plain view once
one is in a position to see it. The relevant questions are: (1) Is the
police conduct which gives rise to the observation a "search,". "ar-
rest" or other intrusion governed by the fourth amendment?; (2) If
so, is it reasonable?; and (3) Did the officer stay within the proper
scope of such reasonable intrusion?
"Plain view" observations, then, always arise during police in-
trusion which has as its object something other than (or at least in
addition to) the search for and seizure of the items later observed
in "plain view." As the Court stated in Coolidge:
[I]t is important to keep in mind that, in the vast
485. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); State v. Taylor, 60 Wis. 2d 506,
210 N.W.2d 873 (1973).
486. LaFave, supra note 8, at 333.
487. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971). For the meaning of the word
"inadvertent," see Section V G infra.
488. United States v. McMillon, 350 F. Supp. 593 (D.D.C. 1972).
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majority of cases, any evidence seized by the police will be
in plain view, at least at the moment of seizure. The prob-
lem with the "plain view" doctrine has been to identify the
circumstances in which plain view has legal significance
rather than being the normal concomitant of any search,
legal or illegal." 9
Such cases arise during various types of intrusion. At the core of the
"plain view" doctrine is that the prior intrusion must prove valid.
a. Arrest
In many cases, the police observe items in "plain view" while
attempting to effect arrest. With a possible exception under the
"inadvertance doctrine"490 if the arrest is, or would be, lawful and
any intrusion into private areas is reasonably necessary to effectuate
the arrest, any "plain view" will be protected. The existence of
probable cause is, of course, indispensible, but, in most cases, an
arrest warrant is unnecessary."9' If the arrest involves the entry into
a house or other protected structure, requirements such as "daytime
hours" and "announcement of authority and purpose" must be
complied with.492 In addition, the police must demonstrate some
reason to believe the intended arrestee is present at such place
though this belief need not approach probable cause.49 Entering the
arrestee's own home is almost always reasonable in this regard.
Once inside, the police are entitled to search for the arrestee, though
the intensity and duration of such a search will be governed by the
likelihood under the circumstances that the suspect is present and
actively avoiding capture. As an outer limit of the scope, of course,
such search must be limited to places where a person may be
found.494
b. Hot Pursuit
A slightly different type of arrest and search was recognized in
Warden v. Hayden.495 An armed robbery suspect entered a house
489. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971).
490. See Section V G 3.
491. See Section V A 1 b supra.
492. See note 298 supra.
493. MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 148, at 267.
494. LaFave, supra note 8, at 284-86.
495. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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shortly after a crime. Police entered five minutes later in "hot pur-
suit" and seized firearms in a bathroom flush tank, ammunition in
a bureau drawer and under a mattress, and clothes (which matched
the description of clothes worn by the robber) in a washing machine.
Clearly the entry to arrest was proper, but the police could hardly
have been looking for the suspect in such places. Nevertheless the
Court upheld the seizures, reasoning that the police had the right
to search as well for weapons "which he had used in the robbery or
might use against them."4 '6 In emphasizing that all seizures "oc-
curred prior to or immediately contemporaneous" with the arrest,
the Court broadened the permissible scope of the search "to prevent
the dangers that the suspect at large in the house may resist or
escape."49 ' Since the search of the washing machine was within the
scope of a search for weapons, the observation of the clothes was
protected. The Court did not denominate the clothes as being in
"plain view" (though that would be the appropriate legal explana-
tion) perhaps because such would call attention to the meaningless-
ness of the doctrine's title. Warden v. Hayden is thus based on an
entry to arrest (1) immediately after the commission of a crime (2)
in hot lursuit of a suspect (3) known to be armed and dangerous.
Generalized searches for weapons during entry for arrest under other
circumstances are not so authorized.
c. Searches
Many "plain view" observations occur during a search for other
items. For such observations to be protected, it must be shown that
such searches were reasonable (which often, of course, requires a
warrant) and that the search stayed within permissible limits.
Thus, if the search is for particular items, the search must be lim-
ited to areas where such items can be found;498 if the search is inci-
dent to arrest, it must be limited to the arrestee and the area within
his immediate control. 99
d. Stop and Frisk
A vaild "stop"or "frisk" may lead to a plain view observation
of incriminating items. If that observation is within the permissible
496. Id. at 298.
497. Id. at 299.
498. LaFave, supra note 8, at 290.
499. See Section V A 2 supra.
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scope of such procedures, it is protected.'"" Often, since the officer
did not have sufficient basis for arrest of "full-blown" search ini-
tially, such observations may give probable cause leading to arrest,
which in turn leads to a search incident to arrest. This type of
escalating encounter is protected by the fourth amendment if the
prosecution can justify each step as being based on lawful prior
steps.
2. Seizure and Other Consequences of a "Plain View"
Observation
If a "plain view" observation is protected, the police may use
such observation to form probable cause for arrest or for a further
search; however, if the observation is not protected, any such use
would be "fruit of the poisonous tree."50 ' But having lawfully ob-
served items in "plain view," may the police immediately seize such
items, or must they obtain a warrant? The threshold question is
whether the items are connected with criminal activity either be-
cause they are contraband, fruits or instrumentalities of crime, or
"mere evidence" thereof. 0 2 In United States v. Gray,0 3 police con-
ducting a search for illicit liquor observed firearms in "plain view"
and seized them. The Sixth Circuit held such seizure improper since
(1) they were not contraband and thus not facially criminal, (2) they
had no connection with the suspected crime underlying the search
and (3) there were no other indications that they were connected
with crime in any way. 04 It was not, then, "immediately apparent"
that such items were "incriminating," 0 5 and they were, therefore,
improperly seized. It is difficult to quantify "immediately
apparent," but it is clear that the Constitution requires at least
probable cause to believe the items are connected with crime.
Assuming that it is immediately apparent that the viewed
items are incriminating, the next question is whether a warrant
must be obtained. Courts have almost universally answered this
question in the negative due to language in Warden v. Hayden'" and
500. Deberry v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. 1973).
501. United States v. Soviero, 357 F. Supp. 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
502. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
503. 484 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1973).
504. They were later found to have been stolen.
505. United States v. Gray, 484 F.2d 352, 355 (6th Cir. 1973).
506. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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Coolidge.0 7 And yet approval of the warrantless seizures in Warden
is at least partly explicable on the grounds that they were made
while defendant was in the house avoiding arrest-i.e., on "exigent
circumstances." In Coolidge, the Court noted:
Where, once an otherwise lawful search is in progress, the
police inadvertently come upon a piece of evidence, it
would often be a needless inconvenience, and sometimes
dangerous-to the evidence or to the police themselves-to
require them to ignore it until they have obtained a warrant
particularly describing it.5°B
The right, then, is triggered by the finding of "evidence."
Clearly it would be a meaningless exercise to leave an item to go to
a magistrate and convince him it is "probably" where it was left.
And yet probable cause for a search requires, in addition to the
probability of an item's presence in a particular place, the probabil-
ity of its criminal connection. The interposition of the "neutral and
detached magistrate" may serve as a valuable protection in cases
where criminal connection is not clear. When the items are contra-
band, warrantless seizure should doubtless be permitted. When,
however, an item does not carry criminality on its face, warrantless
seizures in the absence of exigent circumstances should not be so
readily permitted. Perhaps this is the intent of the "immediately
apparent" language in United States v. Gray.5"9
If the observation is proper, but the seizure improper, the evi-
dence itself will be suppressed; however, the police can still testify
to their observation of the evidence since it was not the product of
unlawful activity and since the subsequent unlawful seizure does
not taint the observation. 10
3. The "Inadvertence" Requirement
The Court's opinion in Coolidge imposes another condition on
"plain view" seizures-the discovery of the items must be "inad-
vertent." '' Noting first that the "plain view" doctrine does not
507. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
508. Id. at 467-68.
509. 484 F.2d at 355.
510. United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927), cited in Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 469 n.26 (1971).
511. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 469 (1971).
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"turn an initially valid (and therefore limited) search into a 'gen-
eral' one" and that the "inconvenience of procuring a warrant to
cover an inadvertent discovery is great,"5 2 the Court then stated:
But where the discovery is witicipated; where the po-
lice know in advance the location of the evidence and in-
tend to seize it, the situation is altogether different. The
requirement of a warrant to seize imposes no inconvenience
whatsoever, or at least none which is constitutionally cog-
nizable in a legal system that regards warrantless searches
as "per se unreasonable" in the absence of "exigent circum-
stances."51
3
The test for whether a discovery is anticipated is, apparently,
probable cause. Since probable cause is required to obtain a war-
rant, failure to procure a warrant should not invalidate a search
unless the warrant could have been procured. An interesting effect
of the "inadvertence" rule is that it tends to cast the parties in the
criminal case in unlikely roles-defense arguing that probable cause
did exist and the prosecution that it did not. While it may be true
that, as a factual matter, most "plain view" observations are
inadvertent, elevating'this fact to a requirement appears to ignore
certain long-standing elements of the "plain view" doctrine. Noth-
ing about "plain view" turns a limited search into a "general" one
since the police must always justify their presence at the vantage
point as being consistent with a purpose apart from any search for
the items so found. It may be that the police enter for a number of
purposes, for example, as in Coolidge, to effect arrest and to search
for a car. The search for the car, had it been the only purpose, would
fail because it was warrantless and no warrant exception (including
the traditional automobile exception of Carroll) was demonstrated.
If the arrest had been the only purpose (and finding the car truly
advertent), the observation and seizure would be permissible pro-
vided it occurred within the scope of the entry for, and effectuation
of, arrest. If an anticipated discovery is made within the scope of a
valid entry for arrest, there appears to be no reason to differentiate
it from the "inadvertent" discovery so made since both cases turn
on the validity of the arrest and not on the validity of the search of
512. Id. at 469-70.
513. Id. 470-71.
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the car. The Coolidge facts amply demonstrate that the car was not
merely in "plain view," but could not be missed by anyone even
casually on the premises. In some cases it may appear that a "plain
view" was contrived, but this would fail because the observation
really does not flow from the arrest,but from an active search for the
plain view items themselves under the pretext of arrest.
When evidence is discovered pursuant to a search incident to
arrest (that is, on the arrestee's person or within his immediate
control) the "inadvertence" of such discovery is not relevant accord-
ing to the Court." '1 It is not clear why "plain view" durifig arrest and
searches incident to arrest should be treated differently since both
depend on the validity of the arrest and the requirement that the
police conduct remain within carefully prescribed limits. Perhaps
one explanation for the requirement is a general fear of pretextual
entries, avowedly for one purpose, yet directed in fact at a warrant-
less search. Yet there are good reasons not to use a rule of "inad-
vertence" to deter such practices. First, since Chimel, the "pretext"
or "timed" arrest has lost much of its usefulness to the narrowing
of the incident search. Second, when a "pretext" or "timed" arrest
or search is conducted, courts will suppress the fruits for that reason
alone.5"5
Ultimately, the Coolidge "inadvertence" rule may not require
too much but rather too little. The opinion powerfully asserts the
need for a constitutionally dimensioned arrest warrant requirement
and expresses wonder that no such requirement exists.51 Yet the
Court once again refuses to announce such a rule notwithstanding
that it would be hard to contrive a fact situation more strongly
suggesting it.
Whatever the propriety of the "inadvertence" rule, it has had
little impact on lower courts. Many courts have rejected it and
upheld plain view seizure of anticipated items when the prosecution
could show "exigent circumstances" for the initial intrusion, stress-
ing that Coolidge dealt only with planned warrantless seizures.517
The Second Circuit has held that a warrantless arrest and search
514. Id. at 481-82.
515. See Section V A 4 supra.
516. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 473-84 (1971).
517. United States v. Lisznyai, 470 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1972).
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for anticipated items is permitted when the suspect gives signs of
leaving or removing the sought items.' Other courts have ignored
the inadvertence doctrine where seemingly applicable" 9 and the
California Supreme Court has refused to apply it, pointing out that
only four Justices joined in this section of the opinion.52
Because of a clear exception when any exigencies are shown, the
inadvertence rule would appear to be applicable only to arrests and
searches which are planned. In the search situation, since a warrant
would be required in such case, the inadvertence rule would apply
only to items which the police anticipated finding but failed to
include in the warrant. This would be a rare situation. This situa-
tion-arrest with no exigency and with anticipated plain view of
specified items-may be the only situation in which the rule of
"inadvertence" is significant. The only safe alternative for the po-
lice in such cases is to obtain a search warrant. An arrest warrant
is not enough since the arrest is most likely, valid without the war-
rant."
CONCLUSION
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court stated:
Of course, it would be nonsense to pretend that our
decision today reduces Fourth Amendment law to complete
order and harmony. The decisions of the Court over the
years point in differing directions and differ in emphasis.
No trick of logic will make them all perfectly consistent.522
The Court then quoted language of Justice Harlan directed at the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination noting it was
equally applicable to the fourth:
There are those, I suppose, who would put the "liberal con-
construction" approach of cases like Miranda and Boyd v.
United States, [citation omitted] side-by-side with the
balancing approach of Schmerber and perceive nothing
more subtle than a set of constructional antimonies to be
518. Id.
519. Ludlow v. State, __ Ind. -, 302 N.E.2d 838 (1973).
520. North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 502 P.2d 1305, 104 Cal. Rptr. 933 (1972).
521. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 484 (1971).
522. Id. at 483.
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utilized as convenient bootstraps to one result or another.
But I perceive in these cases the essential tension that
springs from the uncertain mandate which this provision of
the Constitution gives to this Court.5 2
The one certainty in the future of fourth amendment law is further
change resulting from the tension between "law and order" on the
one hand and the sanctity of the individual and his privacy on the
other with "reasonableness" the only ultimate guide. Nor is such
change, often criticized as "judicial legislation," improper even in
a constitutional setting, as the Framers must have intended, by
selecting "reasonable" as the crucial term, that this guarantee re-
flect contemporary attitudes.
In an age of race riots, youth rebellion, narcotics traffic running
wild, skyjacking and sensational kidnappings, it is understandable
that the hue and cry for law and order pulls at the fourth amend-
ment; yet police riots, the ugly specter of data banks and other
sophisticated information-gathering and co-ordinating techniques,
the prevalence of wiretapping and other surreptitious invasions of
privacy by those near the highest levels of government, and a perva-
sive feeling that one cannot "get away from it all" even temporarily,
all pull in the opposite direction. Thus, the tension increases, but
it continues. A working knowledge of the law of arrest, search and
seizure must begin with an understanding that all cases, all issues,
are ultimately the product of this tension.
523. Id. at 484.
19741
Berner: Search and Seizure: Status and Methodology
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1974
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 [1974], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol8/iss3/1
